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Abstract 
 
Arbitration is not just about economic and business efficiency, as its advocates 
argue, reducing the costs and delays associated with litigation. As I shall illustrate 
in this thesis, corporations have used arbitration reform as a means of 
restructuring the regulatory state in ways that suit their interests. Drawing on the 
legislative history of the Federal Arbitration Act, as well as on documents 
detailing the rise of the corporate arbitration lobby, I show how corporations have 
used arbitration reform as a means of enacting conservative political change by 
“non-political” means. This corporate legal mobilization is animated by a 
libertarian conception of private law in which government plays a minimal role in 
the oversight of business disputes. The dissertation traces the development of this 
corporate arbitration movement and shows how it is actively reshaping arbitration 
law to protect the “freedom of enterprise” from outward challenge or 
encroachment, with important implications for the state’s ability to monitor and 
govern corporate behavior. 
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Introduction 
 
 
Commercial arbitration is conventionally treated by its advocates as a private, 
contractual, non-adjudicative mechanism of dispute resolution that provides 
individuals and businesses with a faster, cheaper, and overall more efficient 
means of settling disputes than litigation in court.1  The point of arbitration is to 
allow the two disputing parties (one claimant, another respondent) to collectively 
appoint a neutral decision maker; an arbitrator (or panel of arbitrators), whose 
decision they agree to submit to in advance. In order to expedite proceedings, and 
to minimize procedural delays, the arbitrator’s decision is usually final and 																																																								
1 There is no universally recognized definition of commercial arbitration. 
 
 In the United States, the Federal Arbitration Act adopts a broad definition 
commercial arbitration. As Section 2 of the FAA states, “In any maritime 
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce, an 
agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration any existing or 
subsequent controversy is valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. In the 
absence of such a ground, the arbitration agreement is enforceable by the remedy 
of specific performance.” Edward Brunet, Richard E. Speidel, Jean R. Sternlight, 
and Stephen J. Ware. Arbitration Law in America (New York: Cambridge 
University Press: 2006): 343.  
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binding. Arbitral awards are rarely subject to review or appeal.  Disputes are duly 
settled and business can proceed as usual. 
 
While arbitration has historically been looked upon with suspicion by the courts, 
most liberal capitalist countries now have laws permitting parties to resolve 
disputes in private arbitration forums. This is especially true in the United States, 
where the last forty years have witnessed a proliferation of laws and policies 
encouraging the use of arbitration, a shift which has been accompanied by a boom 
in the arbitration services sector, today valued in the billions of dollars.2 The 
arbitration movement has been guided by the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration 
decisions. Beginning in the 1980s, and continuing to the present, the Court has 
interpreted the Federal Arbitration Act, the 1925 legislation that overturned 
judicial suspicion of arbitration, as manifesting a “liberal Federal policy favoring 																																																								2	For an excellent overview of the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence, 
see. Stephen L. Hayford "Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-
1995: A Sea Change." Wake Forest Law Review. 31 (1996): 1.  See also, Jodi 
Wilson "How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration 
Act." Case Western Reserve Law Review. 63 (2012): 91. Hiro N. Aragaki "The 
Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform." New York University Law 
Review. 89 (2014): 1939. Judith Resnik "Fairness in numbers: A comment on 
AT&T v. Concepcion, Wal-Mart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers." Harvard Law 
Review. 125 (2011): 78. Jean R. Sternlight "Panacea or Corporate Tool--
Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration." Washington 
University Law Quarterly. 74 (1996): 637. 
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arbitration”3 giving wide berth to parties to arbitrate a vast array of commercial 
disputes. Today, arbitration agreements are not only routinely enforced by 
American courts, but potential litigants are encouraged to use arbitration 
whenever possible. Judicial suspicion of arbitration, which was widespread in the 
early twentieth century, is now largely a thing of the past. Arbitration is widely 
seen to be an inexpensive and effective surrogate to litigation in US courts. 
Federal and state courts enforce arbitration awards unless they are procured by 
“corruption, fraud, or undue influence” or exhibit “manifest disregard” of the 
law.4  
 
This all might be read as a legal movement guided by the need to cut on legal 
costs. Still, it is important to point out that the view that arbitration is cheaper and 
faster than litigation is not new. Despite the frequency with which it appears in 
modern legal commentary, complaints about legal fees, sluggish judicial 
processes featured prominently in the promotional statements of early 20th century 																																																																																																																																																							
	
3 Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp. , 460 U.S. 1, 
24–5 (1983). 
4 United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as 
amended at 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–15 (2012)).  
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arbitration reformers, and can be traced as far back as the antebellum period.5  
Commercial arbitration’s promise to do away with formal legal proceedings 
appeals to a recurrent theme in American history; the desire to produce what 
Jerold Auerbach calls justice “without law”. The aim to peaceably resolve 
disputes without the paternalistic intervention or assistance of government, courts, 
or the legal profession, thereby allowing individuals to assert their freedom and 
autonomy.6  
 
In more recent times, efficiency (not just cost-cutting) has become the central 
justification for promoting arbitration law. Indeed, at present, the view that 
arbitration is more efficient than litigation could be said to form the basis of the 
contemporary arbitration movement’s “common-sense”. It is a view that is 																																																								5	As early as 1796, Massachusetts lawmaker Benjamin Austin could argue that 
“The 'order' of lawyers ... so far from being a 'necessary,' are in most cases a 
useless body. As the laws can be better executed without them; and as they are of 
late so rapidly increasing in all parts of the Commonwealth, ... it is become 
absolutely necessary, as we regard the welfare of the community, that the people 
direct their Representatives to lay before the Legislature, the present pernicious 
practice of this 'order,' that some measure may be adopted effectually to stop them 
in their dangerous progress.” Aaron T. Knapp "Law's Revolution: Benjamin 
Austin and the Spirit of ‘86." Yale Journal of Law and the Humanities. 25 (2013): 
277. 
	
6 See for example, Jerold S. Auerbach. Justice without law? (Oxford University 
Press, 1984). 
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seemingly taken to be self-evident by lawmakers, business officials, to the point 
of not requiring systematic exposition.  One doesn’t need to look far to gain a 
sense of the integral role the concept of efficiency plays in arbitration discourse. It 
is the main selling point of the arbitration industry. Private service providers like 
the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the International Center for 
Conflict Prevention (CPR), JAMS international, and the more recently founded 
Silicon Valley Arbitration and Mediation Center (SVAMC) seek to draw clients 
to their arbitration services by promising faster and cheaper resolutions to their 
disputes.7  At the 2014 Alternative Dispute Resolution Institute of Canada’s 
(ADRIC) annual meeting in Toronto, for example, representatives of London 
Court of International Arbitration spoke of the way their clients wait for years 
multi-year for their disputes to be heard in court. Arbitration, they attested, 
allowed their clients to significantly reduce, if not eliminate these wait times 																																																																																																																																																							
	
7  The Silicon Valley Arbitration and Mediation Center, a recently formed 
arbitration provider specializing in high-tech and aerospace disputes advertises to 
potential clients by warning them of the waste cause by high-stakes corporate 
litigation. “In recent years, bulging patent portfolios and multi-million dollar 
patent litigations have characterized the technology sector, especially the 
smartphone and tablet industry. Accumulating lawsuits between the world’s most 
prolific technology companies - Apple, Google, HTC, Microsoft, Motorola, 
Nokia and Samsung - span a multitude of courts and several continents.”  
“Android Wars,” SVAMC, accessed October 23rd 2017,https://svamc.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/ACC-Android-Wars-Sept-2014.pdf 
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altogether. Proponents of arbitration thus see themselves to be rendering a 
practical service to their clients, while at the same time remedying the public 
justice system’s shortcomings.  
 
Private service providers are not the only proponents of efficiency. Courts have 
also sponsored the view. Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court’s support for arbitration 
has been advanced under the premise that it is cheaper and more expeditious than 
litigation. As the late Justice Scalia reaffirmed in two important opinions, AT&T 
v. Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the 
purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act is to ensure that disputes can be arbitrated 
swiftly and cheaply, and to avoid what he called “procedural morass”.8 Although 
arbitration imperfectly recreates the formal rules of procedure available in federal 
and state courts, these procedural imperfections are seen as tolerable, and 
ultimately justifiable, because their effect is to greatly reduce the courts’ 
caseloads, and to allow disputants the chance to settle their disputes on their own.   
 																																																																																																																																																							
 
8 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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1. Explaining the Rise of Arbitration 
 
Arbitration practitioners, corporate lobbyists, major law firms and the U.S. 
Supreme Court have been vocal about their wishes to reduce the costs and delays 
of litigation, and to ensure that expediency and efficiency remain the central 
features of arbitration. And who could blame them? Nobody wants more 
litigation, nor does anyone appear to want dispute resolution services to be more 
costly and expensive. In fact, for many, litigation is something to be avoided at all 
costs. Anti-litigation attitudes permeate our culture, from the depiction of lawyers 
as “ambulance chasers” to the much hyped “frivolous lawsuit”, often condensed 
in mythic stories about our legal system, like the McDonald’s “hot coffee” case. 
This aversion to litigation has been a recurrent theme in American history and 
political discourse, and can be traced as far back as the colonial period. Indeed, 
some of America’s most distinguished statesmen have been detractors of 
litigation. In his 1850 Notes for a Law Lecture, Abraham Lincoln implored 
Americans, 
Discourage litigation. Persuade your neighbors to compromise whenever 
you can. Point out to them how the nominal winner is often a real loser — in 
fees, expenses, and waste of time. As a peacemaker the lawyer has a 
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superior opportunity of being a good man. There will still be business 
enough.9 
 
Lincoln’s comments are only mildly more verbose than the ideas one can find 
expressed in a brochure for a modern ADR services provider. Just as 19th century 
advocates of arbitration were wary of formal adjudication, today, litigation is 
more often than not associated with acrimony, unnecessary procedure, cost and 
delay. Indeed, in America, the connation of “litigation”, or a “litigious person” is 
usually a negative one. It often evokes a sense of unnecessary combativeness and 
appetite for conflict over dialogue and civility.10 Worse still, lawyers (the people 
who are most immediately associated with litigation) are often seen as fueling 
needless court battles for no other reason than to get paid as much as possible.11 In 																																																								9Abraham Lincoln, Notes for a Law Lecture, in The Complete Works of Abraham 
Lincoln II  (J. Nicolay & J. Hay ed. 1894): 142. 	 
	
10 Laura Nader. "Controlling Processes in the Practice of Law: Hierachy and 
Pacification in the Movement to Re-Form Dispute Ideology." Ohio State Journal 
on Dispute Resolution 9 (1993): 1. 
	
11 Marc Galanter’s work critically examines the discourse of “hyperlexis” that is 
often attributed to litigation in America. One determinant that stands out 
surrounding this discourse is the absence of, or the paucity of data in support of it. 
“The assertion that we engage in too much disputing and litigation implies two 
determinations: first, ascertainment of how much we have, and, second, 
establishment of how much is too much. What are the data from which such 
determinations can be made? Until recently there have been few attempts to 
measure the amount of contention and litigation. Although court statistics have 
been compiled for management use, they are incomplete.” Marc Galanter 
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light of these attitudes, it is unsurprising that arbitration would be welcomed as a 
reasonable compromise between informal settlement and full-blown litigation in 
court. Perhaps most importantly, nobody is obliged to submit to arbitration if they 
do not wish to.  The pro-arbitration policy agenda is seen to produce a “win-win” 
scenario; nobody is actually denied their right to a fair trial, but those who wish to 
voluntarily opt out litigation in favor of privately-run proceedings can do so if 
they wish.   
 
These justifications for arbitration reform are appealing at face value, but they 
conceal a much broader private restructuring of the American state, and a very 
important modification of “the legal institutions of capitalism”, to borrow a term 
from John Commons. Underlying the common-sense view that arbitration is more 
efficient than litigation is a politically charged process involving corporations, 
lawmakers and lobbyists who are vying to reshape the American legal system in 
ways that benefit their own interests. 
 																																																																																																																																																							
"Reading the landscape of disputes: What we know and don't know (and think we 
know) about our allegedly contentious and litigious society." UCLA Law 
Review. 31 (1983): 3. 
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 Arbitration reform, I claim, is integral to the transformation of adjudication The 
reason for this is that for all its purported values of voluntariness, dialogue, and 
informality, arbitration ultimately involves binding decisions supported by state 
power. Moreover, these decisions are of regulatory significance because they 
determinately impact the social obligations to which business are subject. 
Arbitration is matter of power, not just because it empowers private citizen 
arbitrators, but because it alters the parameters of the state’s authority, the 
dimensions of the regulatory state and the application of coercive force more 
generally. 
 
The shifts of power engendered by contemporary arbitration reform, however, are 
either denied, or when they are acknowledged, taken to be a pale reflection of the 
powers commanded by the courts. In the domains of law, political science and 
political theory, arbitration law has not been subject to the same rigorous 
theoretical scrutiny that are the norm in federal and state led adjudication, 
international law and constitutional law. This lack of theoretical grounding, 
however, does not mean that arbitration law is not important.  
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I want to argue that arbitration reform is a potent means of effectuating political 
change, not least because it allows corporate disputants to use contractual 
agreements to divert conflict to private channels that are far less subject to public 
oversight and common-law rules than litigation in court. This political and 
regulatory potency is reinforced by the fact that since arbitration is private, not 
public, it has the semblance of being a step’s remove from elections, political 
parties, and legislative enactments and executive decrees, the institutions and 
processes that are typically subject to much closer political analysis. Changes to 
arbitration law are seen to be much less politically suspect than other areas of 
policy-making.  
 
I challenge the conventionally accepted belief that the arbitration movement is 
driven by economic efficiency, and the concomitant assumption that arbitration is 
itself politically inconspicuous. The history of arbitration is richer than that. It 
involves powerful social forces vying to shape the legitimate parameters of state 
power. Presently, arbitration reform is being used as a form of political capture 
that is being advanced by a broad coalition of business lobbyists, jurists, and pro-
arbitration think tanks, all of whom wish to ensure that the courts are “safe for 
business”. This is to say that arbitration reform is not merely about reducing the 
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costs and delays of litigation, but a politically transformative process that has 
radically changed the way law is used to govern corporate behavior, including, 
but not limited to issues involving employment rights, consumer rights, anti-trust 
claims, environmental damages, intellectual property claims and shareholder 
derivative suits. Since all of these issues have some bearing on the greater public 
interest and the integrity of the U.S. legal system, not to mention the distribution 
in society at large, we need a broader view of arbitration law that links the 
corporate pursuit of profit with the Rule of Law.12 Arbitration is not just a 
technical means of resolving conflicts between individuals, it is a reform 
movement that is effectuating a sea change in the way society “names, blames and 
claims” through its institutions of dispute resolution.13  The powers that are 
attributed to arbitrators, and the strategic behaviors that arbitration law enables 
(corporate) disputants to pursue need to brought to light and theorized in 
relationship to the neo-liberal reorganization of the regulatory state that have 
dominated the economic policy agenda of the last four decades. 																																																								
12  Gregory C. Shaffer "How Business shapes law: A socio-legal 
Framework." Connecticut Law Review. 42 (2009): 147. 
	
13 William L. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel, and Austin Sarat. "The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming..." Law and society 
review (1980): 631-654. 
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To do this, I locate the power of arbitration in relation to the history of the welfare 
state over the twentieth century. Specifically, the study focuses on the making of 
the Federal Arbitration Act and on the parallel development of the private 
arbitration service sector, where many of the practical effects of arbitration policy 
can be identified. Contextualizing the rise of arbitration historically enables me to 
highlight the intimate relationship between business power and contemporary 
justice reform that more technical and doctrinal studies overlook. Arbitration 
reform needs to be understood in the context of the business practices it emerges 
in response to, as well as the over-arching regulatory state it is ineluctably part of.  
 
 While arbitration is an active site of legal transformation in many countries, 
including my own country, Canada, I have chosen to focus on the United States 
because of its leading role in promoting arbitration reform, as well as its centrality 
as a global economic power. Owing to the magnitude of its economic and 
geopolitical power ; the U.S is generally accepted to be a very important shaper of 
the international legal system.14 The United States’ exerts an important influence 																																																								
14 Many commentators identify the United States as a leader in global legal 
practices. See. Terence Halliday, and Bruce Carruthers. Bankrupt: global 
lawmaking and systemic financial crisis. Stanford University Press, 2009. See 
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on the international arbitration system, for example. Section 2 of the Federal 
Arbitration Act (a piece of national legislation) plays a critical role in the 
international system law by setting out the parameters for the enforcement of 
arbitral awards in U.S. courts.  
 
The size of the United States legal market also means that it is an important 
shaper of arbitration practices. America is home to major arbitration service 
providers including the American Arbitration Association (and its international 
wing, the International Center for Dispute Resolution), JAMS, and the 
International Center for Conflict Prevention, not to mention hundreds of specialty 
service providers targeting domestic and international business disputes. 
 
Finally, the U.S. corporations still, although to a declining degree, dominate 
international commerce. The dispute resolution practices that they adopt have a 
major influence on global business culture. Thus, while arbitration law is popular 																																																																																																																																																							
also, Kelemen, R. Daniel, and Eric C. Sibbitt. "The globalization of American 
law." International Organization 58, no. 1 (2004): 103-136. Leo Panitch and 
Martijn Konings, eds. American empire and the political economy of global 
finance. Springer, 2008. 
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many countries, the convergence of political, economic, and ideological forces in 
the U.S. make it an ideal subject for a study of the relationship between corporate 
power and arbitration law. 
 
It is very common to separate the study of domestic arbitration from international 
arbitration. Even though I believe the case for separating these practices is often 
overstated, this study focuses mainly on domestic institutions and national policy 
formation to the relative neglect of international developments. Nevertheless, 
there are a number of important points of overlap between international and 
domestic arbitration. There are critical commonalities between the institutions, 
actors, and ideologies that comprise the domestic and international arbitration 
systems. To enumerate just a few examples, the doctrine of party-autonomy, the 
framework which informs virtually all contract-based arbitration, is critical to 
both domestic and international and arbitration. There is also institutional 
crossover between domestic and international arbitration institutions at the level 
of service provision. For instance, the American Arbitration Association, which is 
usually treated as a hub of domestic arbitration, has its own international wing, 
the International Center for Dispute Resolution, a major player in the international 
arbitration services market, but they are unified as one organization. And 
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importantly, the arbitrators and lawyers who work in domestic arbitration often 
“graduate” to the high stakes world of international arbitration. Thus, while there 
are important distinctions between international and domestic arbitration, an 
analysis of the development of U.S. arbitration law can help shed light on the 
interests and ideas at play in the international arbitration system.  
 
A recurring point of focus in this study is the way that corporations seek to 
effectuate political change by “non-political” means. Contracts, not necessarily 
legislation, are the primary mechanisms through which disputes are resolved in 
arbitration. But contracts can be powerful mechanisms of shaping social behavior.  
This reflects the influence of American legal realism on my thinking. As the 
realists brilliantly illustrated, private law mechanisms, which ostensibly have their 
basis in contract, are not typically associated with what the liberal political 
tradition identifies as “power”. As the realists showed as early as the 1920s, 
however, the apolitical status of contract law was largely an illusion. Contracts, 
which were traditionally demarcated as private, and thus separate from politics, 
often doubled as mechanisms of political and distributional power. Contracts 
between workers and employers, for example, had the appearance of being 
negotiated on equal terms, but they concealed the unequal application of the 
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state’s power to enforce these same contracts, acts which they ultimately saw as 
betraying the state’s purported distributional neutrality.15 Through their rejection 
of the legal formalist analysis that dominated the Lochner era, which they accused 
of being abstract and divorced from material relations of political-economic force, 
the realists wanted to focus on “law in action”, and in so doing, to challenge the 
Lochner era’s laissez-faire distinction between what was “political” and what was 
“commercial”.  
 
Although it is a dated school of thought, the realist paradigm can yield important 
insights into the dynamics governing contemporary arbitration system.  Whereas 
arbitration is normally seen as an apolitical mechanism that it is at a step’s remove 
from political parties, legislatures, and even courts (which are often accused of 
carrying out politically driven agendas), it is in reality, a very important institution 
of power that has the ability to tilt the balance of adjudicative power between 
groups in society like business, consumers, workers, regulators, public watchdog 
groups and courts. This is especially important in a litigious society like America, 
in which adjudication is often argued to play a disproportionately important role 																																																								
15 See, Louis L. Jaffe "Law making by private groups." Harvard  Law Review 51 
(1937): 201. See also, Robert Lee Hale "Coercion and distribution in a supposedly 
non-coercive state." Political Science Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1923): 470-494. 
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in balancing relationships between government, business, and individuals. 16 
While many have been suspicious of arbitration because it allows businesses to 
manipulate the terms of a contract in their favor, there has been much less focus 
on the way arbitration reform has been used as a vehicle of state building.  
 
Arbitration is not just about asymmetric bargaining, but about the privatization of 
key areas of American justice, thereby increasing business control over the legal 
system. Corporations are using arbitration reform as a way of enacting 
conservative political changes to the justice system that effectively shield them 
from unwanted lawsuits, government oversight, and public control. Corporate 
lobby groups have used the pretext of making litigation “less costly” to diminish 
their exposure to specific kinds unwanted litigation, and then again, to kinds of 
procedural formalism associated with it (documentary discovery, common-law 
precedent) that they have often viewed as an anathema to their interests. Whereas 
there have been liberal conceptions of arbitration law that sought to expand 
ordinary citizens access to legal services, and to promote procedural justice 
reform, the contemporary corporate movement focuses almost exclusively on the 																																																																																																																																																							
	
16 See for example Sean Farhang. The litigation state: public regulation and 
private lawsuits in the US. Princeton University Press, 2010. 
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freedom on contract and the freedom of enterprise. This interpretation of 
arbitration law, I claim, conceals a neo-conservative view of society in which the 
use of legislation, administrative law, social policy and collective struggle are 
seen to interfere with the natural order of the free-market. The current vision of 
arbitration law, as it is being advanced by the U.S. Supreme Court and the 
business arbitration lobby, downplays public policy and the history of using law 
as a means of progressive social change, and instead elevates the values of 
“market civilization” in which business (read, corporations) determine which 
social obligations (if any), they ought to be subject to.  
 
In this broader theoretical context, the periodization of arbitration reform is 
illuminating. Students of the history of political-economy cannot help but take 
stock of the fact that the two most active periods of arbitration reform in twentieth 
century, the 1920s and the 1980s, coincide with periods of increasing corporate 
power, accompanied by greater faith in free-markets, the privatization of public 
services, as well as business efforts to insulate their activities from encroaching 
government regulation. There is a story to be told here about the relationship 
between arbitration and neo-liberal politics that has not been given sufficient 																																																																																																																																																							
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attention in the arbitration literature, nor in the broader political-economy 
literature.17 As I shall show, arbitration reform cannot be dissociated from the 
politics of privatization that are associated with neo-liberal economic reforms that 
recast and in fact intensify the laissez-faire dogma that was prevalent in the 1920s. 
There are important points of overlap between the  politics of deregulation and the 
dynamics that drive firms to embrace private alternatives to court. Such reforms 
not only involve the privatization of adjudication, but the development of a 
doctrine, now embraced by the U.S. Supreme Court, that arbitration is ultimately 
about “the freedom of contract”, and that most efforts to impose greater public 
oversight on the process amount to a betrayal of one’s individual liberty and a 
arbitrary limitation on the freedom of enterprise.  
 																																																								
17 Amy Cohen, Ugo Mattei and Laura Nader’s work have identified the focus on 
individuality, autonomy, and privately-led initiatives in the ADR movement as 
engendering a form of neo-liberal politics. Cohen, Amy J. "Dispute Systems 
Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale." Harvard Negotiation Law 
Review. 14 (2009): 51. Mattei, Ugo, and Laura Nader. Plunder: when the rule of 
law is illegal. John Wiley & Sons, 2008. 
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2. Arbitral Control 
 
So far, I have spoken about the structure of American arbitration law. But the 
political-economic transformation that I am identifying is not only occurring at 
the level of law and legislation, it also permeates arbitration practice. Arbitration 
practice is itself being developed in ways that allow corporations to gain strategic 
disputing advantages, often with important distributional consequences.  
 
Consider what arbitration commentators routinely refer to as control; the powers 
that parties may exercise over the arbitration process. In the broader arbitration 
literature, control usually refers to a property of commercial arbitration, as though 
it were a natural feature of arbitration practice itself. Indeed, control is used as a 
catch-all term that encompasses virtually all of the features arbitration procedure 
including the appointment of the arbitrator, the ability to choose institutional 
rules, the choice of location (the situs) of the arbitration, as well as the ability to 
guarantee the confidentiality and privacy of the arbitration process.18  																																																								
18 The concept of control features prominently in arbitration textbooks, but is 
usually loosely defined. Lisa Bingham, drawing on Robert Fisher and William 
Ury’s popular conception of Dispute System Design emphasizes two separate 
aspects of control; party self-determination and control over the arbitration 
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These control mechanisms may appear inherently desirable, but their value and 
function is rendered more clearly when they are compared to the relative absence 
of control available to parties in court, not to mention the comparative ease with 
which arbitration agreements are enforced.  
 
In some ways, the “strategic” value of arbitration is obvious. Adjudication in 
courts of law, at least in the United States, is associated with broad powers of 																																																																																																																																																							
process. As she writes, “Control over dispute-system design includes making 
choices regarding which cases are subject to the process, which process or 
sequential processes are available (mediation, early neutral evaluation, or binding 
arbitration, for example), which due process rules apply, and other structural 
aspects of a private justice system. Control at the case level includes the process 
and outcome, such as whether within a discrete dispute the process results in a 
voluntary, negotiated settlement agreement or an imposed, binding, third-party 
decision.” Bingham, Lisa B. "Control over dispute-system design and mandatory 
commercial arbitration." Law and Contemporary Problems 67, no. 1/2 (2004): 
222. 
 
The strategic application of arbitral control is also emphasized by David Lipsky 
and Ronald Seeber in their 1997 survey of practices employed by Fortune 500 
general counsel. As they write, “…many corporations believe the American 
system of civil justice in the 1990s is out of control. One of the foremost trends in 
corporate America in recent years has been the shift from traditional litigation and 
agency resolution of disputes toward the use of alternative dispute resolution 
(ADR).” David B. Lipsky, Ronald L. Seeber. "In search of control: The corporate 
embrace of ADR." University of Pennsylvania Journal of Labor & Employment 
Law. 1 (1997): 133. 
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documentary discovery (enabling them to recuperate e-mails, correspondence, 
written records and financial data), jury trials, appellate review, and mechanisms 
enabling participation for third parties like expert witnesses and indirectly 
affected parties. These features of litigation are mechanisms designed to elevate 
the quality of the judicial decision, and to ensure that the ruling is made 
impartially and fairly. They increase the gradation of truth attributed to the 
decision. Arbitration, to be sure, may be very rigorously formal, but it is seen to 
be less formalistic that adjudication. Discovery may be curtailed, there is 
generally little room for appeal of the arbitrator’s decision, there are no juries, and 
third parties are generally barred from participating in the process. These 
conditions ostensibly exist to accelerate the judicial process, but they also enable 
judicial avoidance strategies that may have important regulatory effects.  These 
regulatory avoidance strategies, I claim, are the less often registered effect of 
arbitral control. They only make sense if we think of them in the context of the 
broader history of business dispute resolution, and the regulatory and adjudicative 
powers exercised by the welfare state. The power of arbitration thus needs to be 
contextualized and understood in relation to the concrete actors who use it. 
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Control, as Max Weber aptly illustrated in his works, is not a natural or inherent 
property of any institution or authority as such, it is a socially constructed and 
historically mediated practice. This is true of all institutions of power, and it is 
certainly true of arbitration. Despite the fact that modern arbitration practices are 
compared to medieval merchant practices,  not all legal orders have given parties 
the same degree of control over arbitration, nor have they enforced arbitration 
agreements in the same way. Moreover, the range and variety of disputes that are 
subject to arbitral have changed. Many areas of litigation that were once seen to 
be too complex to leave to arbitrators like class-actions and anti-trust suits are 
now routinely subject to their rule. Likewise, it has not always been the case that 
corporations were given such great latitude to design the terms by which their 
contractual and statutory disputes would be adjudicated.  
 
The history of political economy has an important lesson to teach here. The 
relations of control that arbitration enables only make sense if we situate them in 
relation to available alternatives of dispute resolution, and the political and 
constitutional regimes that have historically sustained them. Moreover, the way 
that businesses use arbitral control mechanisms clearly have an impact on their 
broader ability to navigate their legal environment. Negative publicity, class-
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actions, judicial inquiries, and embarrassing lawsuits may all diminish a firm’s 
ability to turn a profit. Instead of asking whether or not control mechanisms are in 
fact available in arbitration, we should think about the disputing behaviors that 
control mechanisms enable, and the strategic purposes to which they are set.  
 
The meaning and substance of arbitral control also seems to be highly “user 
dependent”. While it is true that arbitration control mechanisms can be exercised 
by anyone who enters into an arbitration agreement (and arbitration is indeed used 
in a wide number of disputing contexts), corporations and commercial interests 
historically have been, and remain some of the most active users of arbitration 
practices. Corporations have been active in defining and developing the practices 
and played a major role in shaping arbitration law itself. The types of conflict that 
corporations deem most important, as I shall illustrate in the development of the 
arbitration lobbies in the 1920s and 1980s critically inform the history of 
arbitration.  
 
Why have corporations, apart from being important commercial actors, been so 
heavily involved in the development of arbitration law? In an advanced capitalist 
economy in which multinational corporations constitute the principal 
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organizations of trade and investment, the ability to control the outcomes of legal 
conflict is very important. Corporations have unique disputing problems that do 
not beset other actors. As Joel Rogers and Terence Dunworth illustrated in their 
work on the history of business disputing in America, corporations litigate more, 
more often, (and appear to win more) than any other classification of disputant in 
the United States.19 This is true of both federal and state courts. They also spend 
more on litigation than any organized group in the country. For such actors, 
litigation is not an “occasion” or aberration from normalcy, it is a matter of 
structural routine. Litigation is integral many corporations entire business model. 
In fact, for some companies that aggressively pursue mergers or intellectual 
property litigation, “litigation” may be said to constitute their main way of 
making profit. Similarly, companies like Apple, Uber, Wal-Mart, Air BnB, and 
Amazon litigate constantly, they employ a wide variety of dispute resolution 
processing tactics with contractors, employees, “associates”, suppliers and 
consumers. Greater control over such conflict creates the possibility of engaging 
in a series of strategic disputing behaviors that reduce the likelihood that disputes 
will escalate into what litigators have referred to as “litigation warfare”; 																																																								
19 Terence Dunworth and Joel Rogers. "Corporations in court: Big Business 
litigation in US federal courts, 1971–1991." Law & Social Inquiry 21, no. 3 
(1996): 560. 
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protracted, acrimonious, and what may seem to be ultimately wasteful legal 
conflict that sap firms’ resources, can lead to unwanted negative publicity, and 
which may sever business relationships.20 From a political-economy angle, what 
is important to seize here is that these relationships also have to do with issues of 
distributional consequence.   
 
I want to show how arbitral control changes depending on who is using it, and for 
what purpose, and how this figures in the broader political-economy of the 
American state. This study argues that the organizational size and wealth of the 
actors involved in arbitration matters, as does the broader political-economic 
setting in which arbitration reform is being waged. If we wish to understand the 
true meaning of contemporary arbitration reform, we need to have a sense of the 
strategic motivations that corporations have sought to enact, and the broader 																																																																																																																																																							
	
20 As Jonathan Molot writes “Corporate America, in particular, complains that 
litigation is too expensive, time consuming, and unpredictable.” Jonathan Molot 
"A market in litigation risk."  The University of Chicago Law Review (2009): 
367. Corporations often complain of their exposure to litigation, particularly 
regulatory litigation. Joanna Chung. “Flood of investor legal actions set to hit 
peak.” Financial Times October 21, 2008 Retrieved from 
http://ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/250
137440?accountid=15182 Alison Smith.  “Fear of litigation cited for US 
companies' reluctance to disclose.”  Financial Times April 6, 2011 Retrieved from 
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effects of the privatization of adjudication. This is not to say that corporations are 
the only actors involved in arbitration reform; organized labor for example, has 
also played an important role in shaping American arbitration law. But over the 
last forty years, corporate lobby groups led the charge in shaping the policy 
agenda. They have formed groups like the Center for Conflict Prevention and the 
Business Roundtable to promote the use of mandatory arbitration clauses in 
consumer and employment contracts, and they have sought to develop arbitration 
systems for disputes that previously were deemed too complex, or important, for 
arbitral tribunals. This is true of anti-trust disputes, defense contracts, high-tech 
disputes, and intellectual property disputes amongst others. In addition, there are 
an increasing number of private arbitration service providers that who serve 
corporations exclusively. In both of the most recent arbitration decisions made by 
the U.S Supreme Court, corporate lobby groups wrote amicus briefs in favor of 
AT&T and American Express from the perspective of what they viewed as 																																																																																																																																																							
http://ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/login?url=http://search.proquest.com/docview/860
327308?accountid=15182 
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policies that might usurp the future of American arbitration by making unsafe for 
business.21  
 
My focus on the corporate lobby’s influence in judicial privatization and 
arbitration reform is meant to supplement the existing literature on arbitration and 
ADR reform more largely. Scholars like Owen Fiss, Judith Resnik, Jean 
Sternlight, Bryant Garth and more recently, Sarah Staszak have illustrated some 
of the policy effects of relying on privately-led judicial reform initiatives, and 
dilution of the legal system’s public values associated with them.22 Similarly, in 																																																								
 21 In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, virtually all of the amicus briefs filed in 
favour of the petitioner (AT&T) were written by pro-corporate think tanks and 
business associations. In the brief of the American Bankers Association, for 
example, the American Financial Services Association, the Consumer Bankers 
Association, the Financial Services Roundtable, and the California Bankers 
Association, they claimed that a California court’s invalidation of a class-action 
waiver would “invalidate the overwhelming majority of arbitration agreements, 
which provide for individual arbitration and disallow class proceedings.” Brief of 
Amici Curiae American Bankers Association, American Financial Services 
Association, Consumer Bankers Association, Financial Services Roundtable and 
California Bankers Association in Support of Petitioner, p. 3, AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
22 Fiss, Owen M. "Against settlement." Yale Law Journal 93 (1983): 1073. Judith 
Resnik. "Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the Private 
in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights." Yale Law Journal 124 (2014): 2804. 
Sternlight, Jean R. "Panacea or Corporate Tool - Debunking the Supreme Court's 
Preference for Binding Arbitration." Washington University Law Quarterly 74 
(1996): 637. Garth, Bryant G. "Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic 
		 	
	 30	
the international sphere, scholars like Claire Cutler, Robert Wai, Horatia Muir 
Watt and Gus Van Harten have illustrated the shifts of power taking place through 
the increasing importance of arbitral tribunals in investment conflict.23 In the 
Canadian public policy setting, Trevor Farrow’s work illustrates the often skewed 
form of justice produced by ADR practices, and suggests pathways for reform.24 
By bringing corporations back into the frame of national policy discussion, I wish 
to raise awareness about the divergent uses and motivations for arbitration reform, 
as well as to challenge the still prevalent view that arbitration reform is a force in 
the service of progressive politics and efficiency. 
 																																																																																																																																																							
Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution." Georgia State 
University Law Review. 18 (2001): 927. Staszak, Sarah. No day in court: Access 
to justice and the politics of judicial retrenchment. Oxford University Press, 2014. 
 
23 Claire A., Cutler. Private power and global authority: transnational merchant 
law in the global political economy. Vol. 90. Cambridge University Press, 2003. 
Horatia Muir Watt. "The contested legitimacy of investment arbitration and the 
human rights ordeal." (2012). Van Harten, Gus. "Arbitrator behaviour in 
asymmetrical adjudication: an empirical study of investment treaty 
arbitration." Osgoode Hall Law Journal 50 (2012): 211. Wai, Robert. 
"Transnational liftoff and juridicial touchdown: the regulatory function of private 
international law in an era of globalization." Columbia Journal of Transnational 
Law. 40 (2001): 209. 
	24	Trevor CW Farrow. Civil justice, privatization, and democracy. University of 
Toronto Press, 2014. 
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3. Is Arbitration Efficient? 
The question of efficiency is integral to the contemporary pro-arbitration policy 
agenda. The most prevalent defense of arbitration is that it is not only cheaper and 
faster litigation, but that it creates second-order efficiency gains for society as 
whole. According to the proponents of the efficiency hypothesis like Gillian 
Hadfield and Lawrence Ribstein, when business disputants resort to arbitration, 
they spare the courts of unnecessary litigation, they increase the speed of legal 
service delivery, and they place downward pressure on legal costs.  
 
I challenge this set of propositions. The idea that business use arbitration because 
it is more efficient than litigation, while elegant as an axiom, is unsatisfactory as 
an historic explanation for why the use of arbitration has proliferated. From the 
outset, there are insufficient data to evaluate whether or not cost and time savings 
have in fact been the main driver of arbitration reform. There is not enough data 
on the use of arbitration that would permit such a wide sweeping evaluation to be 
made. Most of the evidence presented in favor of the efficiency relies on 
interviews with corporate managers and general counsel. Moreover, this claim is 
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complicated by an increasing number of complaints that arbitration is becoming 
exactly like litigation; formal, rigid, and expensive.25 
 
These are only some of the empirical grounds to be skeptical about arbitration’s 
superior efficiency. But claims about arbitration’s improvements to the legal 
system are in my view, even more importantly theoretically incomplete both as 
historical explanations and as broader conceptions of justice. As works like those 
of Ian Macneil, Katherine Stone, Jerold Auerbach, Bryant Garth and Yves 
Dezalay have shown, the history of arbitration is richer than a striving for cheaper 
and faster dispute resolution but in fact involves an entire constellation of social 
actors including judges, lawmakers, retired legal professionals, businesses and 
trade associations seeking to reform the legal process with rival conceptions of 
justice. Moreover, using efficiency as a criterion for judging the effectiveness of 
any legal system seems to relegate core features of democratic lawmaking like 
fairness, representation, impartiality and rationality to a secondary role. Even if 
these substantive matters of justice are being cast aside in pursuit of efficiency, it 																																																								25	David	 Lipsky and Ronald Seeber’s study found an increasing number of 
executives and counsel voicing the complaint that arbitration was becoming more 
like litigation, formalized, costly, and sluggish. David B. Lipskey and Ronald L. 
Seeber. "In search of control: The corporate embrace of ADR." University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Law and Public Policy 1 (1997): 133. 
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is still necessary to theorize how arbitration fits into the broader fabric of 
constitutional democracy. 
 
The efficiency thesis also faces limitations as an explanation for arbitration’s 
increased popularity. It may be true that arbitration main appeal has been its 
promise to make the justice system more efficient, but this leaves out many other 
features of the arbitration system. For starters, arbitration involves the creation of 
a privately administered legal system in which arbitrators and corporate officials 
(not judges) determine what is just. It involves binding decisions made by 
commercial arbitrators, the deployment of powers of decision making that are 
normally attributed to public officials, not to mention the “sanctification” of such 
judgments as legitimate expressions of justice. Efficiency can be used as a 
criterion to evaluate the effects of this movement, but it tells us very little about 
the quality and substance of justice that these actors are involved in producing.  
 
Moreover, from the point of view of the disputants, arbitration involves a wide 
array of strategic disputing activities including the concealment of private 
information, the re-location of dispute to strategically favorable jurisdictions, and 																																																																																																																																																							
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the selection of arbitrators who are more likely to render a favorable ruling. These 
relations of power cannot be satisfactorily explained by efficiency. They need to 
be theorized as serious expressions of a political theory, even if that political 
theory is more obliquely expressed than more familiar and immediately 
observable ideologies like liberalism, conservatism, populism and nationalism. 
Since arbitration involves the creation of a privately run, privately financed 
system of adjudication, any analysis of arbitration has to begin with an evaluation 
of its broader social significance as a social system, not just its ability to resolve 
discretely conceived disputes. Greater attention needs to be paid to the difference 
between public and private power, not the least because corporations constitute 
some of the most important users of the contemporary ADR system.  
 
4. From Arbitration Reform to the Corporatization of Arbitration 
 
Corporations and business groups have been very important actors in the 
arbitration reform movement, and they have mobilized a set of justifications and 
arguments to advance their agenda. One of the most commonly deployed 
arguments in favor of arbitration is that there has been a “litigation explosion”, a 
snowballing of various forms of litigation, including frivolous litigation, that can 
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easily be done away with by promoting institutions of alternative dispute 
resolution and settlement.26 Reformers use tropes like these to justify legal forms 
that radically expand the range of commercial disputes that may be arbitrated, 
while in the same stroke delimiting public oversight on the arbitration system. 
What these proponents do not say is that arbitration reform involves radical 
transformations in the powers of the courts and the state to regulate corporate 
behavior. For all its claims of being dialogic, informal and voluntary, arbitration 
reform is ultimately about the deployment (or non-deployment) of state power.  
 
This involves a paradox. On the one hand, arbitration reform involves a very 
active role on the part of the state. On the other, it involves judicial and regulatory 
restraint from interfering too much in the arbitration process. This dual movement 
often leads to contradictory formulations and policy proposals. For example 
proponents of arbitration like to imagine that arbitration is market-led, demand 
driven, and relative removed from government oversight. But they have also 
lobbied aggressively to ensure that the state does not enact reforms that would 
place limitations on the use of arbitration in consumer and employment settings. 																																																								
26  Leo A. Levine, and Denise D. Colliers. "Containing the Cost of 
Litigation." Rutgers Law Review 37 (1984): 219. 
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They have also sought to ensure that regulators and civil-society groups do not 
interfere in the “stateless” domain of arbitration. Following the insights of Karl 
Polanyi, it seems as though creating a private economic sphere requires a lot of 
state planning. 
 
Much of this policy reform is couched in the rhetoric of progressive values. 
Making arbitration available is seen to improve the quality of justice available to 
disputants. But this corporate legal mobilization, underscored by supportive U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions, has little to do with the aspirations that animated 
progressive arbitration reformers like Julius Cohen and Louis Brandeis in the 
early 20th century, or then again the community activists that embraced the 
alternative dispute resolution movement of the 1980s as means of extending legal 
services to underrepresented groups. What is emerging today is a corporate 
movement that reflects the structural interests and managerial systems of the 
nation’s largest business corporations, and their desire to control the litigation 
landscape.  
 
The active role that corporations have taken in advancing arbitration reform is 
concealed by a universalizing discourse of arbitrators, scholars and jurists that 
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makes it seem like arbitration is a demand-led consumer movement, and 
moreover, that it benefits all members of society equally. In reality arbitration 
reform has been a political project of a relatively small array of business lobby 
groups, jurists, think tanks and scholars. As Austin Sarat pointed out in 1984, 
speaking of court reform generally. 
Court reform is not one of those issues that galvanize or energize visible 
widespread public sentiment. Court reform and court reform efforts are 
almost exclusively the concern of a restricted group of judges, 
professional court administrative personnel, selected law professors at 
predominantly elite law schools, leaders of the organized bar, and a rather 
small group of state and federal legislators.27 
 
This statement is as true of arbitration reform as it is of court reform generally. 
Arbitration reform continues to be spoken about in terms of its benefits to 
consumers and workers, not to the giant corporations who have been active in 
organizing and financing the arbitration movement. In fact, one of the facts that 
struck me most over the course of this research project was that, although 
commercial arbitration conferences are attended by corporate litigators, 
international arbitrators who preside over contract dispute valued in the hundreds 
of millions of dollars, trade officials and a whole series of business auxiliaries like 																																																								
27 Austin Sarat. "The litigation explosion, access to justice, and court reform: 
examining the critical assumptions." Rutgers Law Review 37 (1984): 320. 
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accountants, economists, and academics, seldom are “corporations” mentioned at 
in arbitration discourse or the arbitration literature at all. The agents of the 
arbitration system, as well as arbitration practice manuals speak of “parties”, 
“interests”, “claimants” and “respondents”, but virtually never of the structural 
properties that characterize the global business giants whose disputes they 
administer. The discourse of arbitration and ADR is anti-sociological in the sense 
that it does not consider differences of power, market-share, institutional size, 
scale, or wealth as legitimate categories of analysis. The following chapters 
positively identify the corporation’s influence on the arbitration system by more 
closely examining the dimensions of wealth, political power, and business 
lobbying that have found expression in the arbitration reform movement.28  
 
5. Bringing the Corporation Back In 
 																																																								
28 The anti-sociological nature of litigation discourse is underscored by Owen 
Fiss. “Dispute resolution depicts a sociologically impoverished universe, one that 
does not account for social groups and bureaucratic institutions. There is no room 
in the story for the sociological entities that are so familiar to contemporary 
litigation.” Owen Fiss "The social and political foundations of adjudication." Law 
and Human Behavior 6, no. 2 (1982): 122. 
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The structural cleavages that I am identifying are important to parse out if we are 
to make sense of the many policy goals advocated by proponents of the arbitration 
movement. The arbitration system enables the strategic pursuit of specific 
disputing tactics, while discouraging others. The abstract and axiomatic nature of  
arbitration discourse should not blind us to the fact that corporations have been 
very active in advancing arbitration reform to enact regulatory changes that 
advance their particular interests. Nor should it blind us to the constellation of 
jurists, business managers, and intellectuals who are advancing the free-market 
model of arbitration. 
 
One major contributor to the perceived legitimacy of the arbitration reform 
movement is that inter-business disputes, unlike disputes between individuals and 
business, or investment disputes between states and business, involve voluntary 
relationships between equals. This makes it seem like arbitration is inconspicuous 
– its effects do not spill over to those who are not immediately involved in the 
dispute. The power exercised in the arbitrator’s decision seems to be delimited to 
the two disputants in question, and not to place anyone’s interests at stake. This is 
arguably not the case in high-stakes investment arbitrations, in which the interests 
of the general public make be implicated when a state is ordered to pay damages 
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to a host corporation. In fact, most people do not seem to think it is a matter of 
public concern whether two corporations litigate or arbitrate their contractual 
relationships at all. It is uncommon to attribute political relevance to the fact that 
two corporations, say Kraft Foods and Starbucks, prefer to resolve their problems 
amongst one another in private rather than fight it out in court.  High-stakes 
commercial disputes often attract the attention of the business press, as did the 
patent wars between Apple and Samsung between 2009 and 2016, but it is 
uncommon for them to generate genuine political pressure that is typically 
reserved for public interest litigation and “values-based” litigation like criminal 
justice reform, abortion rights and gun control. The reasons for this are complex. 
For one, most people have an intuitive understanding, garnered from ordinary 
experience, that an entire range of conflicts can be resolved without making 
recourse to formal means. Arbitration appeals to the subconscious notion that 
legal conflict is a matter of “misunderstanding”, and that mutual reconcilement of 
interests (with the assistance of a third party) is possible without resorting to 
court. This is especially true in America, where distrust of bureaucracy has been 
elevated to the level of a civil religion. Adding to this depoliticized view of 
contractual relationships is the classical public/private distinction, in which 
politics is seen to be consigned the acts of the executive and legislative branches 
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of government and “police powers”, not to the acts of private parties like 
business, NGOs, civil society groups and individuals.  
 
What the conventional view of business arbitration leaves out are the immense 
powers that have been created by fostering the culture of alternative dispute 
resolution, especially amongst business. In mainstream arbitration discourse, no 
differentiation is made between corporations, small business, and individuals. But 
can the size, scale, and economic importance of corporate conflict in our global 
capitalist system be compellingly compared that which emerges between much 
smaller parties? For many proponents of arbitration and ADR – the answer to this 
question is yes. Roger Fisher and William Ury’s model of interest-based disputes 
resolution featured in the popular Getting to Yes seamlessly shifts lens from 
conflict between individuals, to conflicts between business, to international 
geopolitical conflict.29  
 
What this compression of scale achieves, and which is very relevant from the 
standpoint of political economy, is a “flattening” effect, an ideological 																																																								
29 Roger Fisher, William L. Ury, and Bruce Patton. Getting to yes: Negotiating 
agreement without giving in. New York: Penguin, 2011. 
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concealment of structural political-economic interests involved in arbitration 
reform. Just as Karl Marx observed that classical political economy erroneously 
posited “man” severed from all social ties, as its main unit of analysis, so does 
arbitration discourse present the arbitration system as a meeting of “individuals”, 
free of historical context, structural power, and class interest. 30  Indeed, in 
arbitration discourse, organizations as varied as corporations, states, NGOs, 
families and individuals are seen to operate in accordance with the same logic of 
rationality. This assumption has its roots in neo-classical economic theory, which 
conceives of society, not as competing classes, structures, organizations or 																																																								30	As Marx wrote in the Grundrisse “The individual and isolated hunter and 
fisherman, with whom Smith and Ricardo begin, belongs among the 
unimaginative conceits of the eighteenth-century Robinsonades, which in no way 
express merely a reaction against over-sophistication and a return to a 
misunderstood natural life, as cultural historians imagine. As little as 
Rousseau’s contrat social, which brings naturally independent, autonomous 
subjects into relation and connection by contract, rests on such naturalism. This is 
the semblance, the merely aesthetic semblance, of the Robinsonades, great and 
small. It is, rather, the anticipation of ‘civil society’, in preparation since the 
sixteenth century and making giant strides towards maturity in the eighteenth. In 
this society of free competition, the individual appears detached from the natural 
bonds etc. which in earlier historical periods make him the accessory of a definite 
and limited human conglomerate.” Karl Marx, Grundrisse 
https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grundrisse/ch01.htm 
(accessed September 26, 2018) 
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regimes, but as an agglomeration of rational, utility-maximizing individuals 
endowed with relatively equal information competing in open marketplace.31  
 
The superimposition of neo-classical concepts of atomistic individualism upon 
arbitration discourse is a theme that has been identified by Amy Cohen. As she 
observes “Interest based dispute resolution, aims, quite sensibly, to achieve at an 
interpersonal level what neoliberalism aims to achieve writ large: to take bounded 
individuals as the basic unit of analysis and to encourage them to pursue their 
interests in relation to the interests of others in order to achieve their maximum 
overall good.”32 Not all interests, however, are expressed equally. Organized 
economic interests like corporations have different strategic aims at stake than do 
individuals and small business. Class-action lawsuits, for example, in which 
corporations are often involved as defendants, are collectively designed to enable 
individual disputants (who would be legally toothless on their own) to create and 																																																								
31  As Martha McCluskey explains “The preoccupation with extracting 
redistribution from efficiency grows out of neoclassical economics’ early-
twentieth-century quest for a formal and objective tool for measuring societal 
well-being that could establish economic policy analysis as a science.” Martha T., 
McCluskey" Efficiency and social citizenship: challenging the neoliberal attack 
on the welfare state." Indiana Law Journal 78 (2003): 788. 
	
32 Amy J. Cohen. "Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of 
Scale." Harvard Negotiation Law Review. 14 (2009): 63. 
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redress asymmetries of legal power and that therefore make it more possible to 
hold more wealthy and powerful disputants to account.  
 
Mainstream arbitration discourse distorts the real social impact of corporate 
disputes. In so doing, it conceals the broader political content of the contemporary 
corporate arbitration reform agenda. The historical emergence of modern ADR 
needs to be fleshed out sociologically. We need a more critical, sociologically 
informed analysis to distill the political and distributive impact of arbitration 
reform that pays attention to the social forces involved in it.  
 
It is important to point out that although this dissertation takes issue with 
foundational theories of arbitration and the modern arbitration policy agenda, it is 
neither “pro” nor “anti” arbitration. What I am interested in doing is examining 
the nature of justice engendered by the corporate arbitration movement, 
considered as a historical development. To do this, it is necessary to observe the 
activities and interests of the actors involved in arbitration reform in the first 
place, and to situate their emergence historically. Most arbitration commentary 
elides this problem altogether by operating at a very abstract level of analysis, 																																																																																																																																																							
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ignoring differences of scale and power between disputants, and by assuming that 
arbitration does not fundamentally change across history. In so doing, they 
overlook the immense advantages that corporations stand to gain new forms of 
legal protection from the further entrenchment of the Lochner-inspired arbitration 
jurisprudence, itself underwritten by the sponsorship of the U.S. Supreme Court. 
When large-volume of high-stakes corporate conflict is diverted to private 
channels, it may be true that the courts are freed from having to deal with 
corporate litigation, but we also lose sight of the fault lines and points of 
economic, political and social friction that constitutes an important source of 
policy-making knowledge. The “political” significance and visibility of conflict 
depends largely upon the concepts we use to make sense of it. Corporations 
perceive the conflicts in which they are engaged as a matter of “ownership” – they 
literally “own” the dispute in question. As Brunet writes, “When parties select 
arbitration, they privatize their dispute and take a form of market ownership of 
their disputing procedure.” 33  From a sociological point of view, however, we 
know that all conflict is ultimately social, even if it categorized as a strictly 
individualized relationship. Moreover, we know that such conflict does not 																																																								
33 Brunet, Speidel, and Sternlight, Arbitration Law in America…7. 
 
		 	
	 46	
merely “arise” but is actively pursued or avoided by agents.34 Conflict does not 
occur in a vacuum, but in the foreground of a broader disputing regime with its 
own historically determined properties. We thus need a better sense of the agents 
involved in contemporary arbitration reform, their structural properties, 
organizational interests, and the ultimately political expression of the legal 
regimes they engender. 
 
From a regulatory perspective, arbitration can facilitate the resolution of 
commercial conflict, but it can also frustrate efforts of public authorities who wish 
to ensure that corporations are abiding by the law. Progressives and liberals tend 
to think that this problem can be resolved by evening the playing field in disputes 
involving asymmetries of wealth.35 Yet the problem of arbitral power that I locate 
in this study does not necessarily lie where many have found it to be most 
problematic; in arbitral bias, or then again, in inequalities of wealth between 																																																								
34 “In the hypothetical state of nature where the dispute resolution story transpires, 
there are no public values or goals, only the private desires of individuals, in this 
instance, the desire for property.” Owen M. Fiss. "The Social and Political 
Foundations of Adjudication." Law and Human Behavior 6, no. 2 (1982): 122.  
 
35 Carrie Menkel-Meadow. "Do the Haves Come Out Ahead in Alternative 
Judicial Systems: Repeat Players in ADR." Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution. 15 (1999): 19. 
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disputants. Although bias and asymmetric bargaining power may taint the 
integrity of an arbitration, the broader historical and structural backdrop of state 
authority against which commercial arbitration practice has been developed is 
even more important than inequality between parties. This deeper architecture of 
state power forms what Duncan Kennedy calls the “legal background rules” that 
make enforcement possible, and which sanctions the legitimacy of arbitral 
authority. Corporate interests have not stood back silently in the formation of 
arbitration policy.36 Through business associations like the International Center 
for Conflict Prevention, and more recently through groups like the Business 
Roundtable of the U.S Chamber of Commerce, they have lobbied government for 
arbitration reforms that benefit them. 
 
6. Business Actors and the Arbitration Reform Movement 
 
Arbitration is not just about changing the forum for the adjudication of disputes, it 
involves a transformation of state power that has radically altered the legal 																																																								
36 For an overview of the way that legal background rules conditions disputing 
behavior, see. “The whole list of factors that we include in bargaining power is 
subtly constituted by the legal background.” Duncan Kennedy "The stakes of law, 
or Hale and Foucault." Legal Studies Forum. 15 (1991): 331.  
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conditions to which corporations are subject, thereby creating strategic disputing 
advantages that they would not otherwise have had in court. What is at stake is the 
creation of a privately administered dominion of legal activity that is virtually 
immune from state oversight, much like offshore tax havens are legally 
constituted, but simultaneously opaque. 37  Arbitration services providers, in 
conjunction with the sanction of the Supreme Court have sought to stretch the 
range of disputes that can legitimately be decided by arbitrators. There is virtually 
no area of corporate litigation that cannot legitimately be arbitrated today. I 
therefore use the term “corporatization”, not only to denote the fact that 
corporations are important users (and consumers) of arbitration services – but to 
place emphasis on the subjection of arbitration law and procedure to corporate 
interests. 
 
Business associations like the International Center for Conflict Prevention (CPR), 
the Business Roundtable of the U.S Chamber of Commerce (BRT), and other 
corporate think-tanks, in conjunction with a constellation of free-market 
ideologues are vying for a system of arbitration that is fashioned on a laissez-faire 																																																								
37 Sune Sandbeck and Etienne Schneider. "From the sovereign debt crisis to 
authoritarian statism: Contradictions of the European state project." New Political 
Economy 19, no. 6 (2014): 847-871. 
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doctrine of business “self-regulation” which can thematically be traced back to 
Lochner-era jurisprudence.38 The Lochner era presented government regulation as 
antithetical to the freedom of commerce, modern proponents of commercial 
arbitration, likewise, argue that greater “judicial interference” in arbitrations is 
sapping the “freedom of contract”.  Courts need to “honour parties’ agreements” 
to defend this freedom. These commitments color the arbitration system with 
latent, but nevertheless, discernable ideological content. That ideology is 
entrusting the private sector to administer private adjudication according to their 
own terms, and in the same measure, ensuring that possibly destabilizing 																																																																																																																																																							
	
38  The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Lochner v. New York came to 
emblemize an entire era of laissez-faire jurisprudence in which the “freedom of 
contract” was elevated to a constitutional right protected under the due process 
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and then invoked that right to 
strike down a variety of state and Federal laws, virtually all of which sought to 
regulate the terms of labor contracts. The struggle between the courts and the 
legislatures in the United States over “liberty of contract” came to a head in a 
series of notorious cases in the first two decades of the twentieth century, in 
which the Court struck down various pro-labor measures that (along with 
antimonopoly legislation) were the centerpiece of progressive legislative reform. 
The Court in Lochner struck down a New York statute setting maximum hours 
for bakers, asserting that it was an unconstitutional infringement of the “liberty 
of person and freedom contract” of “master and employe[e] alike." Barbara 
Fried. The progressive assault on laissez faire. (Cambridge MA, Harvard 
University Press, 2009), 32. 
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interferences from judges, legislators, and the broader public, is as minimal as 
possible. 
 
The creation of a private system of dispute settlement, unbound by formal rules of 
procedure and largely sheltered from public oversight, means the multinational 
firms who constitute the dominant business institutions in the global economy 
now have the ability to exclude an entire range of actors and processes that might 
interfere with the outcomes of the legal conflict in which they are implicated. This 
includes lawsuits involving anti-trust suits, intellectual property claims, 
environmental damage suits that if publicized, could potentially bring reputational 
damage upon those involved. When corporations have the assurance that their 
arbitration agreements will in all likelihood, be enforced, and furthermore, that 
their disputing activities will not be subject to public oversight (whether from 
judges, regulators, watchdog groups, or individual citizens), they gain, in the 
words of Max Weber greater latitude to apply their will without encountering 
interference from others.39 This new form of legal authority is very puzzling 																																																								
39  Political economists and historians have challenged the notion that the 
corporation is an “economic” entity, see David Ciepley. "Beyond public and 
private: Toward a political theory of the corporation." American Political 
Science Review 107, no. 01 (2013): 139-158. Marc Galanter. “Planet of the APs: 
Reflections on the Scale of Law and Its Users.” Buffalo Law Review 
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because it is at once “legal” and “extra-legal”. It is at once law, law-like, and non-
law. The arguments and justifications that are made in favor of it read very much 
like the statements of lawmakers and politicians ,only that they are not, they are 
often made by private functionaries who have no formal accountability to the 
public at all. This new form of legal power needs to be disentangled and 
theorized, especially because it manifests itself in more innocuous ways than has 
traditionally been suspected. That is to say that there are existing 
conceptualizations of arbitral power, but they tend to focus on the immediately 
observable differences of bargaining power between the disputants, rather than 
the structural effects of the arbitration system as a whole, or then again, on the 
substantive content of arbitral justice.  
 
As it currently stands, there are two central critiques of arbitration, both focusing 
on the issue of asymmetric bargaining power. Interestingly, both critiques begin at 
opposite ends of the arbitration system, yet their fundamental content is the same.  
In investment arbitration, the critique is that multinational firms have been able to 																																																																																																																																																							
(2006).  According to Max Weber “In general, we understand by, "power" the 
chance of a man or of a number of men to realize their own will in a communal 
action even against the resistance of others who are participating in the action.” 
Reinhard Bendix and Seymour Martin Lipset. Class, Status and Power. (New 
York: Free Press, 1966): 64. 
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manipulate bilateral investment treaties to sue governments for economic 
damages, thereby placing states, particularly developing states, at a disadvantage. 
Likewise, recent critiques of the manipulative use of consumer and employment 
contracts have shed light on the way that corporations have used mandatory 
arbitration clauses and fine print contracts to manipulate weaker parties into 
accepting agreements that they otherwise would not have agreed to, they have 
largely overlooked the relations of power engendered in arbitration between 
disputants of roughly equal bargaining power. Since commercial parties e.g (two 
corporations) are thought to be of roughly equal bargaining power, and 
agreements are consensual, the prospect that a firm might gain significant 
advantage over another seems counter-intuitive, and does not normally rouse the 
suspicion of otherwise very critical observers. 
 
These theories center on important aspects of arbitration, but they are incomplete. 
I want to suggest that the form of political-economic power engendered in the 
commercial arbitration system is not necessarily about the creating conditions 
under which corporations will “win” more often, (taking winning to mean 
securing of favorable decisions in the discrete sense of the term) but of creating a 																																																																																																																																																							
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deregulated adjudicative “space” that is free from public oversight and 
government interference. This more oblique transformation is very important 
because it alters the distributive potential of law. It can be analogized to what 
Duncan Kennedy, drawing on the legal realist tradition refers to as the “legal 
background rules”.40 For Kennedy, the legal background rules are distributionally 
significant, even though they do not appear to bear on the immediate bargaining 
strength of the parties in question. What they do is shape what disputants can and 
cannot bring to bear in the dispute in the first place.  From this point of view, 
policies that are seen to interfere with the “freedom of contract”, to make 																																																								
40 Duncan Kennedy’s conception of “background rules” is based upon early 20th 
century legal realist analyses of the politics of private law, which figure 
importantly in this study. Legal realism was a diverse intellectual movement, but 
one of its most lasting and intellectually potent themes was the idea that political 
power found expression through seemingly apolitical arrangements like 
contracts, rate-making in utilities, and other innocuous institutions. In the 1960s 
and 1970s, a new wave of legal scholars like Morton Horwitz and Duncan 
Kennedy drew on realist thought to better illustrate the historical and 
distributional importance of private legal arrangements. See for example, Morton 
J. Horwitz "The Transformation in the Conception of Property in American Law, 
1780-1860." The University of Chicago Law Review 40, no. 2 (1973): 248-290. 
Morton J. Horwitz. "The history of the public/private distinction." University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 130, no. 6 (1982): 1423-1428. As Kennedy writes, “In 
the realist analysis, there are two particularly important general categories of 
rules affecting bargaining strength. The first and more obvious contains the rules 
governing the conduct of the parties during bargaining. The second is the set of 
rules that structure the alternatives to remaining in the bargaining situation.” 
Duncan Kennedy. "The stakes of law, or Hale and Foucault." Legal Studies 
Forum. 15 (1991): 327. 
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arbitration more sluggish or costly, or to jeopardize “party autonomy,” constitute 
a threat to the autonomy of the arbitration system.  
 
In sum, this dissertation presents evidence and arguments in support of the 
following five claims, each of which addresses specific positions and problems in 
the broader arbitration literature.  
 
1. Arbitration is presented as though it a species of private law and thus politically 
and distributionally neutral. However, as I argue, arbitration reform has been used 
as a means of effectuating political change by non-political means. I make a case 
for thinking of arbitration as an expression of political-economic power.  
 
2. Arbitration reform is modeled upon an ideologically charged, Lochnerian 
conception of contract law that crystallized in the late 19th century and became an 
entrenched feature of the American political economy in the early 20th century. 
This doctrine is about limiting public interference and “encroachment” on private 
activity, conceived as a domain of contractual freedom and “party autonomy”.  I 
illustrate the origins of this ideology in the formation of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, and the way that it has been reinvigorated by contemporary proponents of the 																																																																																																																																																							
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arbitration lobby in what has come to be known as the “contractualist” approach 
to arbitration. 
 
3. Historically and presently, actors including arbitrators, retired federal and state 
judges, corporate officials and organic intellectuals have been important agents 
in advancing this ideologically charged conception of arbitration reform.  In this 
way, arbitration constitutes a form of elite politics. 
 
4. The benefits of the arbitration system are not evenly distributed. They have 
been organized in such a way that disproportionately benefits corporate capital.   
 
5. Points one through four beckon a set of normative questions. What kind of 
justice is engendered by the contemporary arbitration system, and what is its 
relationship with democracy and the Rule of Law? I claim that the present course 
of arbitration law in the United States contrasts sharply with principles of 
constitutional democracy and presents challenges to the future legitimacy of 
arbitration law.  
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7. The Division of Chapters 
 
 
Chapter one defines arbitration and outlines the methods employed by the study. 
It clarifies some of the definitional problems that emerge when distinguishing 
commercial arbitration from other forms of arbitration including international 
arbitration and alternative dispute resolution.  It makes a case for thinking of the 
arbitration as a what Edward Purcell defines as a “social litigation system” that is 
historically bound and embedded within a broader political-economic regime. 
 
Chapter two situates arbitration reform in its political context and develops the 
idea that arbitration is a site of political-economic transformation. It examines the 
wide powers and techniques that are attributed to the proverbial “arbitration 
revolution” and some of the political problems that emerge therewith.  
 
Chapter three theorizes arbitral power by placing contemporary arbitration reform 
in historical context. The chapter focuses on one of the most important historical 
precursors to our contemporary era of arbitration reform, the making of the 
Federal Arbitration Act.  I place emphasis on two social transformations, both of 
which have tended to be overlooked in the arbitration literature.  The first is 
movement that paralleled the rise of arbitration, the ascent of the corporation as 
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the central unit of business organization in the U.S economy.  The second is the 
development of Lochner-era jurisprudence, a laissez-faire inspired form of legal 
thought that dominated American legal though for much of the early twentieth 
century.  By contextualizing the rise of arbitration in relation to these two parallel 
developments, I wish to show how arbitration embedded within a broader 
ideological framework of corporate dominance and laissez faire ideology. 
 
Chapter four is a critique of contemporary arbitration ideology. The chapter 
identifies the parameters of contemporary liberal-legalism, a political-economic 
ideology which treats both the activity of arbitrators and the arbitration system 
more broadly as separate from politics, (and from) distributive conflict. I identify 
central tenets of this ideology: party autonomy, the principle of judicial non-
interference, and the notion that the effects of arbitral awards are delimited to the 
claimant and the disputant. This doctrine, though seemingly devoid of ideological 
content, effectively forms part of a neo-liberal approach to arbitration. 
 
Chapter five examines the resurgence of the contemporary corporate arbitration 
lobby and their efforts to create a system of business dispute resolution that is 
insulated from public control. I highlight the way the seemingly innocuous 
features of business arbitration: confidentiality, limited review mechanisms, lack 
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of precedent, and profit-based forms of adjudication enable strategic disputing 
behaviors that disproportionately benefit corporations 
 
In the concluding chapter, I discuss the emergent concept of private justice 
engendered in the arbitration system. I provide a summary of my findings, and 
restate my contribution to law and political science.  I discuss potential avenues 
for future research. Finally, I reflect on the nature of private power as it is 
engendered in the contemporary regime, and the sites of political contestation in 
which corporate power is being challenged today.  
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1. Definitions and Methodology 
 
1. What is Arbitration? 
 
Before examining the history, role and function of corporate involvement in the 
arbitration system,  what in the first place is commercial arbitration, and what do I 
mean by specifying the object of study as “corporate arbitration” rather than 
relying on the conventional classifications? In what follows, I explain why I have 
chosen to focus on corporations to the exclusion of other disputants. I criticize the 
formalism, technicality and generality of arbitration discourse, and some of the 
common sociological oversights that emerge from it. Finally, I outline my choice 
of methods derived from political-economy, socio-legal studies and the history of 
business disputing developed by Marc Galanter, Terence Dunworth, Joel Rogers, 
Thomas Palay and the Wisconsin business disputing project. 
 
 
This chapter explains how routinely used classifications like “commercial 
arbitration”, “international commercial arbitration” and “alternative dispute 
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resolution” can give the false sense that each of these areas of arbitration 
discretely defined systems unto themselves. When they are treated separately, or 
as reified “things”, divorced from the networks of social actors who compose 
them, we lose sight of the interests of those who have been involved in 
developing them, as well as the range and comprehensiveness of corporate 
lobbying efforts to reform arbitration. 
 
Arbitration discourse is technical, abstract, and like much dispute resolution 
literature, is written by and for practitioners. It is not generally geared toward 
social scientists, let alone a general readership. Like accounting and insurance, 
arbitration is typically seen as a profession and practice, not a structure of power, 
and thus, is not usually described or theorized in relation to politics and/or 
political economy. This is important because this very formalism and technicality 
also constitutes the linguistic medium through which the activities of arbitrators 
and the broader arbitration system are described. Thus, when Kraft Foods 
arbitrates a billion dollar dispute with Starbucks, it will be reported in the 
language of “parties” contending over “property rights”, formal proceedings, and 
award enforcement, not as a political-economic contest over control of resources.   
Arbitration is presented as though it were quarantined from politics and public 
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policy, and the actors who use it are usually conceived as rational individuals, not 
as agents with material interests at stake or endowed with a broader political 
consciousness. Clearly, however, such material interests and political 
consciousness are at stake in modern arbitration law, given the organizational 
unity with which corporations have vied for specific arbitration reforms (and 
other which they have opposed). We need a more structural and systemic 
understanding of corporate influence on the arbitration system asymmetries of 
power, not just between the actors who are immediately party to the dispute, but 
in shaping the background rules of the arbitration system more broadly. To track 
these changes, I outline a mixed-methods approach to the study of arbitration 
informed by political-economy, socio-legal studies and the history of business 
disputing.  
 
 
Despite the fact that arbitration is ubiquitous and routinely used by legal 
practitioners, there are disagreements about what in fact constitutes “commercial 
arbitration”. Gary Born’s widely used practice manual defines arbitration as: 
 
Arbitration is a contractual method of resolving disputes. By their contract 
the parties agree to entrust the differences between them to the decision of 
an arbitrator or panel of arbitrators, to the exclusion of the Courts, and 
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they bind themselves to accept that decision, once made, whether or not 
they think it right.41 
 
Similarly, a Swiss court has defined arbitration as: 
Arbitration is an agreement according to which two or more specific or 
determinable parties agree in a binding way to submit one or several 
existing or future disputes to an arbitral tribunal, to the exclusion of the 
original competence of state courts and subject to a (directly or indirectly) 
determinable legal system.42 
 
These definitions highlight the contractual basis of arbitration, its non-
adjudicative nature, as well as the parties’ acceptance to defer to the will of 
arbitrator. Apart from this, most forms of arbitration share the following features 
in common: 
  
A) Basis in Contract  
 
With the exception of investment arbitration, which is treaty-based, arbitration is 
usually has its basis in a contractual agreement. Arbitration may be preordained in 
the terms of a contract if the parties anticipate a dispute in the future (as is 																																																								
41  Born, Gary. International Arbitration: Law and Practice. (Kluwer Law 
International, 2012), 4. 
 
42 Born, International Arbitration, 4. 
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frequently the case in construction contracts, which frequently incur production 
delays from disputes), or it may arise in response to the onset of an unforeseen 
dispute that was not covered in the language of the contract case.  In the former 
case, parties will determine the institutions, the range of issues, and the governing 
law under which the arbitration will take place. In the latter, the parties must agree 
on these matters after the onset of the dispute.  
B) Institutional or Ad Hoc 
 
Second, arbitration may be either institutional or ad hoc. In institutional 
arbitration, parties submit their dispute to a particular arbitral institution such as 
the International Chamber of Commerce, the London Court of International 
Arbitration or the American Arbitration Association. In ad hoc arbitration, it is 
left to the arbitrator to determine which rules of dispute settlement will be used.  
 
C) Choice of Rules  
 
In addition to being institutional or ad hoc, disputants may also choose the rules 
that govern the dispute. They may select specific national laws, rules provided by 
a particular arbitral institution, or then again, general commercial practices like 																																																																																																																																																							
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the rules outlined by the United Nation’s Conference on International Trade and 
Investment Law (UNCITRAL), which provides a model for U.N. member states 
upon which to build their arbitration practices. Major arbitration service providers 
like the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), the London Court of International Arbitration (LCIA), and 
the International Center for Dispute Resolution (ICDR) have their own designated 
rules, as well as specialized subsets of rules for specific disputing scenarios.  
 
D) Choice of Arbitrator 
 
Most courts randomize the selection of the judge to ensure that the judgment is 
made impartially. Arbitration is unique in the sense that the disputants hand-pick 
the arbitrator or arbitrator(s) who will make the binding judgment, and for this 
reason, is very alluring to those who desire an expert ruling. Selection processes 
vary depending on the arbitration institution or terms of the contract. Disputants 
can agree to let the arbitration institution appoint the arbitrator, or they can decide 
on the choice themselves. Typically, an arbitration either involves a single 
arbitrator agreed upon by the disputants, or it involves a panel of three arbitrators, 
one appointed by the claimant, one by the respondent, and a third neutral.  
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E) Finality 
 
Fourth, once an arbitral award is made, the disputants may not normally challenge 
the decision. Unlike judicial decisions, which may be subject to review or appeal, 
arbitral awards are final. Given the proliferation of laws and policies that are 
supportive of arbitration, it has become increasingly uncommon for arbitral 
awards subject to review and even more uncommon for them to be overturned, 
even though specific grounds for appeal may be contained in the arbitration 
agreement itself. 
 
2. Different Types of Arbitration 
 
Scholars and practitioners usually distinguish between investment-treaty 
arbitration, international commercial arbitration, commercial arbitration, and then 
again, the long list of dispute resolution mechanisms that fall under the term 
alternative dispute resolution (ADR). It is worth going through each of these to 
illustrate some of the definitional problems at hand in these categorizations. 
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A) Investment Arbitration 
Investment arbitration, also known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) is a 
unique form of arbitration that has its basis in a treaty between two or more states 
(bilateral treaties or multilateral treaties).43  Unlike in commercial arbitration, in 
which the parties are individuals or businesses, the signatories to investment 
treaties are states, but the claimants are individuals, investors and businesses 
(mainly corporations). The protections afforded by investment treaties extend to 
private parties including institutional investors, multinational corporations, and 
individuals who may bring claims against a state that is violation of the 
investment treaty. Conversely, states may not bring claims against private parties. 
For this reason, ISDS might be said to be inherently asymmetrical in the sense 
that its protections apply to one category of disputants to the exclusion of another. 
I have chosen not to focus on investment arbitration in this study because the 
treaty-form diverges significantly from the private law framework of international 
commercial arbitration and domestic arbitration.  																																																								
43 For an overview of the defining features of international investment arbitration, 
see. Gus Van Harten, and Martin Loughlin. "Investment treaty arbitration as a 
species of global administrative law." European Journal of International Law 17, 
no. 1 (2006): 121-150. 
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B) International Commercial Arbitration 
 
International commercial arbitration (sometimes referred to as transnational 
commercial arbitration), by contrast, involves disputes between two international 
business parties from different host states. The designation “international” may 
refer to a) the international character of the dispute itself b) to the fact that the 
parties are connected with different jurisdictions, c) to institutions of dispute 
resolution governing the arbitration proceedings d) a combination of any or all of 
these elements.44 
C) Commercial Arbitration 
 
When used on its generic sense, the term “arbitration” usually refers to what is in 
fact commercial arbitration; contractual arbitrations that fall under the ambit of 
national arbitration law like the Federal Arbitration Act. The term “commercial” 
in commercial arbitration, although used routinely, is the source of considerable 
confusion, especially since it has become popular to use terms like “consumer 																																																								
44 Julian Lew, Loukas A. Mistelis, and Stefan Kröll. Comparative international 
commercial arbitration. (Kluwer Law International), 58. 
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arbitration”, “employment arbitration” and “labor arbitration” as if they are stand-
alone areas of law. In the United States, all of these areas of arbitration are 
commercial arbitration. Even though the term “commercial” suggests that both 
parties are businesses, this needn’t necessarily be the case. A commercial 
arbitration might involve a consumer in a dispute with a major multinational 
corporation, or two small businesses in a disagreement over a sales contract. 
These overlapping terms, as well as the divergent histories of labor arbitration, 
international arbitration, and business arbitration often make for discursive 
confusion, all of which are compounded by the next term I cover; alternative 
dispute resolution.  
 
D) Alternative Dispute Resolution 
 
The term “alternative dispute resolution” has been used to refer to any form of 
dispute resolution that is not litigation, although it is most often associated with 
arbitration and mediation. Like “commercial arbitration” the term ADR also 
generates confusion since it is often used interchangeably, especially in the 																																																																																																																																																							
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promotional literature, with arbitration generally.45 For example, the term “ADR” 
has been used to refer to any form of dispute resolution that does not take place in 
courts of law including consumer-arbitration, employment arbitration, sports 
arbitration, court-annexed arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, and a 
number of “rent-a-judge” programs. To make matters even more puzzling, many 
international arbitration providers have adopted the term “ADR” and now offer a 
range of “international ADR” products, which may or may not include arbitration. 
The International Chamber of Commerce’s website, for example, lists 
“international ADR” amongst its service offerings.  																																																								
45 The term ADR initially saw use in the 1970s when it was used to denote the 
renewal of interest in alternatives to court including arbitration, mediation and 
other forms of non-binding dispute resolution. There is something of an irony in 
this term since it appears to have emerged from left-wing and progressive circles 
– only to be adopted by the corporate sector for its own purposes. From the 
left/progressive point of view, informal approaches to dispute resolution were 
seen to be preferable to the excessively formalistic and impersonal forces of 
judicial machinery. The ADR movement drew the attention of political activists, 
community organizers and others who sought more dialogic and “human” forms 
of dispute resolution than those that were attributed to state courts. It was almost 
as though alternative dispute resolution was law’s answer to the humanist school 
of management – it promised a less hierarchical, less bureaucratic, and more 
humanly engaged form of interaction.   In a twist of events and outcomes, 
however, corporations and other institutions of concentrated decision making 
power also adopted the term ADR when describing their own novel institutions of 
dispute settlement. For this reason, there has always been something of an 
ambiguity in the use of the term ADR, and some have even called for terminating 
its use. 
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These different, and in some ways, competing definitions of what arbitration 
actually is seems to sometimes lead to organizational confusion in the arbitration 
profession itself. At the Toronto Alternative Dispute Resolution Institute of 
Canada conference in 2014, for example, political activists interested in using 
ADR as an organizing tool found themselves on the same panels and receptions as 
those specializing in international business conflict amongst oil companies. In the 
world of practice, these “ADR” specialists would probably never cross paths, 
given the different stakes of the conflict they deal with. However, ADR discourse, 
like that found in the popular “Getting to Yes” is sufficiently general that it 
attracts professionals from many different walks of the legal profession, and 
interested in radically different types of conflict.46 Many have suggested that the 																																																								
46 Jean Sternlight relates a similar experience at an arbitration conference. “One 
ABA Dispute Resolution Section conference on international ADR was even 
rather comical in this regard. The conference brought together many countries’ 
high powered international arbitrators, community mediators primarily from the 
U.S. and persons attempting to use mediation approaches to facilitate political 
change throughout the world. Although these diverse groups were provided with 
separate time slots, they mingled over cocktails and meals. Pin stripes with 
birkenstocks. Everyone was very polite, but it was an odd event. While perhaps 
extreme, the event was not atypical. Most “ADR” conferences reflect a similar 
discomfort, if not tension, between major forms of ADR.” Jean R. Sternlight "Is 
Binding Arbitration a Form of ADR: An Argument That the Term ADR Has 
Begun to Outlive Its Usefulness." Journal on Dispute Resolution. (2000): 97. 
		 	
	 71	
term ought to be dispensed with altogether. Others have sought to distinguish 
themselves from ADR with new acronyms like “dispute resolution design”(DSD) 
“conflict management” and “conflict prevention”.  
 
It is worth keeping in mind that many of  the varied concepts and buzzwords in 
arbitration discourse make claim to nearly identical laws and practices, and 
moreover that very specific forms of arbitration are subsumed under very broad 
definitional categories . This conceptual overlap, and the lack of sociologically 
determinate categories renders the task of the focusing on corporate disputing 
behavior all the more challenging.  
 
E) International arbitration as distinguished from “domestic” arbitration 
 
One final important distinction must be identified, the difference between 
domestic and international arbitration. Some scholars draw sharp lines of 
distinction between international arbitration and domestic arbitration and even 
refuse to speak about the respective systems in the same breath. International 
arbitrator Jan Paulsson, for example, claims that no comparison ought to be made 																																																																																																																																																							
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between the two, and arbitration textbooks often separate international arbitration 
from the national arbitration law. 47 Others have pointed out important areas of 
crossover between the systems. For example, almost all the international 
investment arbitrators at some point have arbitrated commercial disputes at the 
domestic level.  Likewise, domestic arbitration institutions like the American 
Arbitration Association have developed their own distinctive international 
branches. Garth and Dezalay’s study also identified historical lines of continuity 
between the development of national and international arbitration systems.48  
 
My own view is that there is sufficient institutional and ideological overlap 
between U.S. arbitration and international arbitration to give the relationship 
between both systems close analysis. The primary focus of this study, as I 
outlined in the introduction, is the history and development of commercial 																																																								
47 In Paulsson’s view, international arbitration has de facto monopolistic character 
by virtue of the fact that the system does not “compete” with adjudicative 
alternatives. See for example, Jan Paulsson. 2008. “International Arbitration is 
Not Arbitration.” John E.C Brierley Memorial Lecture, McGill University, 
2008. https://www.mcgill.ca/pjrl/files/pjrl/john_e._c._brierley_memorial_lecture_
jan_paulsson.pdf  
 
48  Yves Dezalay and Bryant G. Garth. Dealing in virtue: International 
commercial arbitration and the construction of a transnational legal order. 
University of Chicago Press, 1998. 12. Richard L. Abel "The contradictions of 
informal justice." The politics of informal justice 1 (1982): 267-320. 
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arbitration law in the U.S. and the role that corporations have played in lobbying 
in favor of arbitration reform.  Although my focus is on the domestic setting, there 
are important points of crossover with international commercial arbitration. For 
example, many of the lobbyists that campaigned in favor of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, like Owen Young and Felix Warburg, were also active in 
developing international arbitration law. There are other points of contact. U.S 
law, like the Federal Arbitration Act, and key Supreme Court decisions like 
Mitsubishi Motors v. Soler Plymouth have had an important act in shaping the 
international arbitration regime. Most strikingly, many of the “ADR” institutions 
that I analyze like the International Center for Conflict Prevention and the 
American Arbitration Association have been active in virtually every aspect of 
arbitration, including international commercial arbitration and investment 
arbitration.  
 
I have outlined the similarities and differences between investor-state arbitration, 
international commercial arbitration, commercial arbitration and ADR. I then 
distinguished between the different settings in which these arbitrations take place, 
and some of the definitional entanglements that emerge from them. In the next 																																																																																																																																																							
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section, I explain why particular features of arbitration law have puzzled 
contemporary commentators, and why it has continued to inhabit multiple, 
parallel existences as a species of “law” and “non-law”.  
 
3. Arbitration Between Law and Lawlessness 
 
Thus far, I have focused on technical definitions of arbitration. But where the real 
disagreement in arbitration scholarship emerges is in what kind of law arbitration 
actually is.  
 
Consider the following: arbitration is in one respect law; it is ingrained national 
legislation that enables disputants to adjudicate disputes by appointing arbitrator. 
The Federal Arbitration Act makes agreements to arbitrate “valid, enforceable and 
irrevocable”, and courts will typically enforce arbitrations so long as they do not 
exhibit “manifest disregard” of the law. Thus, arbitration, from this perspective, is 
a legitimate form of dispute resolution that is backed by Federal legislation.  
 
In another respect, arbitration is not law.  Arbitrators are neither lawmakers nor 
judges, they are not elected and no public obligations are attributed to them. 
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Arbitrators, those who decide the outcomes for those bound by an arbitration 
agreement, do not have the power to compel behavior over those who have not 
agreed beforehand to submit to their rule. Arbitrators are not obligated to observe 
legal precedent, nor do their decisions create new legal precedent. Unlike the 
application of executive or legislative power, arbitral authority is not considered 
“coercive”, since it rests upon the precondition of consent. The decisions of 
arbitrators, while routinely approved by the courts, do not carry the same weight 
and societal importance as those of judges. From this vantage point, arbitration is 
not law. 
 
Despite the general dissociation of arbitration from law and politics, intuition 
suggests that arbitration cannot so easily be disassociated from questions of 
governance and the common good.  For this reason, arbitration is law-like in the 
sense that is a system of rule that holds the participants in that system to certain 
predetermined rules and norms. Taken together, the acts of all arbitrators 
constitute, however informally, a “legal system”, and a number of theorists have 
claimed that arbitration is akin to “law without a state”, complicating the 
relationship between law, arbitration and politics.  
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Last and perhaps most interestingly of all, arbitration is “outside” the law. In 
many ways arbitration appears to operate independently of state oversight 
altogether. It lacks the formality, transparency, checks and balances, and 
mechanisms of oversight that are normally attributed to systems of justice in 
Westphalian parliamentary democracies. It’s methods of self-reflexivity and 
rationality appear to be second-rate, if not distorted images of those familiar to 
judges. And since it is so opaque, very little of substance is known about the 
arbitration system, it cannot be studied in the same detail as one can discuss the 
history of international law or civil rights, for example.   
 
These multiple, overlapping, if not contradictory modes of being make arbitration 
something of an anomaly, and that anomaly is reflected in the current state of 
arbitration scholarship. There are very real disagreements about the role, social 
function, and values that arbitration fulfills.49 These are not merely theoretical 
matters for legal scholars to ponder even though it may often seem to be the case.  																																																								
49 Wai, Robert. "Transnational private law and private ordering in a contested 
global society." Harvard International Law Journal 46 (2005): 471. Watt, Horatia 
Muir. "Private international law beyond the schism." Transnational legal 
theory 2, no. 3 (2011): 347-428. 
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Disagreements about what arbitration is, what legitimate social ends it is designed 
to achieve, and whom the system benefits have played out in recent Supreme 
Court decisions that set the terms for millions of consumer contracts, in social 
contestation to major international trade agreements, and in defining the role of 
the courts managing conflict in a capitalist society more broadly. If we wish to 
better understand the social role and function of commercial arbitration, we need 
to focus more closely on the social actors whom have been active in shaping it. 
 
4. Methods and Scope 
 
Any researcher interested in arbitration is ineluctably faced with an obstacle; 
much of the information concerning the arbitration system is private and/or 
confidential. This places serious limitations of the nature and scope of information 
available for analysis. Arbitration scholarship has been severely limited by the 
lack of reliable data, the secrecy of awards, not to mention the general reluctance 
(or then again, legal/professional obligation) of arbitration practitioners to share 
information about their practice.  Unlike other areas of corporate activity in which 
one can access rich databases with relative ease, there is comparatively very little 
information about business involvement in arbitration. To enumerate just a few 
		 	
	 78	
examples, there is a serious paucity of reliable data concerning the size, volume, 
and frequency of arbitral awards, and even less information on the size and scope 
of the arbitration services market.50 We know little about what arbitrators are 
paid, what the financial stakes involved in arbitration are, and perhaps most 
importantly, what most disputes are in fact about. Even when institutions like the 
ICC and AAA compile statistics, their mode of classifying them gives over 
minimal information about their substance. The fact that the AAA arbitrates a 
“contract” dispute for example, tells us little about who was involved, what the 
stakes were, and what the substantive legal questions involved in the case were. 
 
 It should be noted that this lack of information does not stem from a lack of 
interest or curiosity in the arbitration system. There in fact seems to a great desire 
on the part of legal scholars to learn more about the dynamics governing the 
arbitration system. In fact the confidentiality and privacy of arbitration is itself 
“alluring” to outward observers. The lack of information exists, and continues to 
exist because of legal protections guaranteeing the privacy and confidentiality of 
parties involved in arbitration agreements. Most arbitrators, and arbitration 																																																								
50 Joshua Karton. "A Conflict of Interests: Seeking a Way Forward on Publication 
of International Arbitral Awards” 28." Arbitration International 3 (2012): 447. 
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institutions for that matter, operate on a private basis, their decisions are not 
available for public consumption.  For these reasons, most of what is known about 
the arbitration system is schematic or fragmentary in character. Discussions tend 
to revolve what little data is available, published arbitration law, as well as the 
formal rules of procedure that are published by bodies like the ICC and the AAA.  
 
In order to address some of the barriers presented by the lack of reliable data 
(especially quantitative data), I have employed a mixed-methods approach known 
in the social science literature as “triangulation”. In its original sense, 
triangulation is a term derived from navigation to denote the use of multiple 
reference points to locate an object’s exact position.  To carry the metaphor to the 
social sciences, triangulation involves the use of multiple methods of inquiry and 
data collection to give a more complete picture of the studied object. In order to 
do this, I have collected documents from arbitration publications, compiled 
documents from the legislative history attended of the Federal Arbitration Act, 
attended four major conferences on investment arbitration and commercial 
arbitration, and spoken to a number of arbitrators and lawyers. I have also 
assembled secondary sources from financial newswire services, professional 
surveys, and reports published by arbitration service providers and think tanks in 
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an effort to illuminate the nature and scope of the upper segment of the arbitration 
service sector. 
 
The reliance on multiple sources of data, rather than a single set, is an effort to 
better understand the social conditions that have made the rise of arbitration 
possible.  But there is another reason for relying on the mixed-methods approach. 
In the past, methods triangulation was merely thought of as a means of producing 
a more objective picture of the phenomenon in question.  Recent years, however, 
have seen the emergence of a more reflexive trend in mixed methods approaches 
named “retroduction” that I believe is well suited to this study. Retroduction, or 
abductive reasoning, seeks to interpret and contextualize phenomena within a 
conceptual framework or set of ideas. Abduction is different from purely 
inductive research in which one moves from empirical observations to theoretical 
inferences. Rather, it relies heavily on theories as mediators for deriving 
explanations.   
 
In this case, the mediating body of theory is political economy, the study of power 
and the distribution of income. I believe that this method is well suited to the 
object in question (arbitration amongst corporations) for two reasons.  First, the 
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mixed-methods approach seeks to exploit the incompleteness of arbitration data – 
and to make the most of the fragmentary information that is available. There is 
data about arbitration - perhaps not the type of data that would satisfy positivistic 
pattern explanation. The second reason has to do with the theoretical parameters 
that have traditionally been brought to bear on arbitration. Most of what is written 
about arbitration is written by members of the profession, people are directly 
involved in arbitration. With the exception of Heinrich Kronstein’s essay 
“Arbitration is Power” the interpretive framework of political-economy has been 
wholly absent from the study of arbitration law. Approaching the object of study 
from this point of view allows one to dislodge and suspend categories of 
understanding that are ensconced in existing frameworks can help yield 
alternative understandings of arbitration.  
 
Most of the arbitration literature consists of formal rules (or commentary on the 
rules) that govern arbitration proceedings. In the case of this study, however, am 
less interested in the technicalities of arbitration procedure and more in the 
strategic motivations and social interests that come bear in the arbitration system 
broadly.  While I do examine doctrinal developments, I am more interested in the 
way these developments alter the disputing behavior of corporations. Following 
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work of Marc Galanter, Joel Rogers, Terence Dunworth, and Matthew Zeidenberg 
of the Wisconsin Business Disputing Project this study takes a more actororiented 
approach than other studies of arbitration. This means that I focus less on the 
formal rules that govern arbitration procedure and more on the actors whom 
together “constitute” the arbitration system (arbitration institutions, businesses, 
arbitrators, lawyers, intellectuals, publicists). A paraphrase of a well known quote 
by the famous law professor Karl Lewellyn conveys the spirit of the approach. In 
his Bramble Bush lectures delivered to incoming students at the University of 
Chicago, Lewellyn said that if “what judges, lawyers, and law enforcement 
officers do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself”.51 What Lewellyn meant 
by this was that students of law should focus less on legal rules, and more on the 
substantive activity of those agents who “make’ law.  For the purposes of this 
study, we may recast Lewellyn’s problem in a slightly different direction. If 
arbitration is not law, then what is that arbitrators, arbitration lawyers, arbitration 
service providers and corporate disputants do  when they arbitrate disputes? 
 																																																								
51 Llewellyn, Karl N. The bramble bush: On our law and its study. Quid Pro 
Books, 2012. 
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5. Linking Law and Political Economy with Arbitration 
 
There are three fundamental pre-conditions to my argument.  
 
The first is Thomas C. Grey’s view that that all legal systems fulfill a series of 
critical functions. A) They all purport to give an accurate descriptive account of 
legal institutions B) They all seek to explain and outline a method of operating 
them (technique) (C) all legal systems seek to provide a justification of these 
institutions for those who operate the system, but also, for outsiders.52 If this is 
true, then one of the tasks of critical legal theory would be to denaturalize those 
explanations or rationales, which representatives of a given legal system take for 
granted. Another would be to critically separate normative representations of a 
system from the reality of that system.  A third task would be to situate the role of 
legal systems in maintaining a given distribution of power and wealth.  
 
Grey’s schema is useful because it acknowledges a tendency to merge description, 
practice, and legitimation together, which creates a set of descriptive and 																																																								
52  Thomas C. Grey "Langdell's orthodoxy." University of Pittsburgh Law. 
Review. 45 (1983): 1. 
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normative problems. In the case of arbitration law in which most of the material is 
produced by arbitration practitioners, that is to say, people who have a vested 
stake in the continued existence of the arbitration system, one has to be all the 
more alert of the overlap between descriptive and normative.  One dimension of 
the arbitration system that I did not anticipate to focus on, but nevertheless found 
to be very important as I proceeded with this study, was the use of language, and 
the way that concepts that were deployed as neutral terminology tended to be 
ideologically loaded.  When pressed, the use of seemingly neutral conceptions 
like “costs”, “speed”, and “efficiency” could be located within a specific 
historical matrix of ideas, interests and institutions that was organized along a 
more or less coherent system of belief. 
 
All legal systems, no matter how autonomous they claim to exist from outside 
social influence, ineluctably exist in relation to a given distribution of power and 
wealth in society at large. One of the main points that the realists pressed against 
the proponents of classical legal formalism was how impervious their conceptions 
of contract law were to understanding the role of power and coercion in the 
economy generally. In assuming that contracting parties bargained on equal, 
consenting terms, they foreclosed analysis into the coercive and ultimately 
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distributive role of the state.  The realists were able to dispute one of the cardinal 
tenets of contract law, and to revert the focus on the differential distribution of 
power between parties that seemed to be bargaining on equal terms, and to place 
this inequality as a starting point of political-economic study of the law. 
 
Arbitration is a species of contract law. It assumes that disputants meet on equal 
bargaining terms, and moreover, that “the effects” of their disputes are contained 
to them and them only. For this reason, no real distributive or coercive relations 
are assumed to emerge from them. I want to challenge this view.  It may be true 
that disputants meet voluntarily and agree to have an arbitrator make a judgment 
which they accept. But if we take a more systemic view, it becomes possible to 
compare the processes, outcomes, and actors involved in arbitration in 
juxtaposition to what they might have encountered in a public setting, it becomes 
easier to discern some of the hidden, albeit real, mechanisms of redistribution and 
power involved in arbitration.  
 
Grey’s observation about the general function of legal systems is useful for this 
project.  As much as any legal system insists on its universality and neutrality, and 
as much as it asserts that its rules are “ it must always be situated in relation to the 
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contemporary global legal-economic order, that is to the given distribution of 
political power and wealth in which it exists. Arbitration is a perfect example of a 
quasi-legal system whose self “definition” is a negative, or oppositional one.  Its 
features: a  “private, confidential, informal, cheaper, faster” exists in relation to 
features of the public legal system it negates “public, transparent, formal, 
expensive, sluggish”. Thus, when I speak of the political content of arbitration, or 
of arbitration as a means of conducting “politics by other means”, I always mean 
it relatively speaking, in opposition to the politics, law and procedures that exists 
in relation to. 
 
Second, I use Edward Purcell’s idea of  “social litigation system” as a 
methodological framework to understand corporate commercial arbitration. 
Purcell defines a social litigation system as:  
 
[…] a coherent, and dynamic set of patterns of claims disputing behavior 
that arises from an identifiable combination of social and legal factors. 
The idea assumes that historical conditions regularly lead certain types of 
parties to dispute a relatively limited number of issues against one another 
in certain consistent ways and that most of the legally-related activity in 
any given period can be broken down into some number of different 
behavioral patterns that are recognizably “legal” and at the same time 
markedly different. Social litigation systems are defined by prevailing 
historical conditions, the social characteristics of the parties, the types of 
issues that the parties are led to regularly dispute, and the special subsets 
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of legal rules – both substantive and procedural – that are particularly 
relevant and useful to their litigation strategies.53 
 
The “social litigation system” conception conceptualized by Purcell is helpful for 
two reasons. First it places arbitration in its social context. When we examine the 
claims disputing behavior of corporations, as opposed to other types of disputants, 
we gain a much different perspective of the motivations, aims, and justifications 
of arbitration that we would if we examined their use amongst smaller-scale 
disputants.54 Second, the conception is historical. It assumes that arbitration has 
not always been motivated for the same reasons. This can help us better answer 
the question as to why arbitration has only expanded to such a degree in recent 
times, as opposed to at other points in history.  
 
Finally, the effects of the transformation can be better understood by placing them 
in the broader context of the history of corporate disputing.55  And though 																																																								
53  Edward A., Purcell Jr. . Litigation and Inequality: Federal Diversity 
Jurisdiction in Industrial America, 1870-1958. New York, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992: 3.  
 
54 Amy J. Cohen "Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of 
Scale." (2009). 
 
55 Some key contributions to this area of study include. Terence Dunworth, and 
Joel Rogers. "Corporations in court: Big Business litigation in US federal courts, 
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seemingly innocuous (and according to many, even benign), they are in fact, very 
politically important. By allowing particular interests of extraordinary 
concentrated economic power like multinational corporations to administer 
disputes according to rules developed by privately appointed arbitrators, 
arbitration negates the regulatory impact of public courts. The net effect of this 
transformation is the creation of a largely opaque “regulatory space” that has 
disempowered governments, regulators, and the public at large, from directly or 
indirectly interfering with the proceedings. The development of private systems of 
arbitration modifies, delocalizes, and in some cases disrupts the public systems of 
adjudication they exist in tension with. These changes are political because they 
alter structures of decision-making authority both at the domestic and 
international levels. Such changes to the structure of authority in both domestic 
and international orders cannot be dissociated from the central problem of 
political economy: who gets what and why. 
 
 
 
 																																																																																																																																																							
1971–1991." Law & Social Inquiry 21, no. 3 (1996): 497-592. Purcell, Edward 
A. Litigation and inequality: Federal diversity jurisdiction in industrial America, 
1870-1958. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1992. Macaulay, Stewart. "Non-
contractual relations in business: A preliminary study." American sociological 
review (1963): 55-67.  
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2. Context: A Counter-Revolution Through 
Arbitration Reform 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Suppose we were to privatize the provision of law for corporate relationships. 
How would this legal system differ from what we have today? As things stand now 
corporations can design almost all of the elements of their contractual 
relationships. They can even choose to have their disputes adjudicated in private 
arbitration systems, according to procedures designed by private arbitrators. – 
Gillian Hadfield56 
 
Arbitration is always melded into a particular culture and will always reflect 
existing currents of power; it could be socially neutral only if those currents were 
in equipoise; this never happens. – Ian Macneil57 
 
Is society justified in placing the responsibility for the resolution of business 
disputes in the hands of business itself? – Arthur Zariski58 																																																								
56 Hadfield, Gillian K. "Privatizing commercial law." Regulation 24 (2001): 40. 
 
57 Macneil, Ian R. American arbitration law: reformation, nationalization, 
internationalization. Oxford University Press on Demand, 1992. 
 
58 Archie, Zariski. “Dispute about Dispute Resolution: A Study in the Dialectics 
of Law and Economics.” Osgoode Hall Law School, 1990. 
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“Legal revolution” is a term that is normally used sparingly. Scholars use it to 
refer to landmark moments of legal change that have carried pervasive effects on 
society at large.59 The U.S. Supreme Court’s Lochner ruling, Roosevelt’s New 
Deal Constitutional Revolution, the US Rights Revolution of the 1960s, and the 
more recent Canadian “Charter Revolution” are all pivotal periods of legal 
upheaval that have had an extraordinary impact on the Rule of Law in the North 
American setting. Although these events fall short of the momentous breaks with 
the characteristic of past revolutions like the French Revolution or the October 
Revolution, legal scholars use the “legal revolutionary” label to capture the 
sweeping character of these events.60 These events have fundamentally re-shaped 																																																								
59For a general review of “legal” revolution, see Harold Berman’s magisterial 
work in which he traces the origins of legal revolution throughout Western 
history. See Harold Berman, Law and Revolution, II: The Impact of the 
Protestant Reformations on the Western Legal Tradition (Harvard: Harvard 
University Press, 2009) Hauk Brunkhorst emphasizes the specifically legal 
dimension of the great revolutions of the past. In his words “All great revolutions 
are legal revolutions that create a new level of normative constraints which are 
implemented through legal and constitutional norms.” Hauke 
Brunkhorst, Critical Theory of Legal Revolutions: Evolutionary Perspectives. 
(New York: Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2014), 83.  
 
60 Alfred C. Aman Jr. identifies the New Deal era, the environmental era, and the 
global era as marking three crucial turns in the 20th century administrative state 
Alfred C. Aman Jr. The democracy deficit: Taming globalization through law 
reform. (New York: NYU Press, 2004). 
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the nature of modern government. They altered the distribution of rights and legal 
protections for groups and individuals, brought about new administrative agencies 
and regulatory initiatives, and overhauled the powers of the state. But perhaps 
most importantly, these legal revolutions changed the way that people thought 
about law. They actualized political possibilities that had hitherto been considered 
illegitimate or “unthinkable” in the prior order. The revolutionary label is used to 
designate these legal ruptures’ sweeping character. 
 
This chapter examines a historic transformation that has been characterized as a 
legal revolution (at least by its proponents) but which nevertheless bears a much 
lower profile in the popular imagination than the events I have just named. Unlike 
the revolutions of the past, it is not characterized by charged oratory, popular 
struggle, or even “politics”, at least not in any conventional sense of which we 
think of these. I am addressing what an increasing number of legal professionals, 
judges, corporate officials and scholars now refer to as the “arbitration 
revolution”61; the remarkable rise of arbitral institutions over the last forty years 
and the manifold changes to Rule of Law that have followed in its wake. 																																																																																																																																																							
 
61 Many commentators have invoked the term “arbitration revolution”. Thomas 
Carbonneau, one of the most prolific writers on arbitration, including domestic 
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and international arbitration, analogizes the rise of arbitration to a “revolution in 
law”. One of the most pronounced features of this revolution is the sheer 
increased use of arbitration. As he writes, “It is not a hyperbole to state that civil 
justice or adjudication in the United States (or in international cases) is achieved 
primarily through arbitration.” Thomas E., Carbonneau. “Revolution in Law 
through Arbitration, The Eighty-Fourth Cleveland-Marshall Fund Visiting 
Scholar Lecture.” Cleveland State Law Review 56 (2008): 236.  
 
Writing in 1984, Eric D. Green characterized the corporations’ widespread 
adoption of alternative dispute resolution as a “revolution”. See. Green, Eric D. 
"Corporate Alternative Dispute Resolution." Ohio State Journal on Dispute 
Resolution. 1 (1985): 206.  
 
According to Thomas Stipanowich, former director of the Center for Conflict 
Prevention (formerly the CPR), an advocacy group which seeks to promote the 
use of arbitration in the corporate sector, describes the corporate turn towards 
non litigious forms of dispute resolution as a “revolution”. Stipanowich, Thomas. 
"Arbitration: The New Litigation.” University of Illinois Law Review 2010, no. 1 
(2010): 24.  
 
In the Canadian setting, the Mulroney government’s adoption of UNCITRAL 
Model Law in the 1980s is said to have inaugurated its own “arbitration 
revolution”. Kenneth-Michael. "Redefining Public Policy in International 
Arbitration of Mandatory National Laws." Defense Counsel Journal. 64 (1997): 
271.  
 
Likewise, the widespread adoption of arbitration clauses in consumer and 
employment contracts has been dubbed as a revolution. Horton, David, and 
Andrea Cann Chandrasekher. "Employment Arbitration After the Revolution." 
(2015). In the words of Stephen Huber, “An arbitration revolution has taken place 
in recent years that has dramatically reshaped the law and practice of contracting, 
and the resolution of disputes between parties to contracts.” Huber, Stephen K. 
"The Arbitration Jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit." Texas Tech Law Review. 35 
(2004): 497.  
 
As Patti Waldmeir of the Financial Times writes, “Americans may have not 
noticed this truncation of their rights but that does not mean they did not agree to 
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2.What Kind of Revolution?  
 
Even a cursory overview of the changes that are associated with the arbitration 
revolution suggests that it is unlike those with which political scientists and 
historians are familiar. For one, it is only in the remotest sense connected to what 
most people think of when they think about revolutionary conflict. As Lawrence 
Stone, the eminent scholar of the English Revolution reflected, revolutions are 
normally associated with abrupt transfers of political power and total overhauls of 
systems of rule, often by violent means.62 What could “arbitration”, defined in 
standard practice books as, “a contractual mechanism of dispute resolution”… in 
which a third party serves as a neutral decision maker” - have to do with all that? 
If anything, the resolution of conflict by a third party neutral seems to be like the 																																																																																																																																																							
it - or, for that matter, benefit from it. For the legitimacy of arbitration depends on 
consent; and to judge from the signatures on millions of contracts for everything 
from septic tank maintenance to executive compensation, Americans have 
consented to the arbitration revolution.” Patti Waldmeir, “How America is 
privatizing justice through the back door,” Financial Times, 30 June 2003, 
accessed April 20, 2017, https://global-factiva-
com.ezproxy.library.yorku.ca/ha/default.aspx#./!?&_suid=149272609462002932
545224003362 
 
62 Noting the often violent character of revolutionary activity. See. Lawrence 
Stone "Theories of revolution." World Politics 18, no. 02 (1966): 159-176. 
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precise opposite of conflict between ideologically charged partisans. Indeed, it 
was precisely for the attenuation of such conflict that Thomas Hobbes himself 
endorsed arbitration in the 17th century.63  
 
If arbitration itself is not associated with revolution, one might pose the same 
question about the arbitration system’s agents, what kind of revolutionaries might 
they be? The arbitrators and corporate lawyers who themselves practice 
commercial arbitration are not the first people to come to mind when one thinks 
of the charismatic authorities whose temperament for command was theorized by 
Max Weber.64 They work for corporate law firms. These are not people who are 
occupied with revolution in any ordinary sense of the term.  
 
Even when arbitration does enter the political arena, as it has in proposals to 
amend or even dismantle the Federal Arbitration Act, for instance, it seems to be 																																																								
63  Devine, Francis Edward. "Hobbes: The Theoretical Basis of Political 
Compromise." Polity 5, no. 1 (1972): 57-76.	
	
64 Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth see the original commercial arbitrators of 
continental Europe as wielding some form of charismatic authority, but 
interestingly, attribute the  “routinization of charisma” to the Anglo-American 
model of commercial arbitration.  Yves Dezalay and Bryant Garth, Dealing in 
Virtue International Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a 
Transnational Legal Order.  (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996)  
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at a good step’s remove from more hotly contested political issues like 
geopolitics, electoral contests, and Supreme Court appointments that dominate 
today’s headlines.65 Indeed, it seems fair to say that to an unacquainted observer, 
arbitration appears as a rather dry, technical affair, at considerable remove from 
the clamor that is characteristic of contemporary televised politics.  
 																																																																																																																																																							
 
65 With the notable exception of the recent Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership and Transpacific Partnership agreements, both of which contained 
provisions for arbitral tribunals in their initial conceptions, and thus, sparked 
mass public outcry arbitration has rarely been the focus of public attention. 
"TTIP protesters take to streets across Germany." The Guardian, September 17, 
2016. Accessed April 22, 2017. 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/sep/17/ttip-protests-see-crowds-
take-to-streets-of-seven-german-cities. More recently, there has been increasing 
attention on the unfair application of consumer and employment arbitration 
agreements in in fine print contracts.  Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert 
Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice, New York 
Times Dealbook (Oct. 31, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0  As Justice Rakoff writes, …companies 
have widely imposed mandatory arbitration clauses on their employees and 
customers, so as to deny them access to the courts, as well as to exclude them 
from exercising their constitutional right to a jury. In addition, since 
the Concepcion decision, most such clauses also forbid people with complaints 
to bring class action claims, even in arbitration. Jed. S., Rakoff, Why You Won’t 
Get Your Day in Court, New York Review of Books, (Nov. 24, 2016), 
http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/11/24/why-you-wont-get-your-day-in-
court/  
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What then, do these commentators mean when they speak of arbitration in 
“revolutionary” terms?  
 
What these authors are referring to is a transfiguration of law and its associated 
values. The arbitration revolution is used as shorthand to encompass at least four 
distinctive developments. These include 1) national governments’ and courts’ 
adoption of distinctly “pro-arbitration” laws and policies66 2) the expansion of the 																																																								
66 It is worth noting that designation “pro-arbitration” is itself contested. Scholars 
and arbitrator Margaret Moses notes that being “pro-arbitration” may mean 
radically different things in different disputing contexts. For example, the 
connotations of being pro-arbitration in collective bargaining setting are of an 
altogether different order than being pro-arbitration in the corporate setting. 
Margaret L. Moses "Arbitration Law: Who’s in Charge?," Seton Hall Law 
Review 40 (2011), 174-175.  Similarly, according to Tom Ginsburg, the often 
used term “pro-arbitration” should be understood as a euphemism that can 
usually be translated to mean “a fairly deferential” policy toward the review of 
arbitral awards. In his view, however, there is no universal rule for determining 
the validity of arbitral awards. Tom Ginsburg "The Arbitrator as Agent: Why 
Deferential Review Is Not Always Pro-arbitration." The University of Chicago 
Law Review (2010): 1013-1026.  For an overview of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
embrace of arbitration over the last forty years, see. Stephen L. Hayford 
"Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-1995: A Sea 
Change." Wake Forest Law Review. 31 (1996): 1. See also, Katherine Van Wezel 
Stone. "Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration 
Act." North Carolina Law Rev. 77 (1998): 931. More recent assessments of 
Supreme Court echo Hayford’s observation that the Court has adopted policy of 
deference to the rulings of arbitrators. See e.g, Hiro N. Aragaki, “The Federal 
Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform,” New York University Law Review. 89 
(2014), 1939.    
 
		 	
	 97	
arbitration services market and the marked increase in number of arbitration 
specialists amongst members of the legal profession67 3) the proliferation of 
arbitral forms of dispute settlement in new organizational settings68 4) greater 
willingness to use arbitration as a response to the loss of faith courts as efficient 
administrators of justice. 69   Together, these trends form an arbitration 
“movement” that is thought to have changed the courts and the values of fact-																																																								
67 Noting the proliferation of institutions, firms, arbitrators and auxiliary service 
institutions, particularly amongst Wall Street firms, see. Dezalay and 
Garth, Dealing in Virtue, 162. The Global Arbitration Review’s annual awards 
issue lists the total portfolio value of the top 30 global arbitration firms at over 1 
trillion U.S dollars. “Global Arbitration Review 30 - The Guide to Specialist 
Arbitration Firms 2013.” Accessed October 11, 2016, 
http://files.bakerbotts.com/files/Uploads/Documents/GAR%20100%202013.pdf.  
 
68 As early as 1984, Eric Green observed business’ increased consumption of 
arbitration services, see. Eric D. Green "Corporate Alternative Dispute 
Resolution." Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution. 1 (1985): 203. Julie 
Macfarlane identifies increased demand for arbitration services amongst the 
corporate sector. See, The new lawyer: How settlement is transforming the 
practice of law. UBC Press, 2008. David B. Lipsky and Ronald L. Seeber. "In 
search of control: The corporate embrace of ADR." University of Pennsylvania. 
Journal of Labor & Employment Law. 1 (1997): 133.  
 
69 “Practicability has emerged as the dominant force in the definition and 
implementation of law.” Carbonneau, “The Revolution in Law,” 234. As Julie 
Macfarlane writes “Both corporate and personal customers appear increasingly 
unwilling to passively foot the bill for a traditional, litigation-centered approach 
to legal services, preferring a more pragmatic, cost-conscious, and time-efficient 
approach to resolving legal problems.” Julie Macfaralen. "The Evolution of the 
New Lawyer: How Lawyers are Reshaping the Practice of Law." Journal on 
Dispute Resolution. (2008): 61. 
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finding, impartiality, fairness and truth that are associate with law, judging and 
adjudication more broadly.70  
 
These changes may appear disparate but they are all unified by a relatively 
straightforward system of belief; the view that arbitration is faster, cheaper, and 
more satisfying means of resolving legal conflict than courts of adjudication, and 
that such a system is the most appropriate means of managing disputes during this 
period of contemporary capitalism.71 Indeed, the technical literature, theoretical 
literature, and vast promotional literature suggests that concerns over costs and 
speed are the driving force behind the rise of arbitration.  																																																																																																																																																							
 
70Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law, 233. 
 
71John Lande notes the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution's campaign to solicit 
pledges from large corporations (and more recently, law firms) to consider using 
ADR disputing procedures. See "Getting the faith: why business lawyers and 
executives believe in mediation." Harvard Negotiation Law Review. 5 (2000): 
145. ICC arbitrator Janet Walker argues that the increasingly porous nature of 
national economies has generated increased demand for arbitration services. 
Janet Walker “Beyond Big Business: Contests between Jurisdictions in a 
Vertically Integrated Global Economy” (November 16, 2000). Law Society of 
Upper Canada, Civil Litigation Forum, Toronto 2007. Available at 
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=1490723 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1490
723 Gillian Hadfield argues that a private market for the adjudication of 
corporate conflict would benefit society by diverting disputes away from overly-
congested courts. Hadfield, Gillian K. "Privatizing Commercial 
Law." Regulation Magazine 24, no. 1 (2001).  
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Buttressing this belief system is a complementary view that arbitration is good for 
society as a whole. Arbitration may help resolve individual disputes, but at a more 
systemic level, it is believed to produce a series of desirable secondary-effects. 
Amongst other things, it is believed to decongest crowded court dockets, and to 
create faster, more efficient and responsive legal services. And when courts are 
able to defer disputes to private arbitrators, it makes room for more socially 
pressing cases to which they can then devote their attention. In short, arbitration is 
seen to be more efficient than litigation. Its benefits extend beyond the two parties 
involved in the dispute and benefit the legal system in its entirety. 72  
 																																																																																																																																																							
 
72 Proponents of investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS) argue that it facilitates 
international trade and commerce by enabling disputants to attract capital. When 
investors can bypass the parochialism and national favoritism that has been 
attributed to national courts, they gain assurance that their investment will be 
secure. “…parties face the threats of parallel or multiplicitous litigation in 
different national court systems, often located on one another's home territory, 
often facing local courts that may have parochial predispositions against one 
party or the other, and often producing judgments that cannot be effectively 
enforced. Court litigation also presents other pitfalls, such as forum shopping, 
conflicting court judgments, procedural quagmires, corrupt or inept decision-
makers and lengthy proceedings that can go on for years. Born, Gary. "BITs, 
BATs and Buts: Reflections on International Dispute Resolution." Kiev 
Arbitration Days (2012): 15-16. 
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3.Toward a Political-Economy of Arbitration 
 
All of this might suggest that the rise of arbitration is a rational response to 
difficulties associated with modern litigation, and as many claim, the best solution 
to legal conflict in a globalized economy.73 Such accounts, in my view, are too 
simplistic. They end up naturalizing what is in fact the very specific form of 
arbitration regime that has taken shape over the last forty years. Arbitration may 
appear like it has seamlessly and incrementally advanced to what it is today, but it 
is important to suspend the seemingly conventional views and take stock of the 
fact that not long ago, belief in arbitration74 was much weaker and ill-defined. It 
had far fewer proponents, and did not find as thoroughgoing theoretical exposition 																																																								73	Thomas Nathan Hale claims that international arbitration is a rational response 
to the problems associated with cross-border trade. Hale, Thomas, and Thomas 
Nathan Hale. Between Interests and Law. Cambridge University Press, 2015. 
Walker, Janet. "Beyond Big Business: Contests between Jurisdictions in a 
Vertically Integrated Global Economy." (2000). Rational choice theories also 
inform approaches to domestic arbitration.  
	
74 John Lande analogizes belief in arbitration to a religion. Lande, John. "Getting 
the faith: why business lawyers and executives believe in mediation." Harvard 
Negotiation Law Review. 5 (2000): 137. Ralf Michaels discusses belief in the 
“statelessness” of international arbitration as a religion. Ralf Michaels. "The 
Mirage of Non-State Governance." Utah Law Review. (2010): 31. 
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by legal scholars.75 The arbitration service sector was also much less developed. 
The arbitration business was not very large, though certainly playing a role in the 
adjudication of commercial conflict, it was not nearly as prestigious (or 
profitable) as it is has become today. Even though arbitration has been used by 
American business for sometime prior to the 1980s, it was not considered either 
reliable or serious enough for the high-stakes business disputes that were 
characteristic of Wall-Street litigation.  
 
Over the last forty years, the situation has changed markedly. Commercial 
arbitration, at one time delimited to a few specialist institutions, has become, in 
the words of one commentator “ubiquitous”. 76  Not only has belief in the 
advantages of commercial arbitration now widespread, but arbitration has risen 																																																								
 
75 Arbitration law was a largely technical subject – and the literature reflected the 
view of the arbitration specialist. As Stavros Brekoulakis argues “…the field of 
international arbitration scholarship has been developing in isolation from crucial 
theoretical developments in other legal and non-legal disciplines. Partly because 
of its close relevance to legal practice, arbitration was not originally considered a 
subject of academic importance.” Stavros Brekoulakis "International Arbitration 
Scholarship and the Concept of Arbitration Law," Fordham International Law 
Journal 36 (2013): 745-1767. 
 
76 Wilson, Jodi. "How the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal 
Arbitration Act." Case Western Reserve Law Reviwe 63 (2012): 91. 
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markedly in stature. Commercial arbitration has emerged from occupying a 
relatively minor position in the market for dispute resolution services to become a 
multi-billion dollar business. Corporations routinely use arbitration for high-
profile legal disputes. Commercial arbitration awards have been known to surpass 
the billion dollar mark, and decisions are routinely decided for high-stakes cases 
in virtually every area of commercial litigation. Virtually every firm on the 
AmLaw 100 ranking list, boasts dozens of arbitration specialists.77 Arbitration 
law, which scarcely featured in law school curriculums, has become integrated 
into regular course offerings and specialty degrees. The proliferation of arbitral 
institutions, the increasing size of the market for arbitration services, national 
governments’ and courts’ adoption of law and policy supporting arbitration, and 
last but not least increasing scholarly interest in arbitration would suggest that the 
arbitration revolution has been successful, and that it is “here to stay”.  
 
4. Corporations as Partisans of the Arbitration Revolution: 
 																																																																																																																																																							
 
77 “The legal 500 Ranking Tables, International Arbitration,” accessed April 23, 
2017.http://www.legal500.com/c/london/dispute-resolution/international-
arbitration#table_2405 
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Amidst increasingly scholarly interest in arbitration in all its forms, there is a 
dimension of the arbitration revolution that has not received much attention.  I am 
speaking of the corporate embrace of arbitration, as evidenced by the increased 
consumption of arbitration services by large-scale corporations on the Fortune 
500, by the proliferation of corporate litigators specializing in arbitration, and by 
corporate-led efforts to reform arbitration law.78 This is especially relevant in a 
corporate dominated economy like our own. As early as 1973, sociologist James 
S. Coleman observed that “individuals in society, natural persons, show a general 
and continual loss of power to corporate actors.”79 Coleman, along with a small 																																																																																																																																																							
 
78 The increased profile of commercial arbitration in the corporate sector may 
also be registered by observing the steadily expanding caseloads of the major 
international arbitration service providers including the International Chamber of 
Commerce (ICC), the American Arbitration Association (AAA) and the London 
Court of International Arbitration (LCIA). "Statistics - 2011." HKIAC-
Homepage. http://www.hkiac.org/index.php/en/hkiac/statistics (accessed March 
8, 2013). These “elite” providers are joined by boutique-style firms specializing 
in corporate disputing like JAMS International and the Silicon Valley Arbitration 
and Mediation Center. JAMS International  https://www.jamsinternational.com/, 
The Silicon Valley Arbitration and Mediation Center “serves the global 
technology sector by promoting business-practical dispute resolution. 
https://www.svamc.org. Corporate law firms have recruited retired federal and 
state justices amongst their ranks to act as arbitrators.  Former Prime Minister 
Jean Chretien acts as counsel in commercial arbitration , Bob Rae, former 
Premier of Ontario, is an arbitrator.https://www.cpradr.org/events-
classes/annual/past/2015/AM15_Brochure.pdf 
79 Coleman, James S. "Loss of power." American Sociological Review (1973): 13.  
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group of American sociologists and political economists of his generation, was 
drawing to attention to an increasingly ineluctable feature of the American 
capitalist system; corporations were growing in economic and political 
importance – and their power to direct economic affairs was increasingly isolated 
from countervailing forms of resistance like organized class power.80  
 																																																								80	 There is at this point a large-body of literature documenting the ascent of the 
large-scale business corporation over the course of the twentieth century – the 
transnationalization of its business operations, and the increasing power it holds 
over economic and political decision making. Bearle and Means observed in the 
1930s that 
“the huge corporation, the corporation with $90,000,000 of assets or more, has co
me to dominate most major industries if not all industry in the  United States. A ra
pidly increasing proportion of industry is carried on under this form of organizatio
n. There is apparently no immediate limit to its increase. It is coming more and m
ore to be the industrial unit with which American economic, social, and political li
fe must deal.” Adolf Bearle, and Means Gardiner C. The Modern Corporation 
and Private Property. (New Jersey, Transaction Publishers, 1991) 44.  
 
As C. Wright Mills later observed in 1958. “The economy—once a great scatter 
of small productive units in autonomous balance—has become dominated by two 
or three hundred giant corporations, administratively and politically interrelated, 
which together hold the keys to economic decisions.” Mills, Charles Wright. The 
power elite. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.  
 
As Robert Muller observed. “Between 1955 and 1970, Fortune’s 500 industrial 
corporations increased their share of total manufacturing and mining employment, 
profits, and assets from slightly more than 40 percent to over 70 percent." Ronald 
Muller “Global Corporations and National Stabilization Policy: The Need for 
Social Planning” in State Society and Corporate Power, eds. Marc R. Tool and 
Warren Samuels (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 1989). 437- 459. 
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Some forty-five years onward, the developments outlined by Coleman appear 
almost quaint compared to the staggering economic repertoire of the corporations. 
By virtually any measure of account, the large-scale, vertically integrated, limited 
liability multinational (MNC), is a formidable economic force. A typical 
corporation Fortune 500 controls billions in asset holdings, generates greater 
revenues than the annual GDP of entire nations, employs tens of thousands of 
employees, and manages operations across multiple continents. Corporate power, 
we are reminded at this point almost routinely in reports documenting the rise of 
the global one percent, who control the mass of the world’s wealth through stock 
and dividends is omnipresent.81 Not only have the firms that occupy the upper 
echelons of the Fortune 500 grown larger and wealthier, they command 
unprecedented influence in our daily lives. In agribusiness, entertainment, real-
estate, pharmaceuticals, digital technology, and defense contracting, corporate 
power has grown increasingly concentrated. Indeed, the modern corporation’s 
powers to direct human affairs have grown so great that the distinguished business 
historian Alfred Chandler analogizes these global business giants to “Leviathans”, 
institutions whose wealth and organizational capacities eclipse those of the 																																																																																																																																																							
 
81 Keister, Lisa A. "The one percent." Annual Review of Sociology 40 (2014): 
347-367. 
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emergent nation-state documented and theorized by Thomas Hobbes in the 17th 
century.82  
 
Corporations are not only important economically, their actions have a great 
impact on shaping the legal and political systems in which they operate.83 The 																																																																																																																																																							
 
82 For an account of the increasing power of agribusiness see. Joseph Baines 
"Food price inflation as redistribution: towards a new analysis of corporate power 
in the world food system." New Political Economy 19, no. 1 (2014): 79-112. In 
the film industry. McMahon, James. "The rise of a confident Hollywood: Risk 
and the capitalization of cinema." Review of Capital as Power 1, no. 1 (2013): 23-
40. In pharmaceuticals. Gagnon, Marc-André. The nature of capital in the 
knowledge-based economy: The case of the global pharmaceutical industry. 
(doctoral thesis, York University, 2009). In investment banking, see. Hager, 
Sandy Brian (2012): Investment Bank Power and Neoliberal Regulation: From the 
Volcker Shock to the Volcker Rule, In: Overbeek, Henk van Apeldoorn, Bastiaan 
(Ed.): Neoliberalism in Crisis, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, pp. 68-92. In 
defence and aerospace. Eric George, the Consolidation of the U.S Arms-Sector 
1990-present. Paper on File. Documenting the rise of the global tech-giants see. 
“World Investment Report - Investment and the Digital Economy.” 2017. United 
Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development. http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/wir2017_en.pdf.  
 
It is no exaggeration that corporate activities can be analogized to those 
undertaken by nation states. Steve Coll, writing on Exxon-Mobil’s foreign 
investment strategy, speaks of its activities much in the way one might speak of a 
state. “As it expanded, Exxon refined its own foreign, security, and economic 
politics. In some of the faraway countries where it did business, because of the 
scale of its investments, Exxon’s sway over local politics and security was greater 
than that of the United States embassy.” Coll, Steve. Private empire: ExxonMobil 
and American power. Penguin, 2012. 
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tension between democracy, given expression through popular sovereignty and 
the idea of equality before the law, and concentrated economic power, is a 
recurrent theme in the history of political-economic thought. The tendency of 
powerful economic interests to dominate political life is a thesis most often 
associated with the thought of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, but it also features 
prominently in the American tradition of political economy in the works of 
Thorstein Veblen, John Dewey, Adolf Bearle, Gardiner Means, and James 
Galbraith. The American tradition of political-economy, unlike the European, 
focused less on revolutionary class conflict, and more on the institutional 
parameters (legal, political, cultural) that shaped what Veblen called the “new 
order” of business enterprise. The new order was characterized by the general 
obsolescence of the state as an industrial unit, and the increasing importance of 
both the captains of industry and the pecuniary interests of finance.84 																																																																																																																																																							
83 As Greg Shaffer writes, “To assess the relation of business to law, one must 
thus examine how law is created and applied through public institutions, how it is 
created and applied through private entities, and how these systems interact, 
including between the national and the transnational levels.” Shaffer, Gregory C. 
"How Business Shapes Law: A Socio-Legal Framework." Connecticut Law 
Review 42 (2009): 150. For an overview the effect corporations have on law, see. 
Galanter, Marc. "Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its 
Users." Buffalo Law Review 53 (2005): 1369.  
 
84 As Veblen wrote “As an industrial unit, the nation is out of date. This will have 
to be the point o departure for the incoming New Order. And the New Order will 
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The study of corporate power has an important intellectual lineage, but the idea 
that corporations exert disproportionate influence over politics is intuitively true 
to any observer of modern politics.  Corporate campaign contributions, political-
action committees, and political candidates like Donald Trump, Paul Ryan, 
Michael Bloomberg and Linda McMahon color the American political arena. 
Indeed, over the 2016 election cycle, Finance, Real Estate and Investment (FIRE) 
firms spent some $2 billion on campaign contributions to Federal candidates, and 
both presidential candidates were criticized for their cash-raising activities from 
corporate donors.85  
 																																																																																																																																																							
take effect only so far and so soon as men are content to make up their account 
with this change of base that is enforced by the new complexion of material 
circumstances which condition human intercourse. Life and material well-being 
are bound up with the effectual working of the industrial system; and the 
industrial system is of an international character - or it should perhaps rather be 
said that it is of cosmopolitan character, under an order of things in which the 
nation has no place or value.” Thorstein Veblen, Essays in Our Changing 
Order (London, Read Books, 2013). 
 
85 Allison, Bill, and Mira Rojanasakul, Brittany Harris and Cedric Sam. 2016. 
Tracking the 2016 Presidential Money Race. Bloomberg. December 
16. https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/graphics/2016-presidential-campaign-
fundraising/ 
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Law is a vehicle through which business asserts its power. Business influence on 
our legal system finds expression in many ways, from the innocuous to the more 
politically pronounced. First and perhaps most starkly, corporations are the most 
dominant consumers of legal services. As John P. Heinz and Edward Laumann 
argued in their classic study, Chicago Lawyers, the Chicago Bar was segmented 
into “two distinct, largely separate hemispheres” one serving corporate clients, the 
other smaller business and individuals. That is to say that the legal profession was 
a near mirror reflection of the relative importance of the corporation in American 
society. The upper hemisphere legal profession serving corporations drew more 
income, was more prestigious, and their actions were more politically and 
economically impactful than those in the bottom hemisphere.  According to Heinz 
and Laumann, lawyers representing corporations had access to decisions that were 
“more likely to have important effects on the allocation of scarce goods and 
resources, on the manner of development and use of both public and private 
property, and on the course of governments.”86 The legal profession, was in their 
view, “overdetermined” by the relative dominance of corporate actors in 
American society. As they wrote, "The social power of the corporate sector of the 																																																								
86 John P., Heinz, and Laumann Edward. Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure 
of the Bar. (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1982). 322. 
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bar is, then, based in its perceived influence on the distribution of the wealth of 
the society, influence that is derived from the belief of corporate officers in the 
wisdom and arcane skill of these lawyers […]" 87  Corporate lawyers were 
powerful to extent that they commanded the continued patronage of their 
corporate clients. 
Corporations not only shape the law, they are creatures of law. Corporation owe 
their very existence to what has come to be known as the “legal fiction” of 
modern corporate personhood, a doctrine which emerged in the late 19th century 
endowing them with the same legal rights and protections as individual citizens.88 
As Lord Chancellor of England, Edward Thurlow famously proclaimed in the 
19th century, corporations had “no soul to be damned, no body to be kicked”.89 
Indeed, the corporation can sue, be sued, and as was starkly illustrated in Citizens 
United v. FEC, can seek protections for fundamental freedoms like the freedom of 																																																								
87 Heinz and Laumman. Chicago Lawyers, 383. 
 
88 For a history of the individual personhood doctrine in the 19th century United 
States, see. Horwitz, Morton J. "Santa Clara revisited: The development of 
corporate theory." West Virginia Law Review 88 (1985): 173. 
 
89 Coffee, John C. “No soul to damn: no body to kick": An unscandalized inquiry 
into the problem of corporate punishment." Michigan Law Review 79, no. 3 
(1981): 386. 
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speech.90 Indeed, as Laurence Baum has illustrated, even legal protections that 
have traditionally been associated with the protection of politically 
disenfranchised groups (free speech, discrimination, and voting rights) are now 
more likely to be exercised by corporations that individuals.   
As corporations have grown in scale, scope, technological sophistication and 
importance, so has their propensity to engage in, and in fact propel social conflict. 
This is not because corporations are malign actors, but because their primary 
objective of maximizing the interests of their shareholders so often clashes with 
alternate ideas of how society ought to function. Over history, the tension 
generated between business and society has shifted axis. In the 19th century, 
Marx theorized that capital accumulation directly conflicted with the interests of 
workers. The interests of capital and the working class were contradictory and 
irreconcilable, and thus beckoned a revolutionary solution. For most of the 
capitalist West, the rise of the welfare-state in the twentieth century attenuated the 
conflict between labor and capital. Faced with social unrest and increasingly 
demanding electorates, governments launched an entire range of policies and 																																																								
90 Kuhner, Timothy K. "Citizens United as neoliberal jurisprudence: The 
resurgence of economic theory." Virginia Journal of Social Policy & Law. 18 
(2010): 395. Baum, Lawrence, and Neal Devins. "Why the Supreme Court cares 
about elites, not the American people." Georgia Law Journal 98 (2009): 1515. 
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social programs to offset the economic anarchy associated with the laissez-faire 
order of the 1920s.91 The question became whether counter-cyclical monetary 
policy could overcome the problems of recession and unemployment. In the 
1960s and 1970s, new forms of rights struggles, progressive legislation, and 
litigation sought to rectify the problems of business dominance. Consumer 
protection laws, environmental regulations, and class-action lawsuits were used 
by progressives to accelerate social change, a tide of reform which inspired an 
entire generation of reform advocates to use litigation as a means of achieving 
social change.  
 
In the pursuit of profit, corporations come into friction with other actors and 
organizations who do not share the same goals as they do. Laws, regulations, 
public scrutiny, organized labor, political volatility, corruption, crime cyber-
attacks are all of these are potential sources of conflict that corporations face, or 																																																																																																																																																							
 
91 As Charles S. Maier writes “The Depression led voters to shatter the Western 
political coalitions of the 1920s even when it did not destroy democratic regimes. 
Distress forced governments in the 1930s to become employers of last resort; by 
the 1950s they were called upon to assure continuing economic growth as well as 
high employment at a given level of national income.” Maier, Charles S. "The 
two postwar eras and the conditions for stability in twentieth-century Western 
Europe." The American Historical Review (1981): 333. 
 
		 	
	 113	
very least - anticipate, on a more or less routine basis. Moreover, “non-human” 
factors like the finite nature of the earth’s natural resources, present tangible 
limits to future of corporate growth. These obstacles to the realization of business 
objectives are recurrent sources of tension in capitalist society.  
 
5. The Corporate Propensity to Litigate and the Search for Alternatives 
 
From a sociological point of view, contemporary corporate conflict, by which I 
mean corporations’ propensity to clash with other actors in the pursuit of their 
economic objectives, assumes a seemingly inexhaustible number of expressions 
ranging from the highly formal (litigation, regulation, collective bargaining, price 
competition) to the informal (environmental degradation, violations of workplace 
safety, crime), or what economists often call “negative externalities”. The 
corporate pursuit of profit places strain on the environment, upon workers and 
consumers, upon business competitors, and on virtually any social system that 
does not share its institutional aims and values.92  																																																								92	As, Marc Galanter writes “Such dissonance includes the "…concealment of 
information as it flows up the organizational hierarchy, the perpetuation of 
unrealistic belief systems, excessive optimism, and a bias against relinquishing 
commitments, even in the face of contrary evidence.” Galanter, Marc. "Planet of 
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The nature and scope of corporate conflict seems so wide in scope, variegated, 
and to assume so many different forms that it seems futile to speak about in 
general terms. Any attempt to document the “nature” of his conflict, in its totality, 
seems like a gargantuan effort that is a relic of the grand-theorists of the 19th 
century like Comte, Saint-Simon, Engels and Marx, but definitely ill suited to the 
specialized nature of our contemporary social sciences. Still, it is possible to zero-
in on some of the better-catalogued expressions of corporate conflict. One of its 
formal manifestations, which gives us a reliable documentary trace of their 
general “appetite” for social friction is the lawsuit.93  Corporations are very 
litigious. In the United States, the country in which still most of the globe’s 
largest corporations are headquartered (although at a declining rate), corporations 																																																																																																																																																							
the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its Users." Buffalo Law Review. 53 
(2005): 1374. 
  
93 Scholars associated with the Wisconsin Business Disputing Project have shown 
the multiple means by which corporations settle conflict. Strategies include 
settlement, mediation, arbitration, litigation – and sometimes outright “neglect”. 
Dunworth, Terence, and Joel Rogers. "Corporations in court: Big Business 
litigation in US federal courts, 1971–1991." Law & Social Inquiry 21, no. 3 
(1996): 497-592. See also Baar, Carl. "The Myth of Settlement." In delivery at the 
Annual Meeting of the Law and Society Association, Chicago, Illinois. 1999. 
Galanter, Marc. "Planet of the APs: Reflections on the Scale of Law and its 
Users." Buffalo Law Review. 53 (2005): 1369. 
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litigate more, more often, (and appear to win more) than any other classification 
of disputant.94 Consider the fact that in 2007, Wal-Mart, the global retail giant, 
and currently ranked as the largest corporation on the Fortune 500 with a market 
capitalization of 271 US$ billion, is estimated to have faced some form of lawsuit 
at a rate of about twice an hour.95 Indeed, a less documented aspect corporations’ 
path to economic dominance has their increased litigiousness - not just against 
consumer and workers, but against one another, an issue that has given rise to a 
decades long corporate lobbying campaign against the “high costs of litigation”.96  
 
Corporate efforts to reform the legal process to better reflect their interests have 
taken many forms, from the unobtrusive (increasing reliance on in house counsel) 
to the more unscrupulous (oil companies lobbying to terminate the Arctic 																																																								
94 Dunworth, Terence, and Joel Rogers. "Corporations in court: Big Business 
litigation in US federal courts, 1971–1991." Law & Social Inquiry 21, no. 3 
(1996): 497-592.	
95 As the U.S.A Today reports “By its own count, Wal-Mart was sued 4,851 times 
last year — or nearly once every two hours, every day of the year. Juries decide a 
case in which Wal-Mart is a defendant about six times every business day, usually 
in favor of the Bentonville, Ark., retail giant. Wal-Mart lawyers list about 9,400 
open cases.”  
96 See Dunworth, Terence, and Joel Rogers. "Corporations in court: Big Business 
litigation in US federal courts, 1971–1991." Law & Social Inquiry 21, no. 3 
(1996): 497-592. 
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National Wildlife Refuge).97  Many of these have directly targeted laws and 
policies that enable litigants to bring claims against them. Jay Feinman’s book 
Un-Making Law, for example, documents the rise of the tort-reform movement, a 
campaign led by conservative think tanks, business associations, and elite jurists 
that has sought to diminish corporate exposure to tort liability by rolling back the 
gains made by the Rights Revolution of the 1960s and 1970s.98   
 
Another strategy that the corporate sector has pursued in response to threats 
presented by the increasingly litigious nature of their environment has been a shift 
toward privately administered forms of adjudication like commercial arbitration 
and alternative dispute resolution (ADR). This campaign to place adjudication 
under private control, I argue, constitutes a form of politics pursued by private 
means, what the American legal realists called “lawmaking by private groups”.99 																																																																																																																																																							
 
97 Nelson, Robert L., and Laura Beth Nielsen. "Cops, counsel, and entrepreneurs: 
Constructing the role of inside counsel in large corporations." Law and Society 
Review (2000): 457-494. 
 
98 Feinman, Jay M. "Un-Making Law: The Classical Revival in the Common 
Law." Seatle UL Rev. 28 (2004): 1. 
 
99 Jaffe, Louis L. "Law making by private groups." Harvard Law Review. 51 
(1937): 201. 
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Although it is ostensibly designed to make litigation less time consuming and less 
costly, thereby enabling firms to pass on cost-savings to consumers, greater 
reliance on arbitration has in fact allowed corporations to avoid the regulatory 
authority of the state, as well as to negate the potentially damaging aspects of 
public exposure. By effectively privatizing adjudication, arbitration has altered 
the corporation as an object of economic governance, thereby allowing it to 
engage in strategic disputing behaviors that would not otherwise have been 
possible in courts of law. For all these reasons, the wider commercial arbitration 
system, I argue, should be thought of as means by which corporations have led a 
structural change in the distribution of power in the legal system. 
 
6. Theorizing Arbitration and Political-Economic Power 
 
This is not the first study to examine the relationship between economic power 
and arbitration. Many studies have focused on the abuse of arbitration when the 
parties of are unequal bargaining power, what have come to be known as 
“asymmetric bargaining” scenarios. However, with the exception of Heinrich 
Kronstein’s “Arbitration, Instrument of Private Government” written in 1944, and 
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his later 1962 piece “Arbitration is Power”, there has been very little criticism of 
commercial arbitration between corporations. There is a good reason for this. 
Unlike employment arbitration, consumer arbitration, and investment arbitration 
between investors and government, commercial arbitration usually involves 
disputes between actors of roughly equal bargaining power. The agreement to 
arbitrate is consensual. Both parties voluntarily agree to waive their right to a 
public trial before a dispute even emerges between them. Since commercial 
disputants can only enter into arbitration with “eyes wide open”, commercial 
arbitration is seen to be far less subject to manipulation that other forms. With the 
exception of the potential for arbitrator bias, it is generally not seen how, or why 
arbitration between commercial disputants might be unfair, forced, or engender 
relations of power. 
 
This line of reasoning is understandable, but it overlooks a phenomenon of great 
importance, the more general regulatory role of the courts in governing corporate 
behavior through private law enforcement, and the subsequent dilution of this 
power achieved through corporations’ increased use of commercial arbitration. 
This requires a suspension of the still widespread belief (attributed to hegemonic 
liberal legalism) that courts are not invested with real regulatory powers. 
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Although it is true that judges are not regulators, virtually everyone except the 
most austere formalists acknowledge in some way or another that courts have, and 
continue to play an important role in regulating the behavior of corporate actors 
through rule enforcement, deterrence, and informal tactics of “naming and 
shaming”. Arbitration changes this. By privatizing adjudication, commercial 
arbitration places the adjudication of corporate disputes under business control, a 
qualitative shift that would appear to open the possibility of strategic 
manipulation, dilution, or redundancy of the courts’ regulatory role. 
 
Given the increased importance of multinational firms in the global political 
economy, and the intensification of legal conflict between them, this dissertation 
seeks to answer the following questions: what is the significance of the corporate 
turn from litigation to private forms of dispute resolution like arbitration and 
ADR (alternative dispute resolution), and how have these forms of dispute 
resolution altered the relationship between business, government, courts and the 
state? If courts play a role in governing corporate behavior, then what happens 
when the adjudicative power is placed in the hands of corporations themselves? 
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The corporate embrace of arbitration constitutes a revolution in the adjudication 
of commercial conflict, a revolution that has markedly altered the regulatory 
powers of the state. The corporate drive toward commercial arbitration is not just 
responsible for changing the way that business disputes are adjudicated 
(conceived in a technical sense), it has altered the legal conditions (read, political) 
to which businesses are subject, enabling new forms of strategic behaviors that 
have markedly increased their power. This dual transformation, on the one hand, 
initiated by changes to law and policy, but also, by increased consumption of 
arbitration “products” I shall argue, is best conceived as a political-economic 
shift. The arbitration revolution has involved a re-articulation of state power that 
has altered the function of the judiciary, and the ability of courts, regulators, and 
citizens to govern corporate behavior, a process that has hamstrung society’s 
ability to govern corporate conduct effectively.  
 
As I hope to show, the corporate sector is increasingly committed to investing in 
commercial arbitration, not only financially, but also, politically – at least in terms 
of lobbying, engaging in public relations campaigns, and through the activities of 
the U.S Chamber of Commerce.  Indeed, since the 1980s, corporations have 
increasingly sought the use of private alternatives to litigation. In Canada, the 
		 	
	 121	
U.K. the United States and other countries in which pro-arbitration regimes are in 
place, corporations (and large-scale multinational corporations in specific) have 
embraced a variety of arbitration mechanisms including international commercial 
arbitration, domestic arbitration and various forms of alternative dispute 
resolution (ADR) as means of managing business related conflict.  
 
Before illustrating how the contemporary arbitration lobby is using arbitration as 
a mechanism of political transformation, then next chapter provides a historical 
context by focusing the business actors and lawmakers who lobbied in favor of 
the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925. This historical backdrop shall help identify 
common political and regulatory themes between present day arbitration and the 
arbitration movement of the 1920s. 
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3. Corporate Power and the FAA 
 
1.Introduction 
 
 
The previous chapter presented an overview of the rise of commercial arbitration 
since the 1980s. It described the way that laws promoting the use of arbitration, 
the rapid growth of the arbitration service sector, and the use of arbitral forms of 
dispute resolution in new organizational settings had contributed to an “arbitration 
revolution” that had fundamentally altered the values and practices traditionally 
associated with adjudication. I then argued that arbitration reform is being used as 
a vehicle through which corporations can avoid forms of legal accountability that 
they view as an anathema to their interests. Specifically, I identified the way that 
corporations have lobbied for arbitration reforms as political response to what 
they perceive as encroaching regulatory authority and hostile courts, and the way 
they have integrated arbitration strategies into their dispute resolution 
management. The relations of power engendered by the corporate disputing 
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system need to be examined in greater detail and theorized historically in relation 
to the welfare state framework they are seeking to displace.100  
 
Arbitration is seen to involve contractual relations between two parties, and thus, 
to be an unambiguous “private law” relation, distinctly separate from political 
power properly speaking. 101  A broader, historical analysis will reveal that 
arbitration reform is politically and distributionally significant system of power 
because it alters the architecture of the capitalist state, and the way that corporate 
conflict is governed by regulators, judges, and the broader public. The rules and 
norms to which corporations are subject to in the course of commercial conflict 
may seem arid and technical, but they are very important instruments of public 
policy. Historically, the form that institutions of business dispute resolution has 
taken has been politically contested, both by business, but also by regulators, 
lawmakers and citizens. Anti-trust law and class-actions, for example, a forms of 																																																								100	Many private legal theorists have called for a closer examination of the hidden 
politics of private law engendered in contractual relations. Zumbansen, Peer. 
"Law after the welfare state: Formalism, functionalism, and the ironic turn of 
reflexive law." The American Journal of Comparative Law 56, no. 3 (2008): 769-
808.  Feinman, Jay M. Un-Making Law: The Conservative Campaign to Roll 
Back the Common Law. Beacon Press, 2004. 
	
101 Kennedy, Duncan. "The stakes of law, or Hale and Foucault." Legal Studies 
Forum. 15 (1991): 327. 
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commercial litigation that clearly involve broader public stakes than the resolution 
of disputes between two parties. In the 1960s and 1970s legal reformers sought to 
use litigation as a means of accelerating social change. Lawsuits were used to 
address issues relating to pollution and environmental degradation, workplace 
safety, consumer protection, and wage protections. Today, judicial privatization 
by way of arbitration is being used to diminish the impact or undo these policies.  
 
Arbitration reform allows disputants to resolve disputes under privately 
administered rules, thereby avoiding common-law precedent. It is being used to 
change the way court documents are collected and published. Most importantly, it 
alters business exposure to public oversight, creating asymmetries of information, 
and “information deficits” that change the way lawmakers, citizens, consumer and 
workers can respond to business behavior.  Such issues are amplified when we 
consider that modern disputes between corporations can reach stakes in the 
billions and involve a wide array of stakeholders including shareholders, workers, 
employees, and in the case of trade litigation, the economic vitality of entire 
industries.  
 
Corporate conflict is a regular feature of contemporary capitalism, but the way 
that it is perceived, managed, and ultimately decided has historically been subject 
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to political contestation. When corporate conflict is administered by business 
itself, new questions of legitimacy, distributive justice, and social values emerge 
that challenge our notions of what law is and what it is designed to do. 
 
Chapters four and five outline the way that arbitration reform is being advanced 
by pro-corporate lobby groups, the Supreme Court, and libertarian academics in 
such a way that makes it more difficult for lawmakers and the public to control 
and monitor corporate conflict. It also shows how watchdog groups, dissenting 
judges, and progressive law groups have sought to resist this particular pro-
business vision.  
 
To truly capture the significance of this modern reform movement, it is first 
necessary to situate arbitration reform historically. The present chapter does this 
by examining the coalition of business interests and legal professional that 
coalesced to design the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA). I stress the ideological 
framework through which they advanced their agenda, and the way that a 
libertarian inspired reading of FAA history is presently being used to aggressively 
push for pro-business reformers.102   																																																								
102 As Morton Horwitz illustrates brilliantly in the Transformation of American 
Law, business mobilization in favor of arbitration is not new - nor is business 
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Why is the early 20th century so critical to understanding the modern U.S. 
arbitration system?  With the exception of the present era, the 1920s was the most 
active period of arbitration reform in U.S. history. 103  It established federal 
legislation that reversed judicial suspicion of arbitration, thereby lending added 
legitimacy to the use of arbitration in a wide array of business settings including 
the textiles, banking, and insurance sectors.  The general economic setting in 
which this transformation occurred is also important. The arbitration reform 
movement emerged amidst one of the most rapid economic expansions in the 
nation’s history, during which the vertically integrated, limited liability 
corporation established its dominance over alternative forms of business 
organization.  
 
The discourse in which arbitration reform was packaged in the 1920s scarcely 
differs from that which lawmakers and businesses use today. Like today, reform 																																																																																																																																																							
antipathy to dispute resolution in courts of law. Horwitz associates business 
expressions of “anti legal sentiment” with periods of experimentation with private 
alternatives to court. Horwitz, Morton J. "The Transformation in the Conception 
of Property in American Law, 1780-1860." The University of Chicago Law 
Review 40, no. 2 (1973): 248-290. 
	103	Szalai, Imre Stephen. "Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the 
Lens of History." Journal on Dispute Resolution. (2016): 115. 
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efforts were overtly declared to respond to the mounting costs and delays 
associated with litigation in court.  Business, it was said, was unnecessarily mired 
by tedious and time-consuming litigation that could more swiftly be managed 
through arbitration. Making arbitration available to those who wanted it would 
decongest the courts and make justice available to the layman. Underlying this 
discursive commonality is a deeper set of ideological commitments. Arbitration 
reform was ideologically embedded in a conception of a free-market economy, 
unconstrained by government encroachment and oversight. Arbitration was seen 
to be a dominion of free-enterprise and managerial enlightenment over and 
against socialist or government controlled forms of arbitration. Arbitration 
reformers constantly made recourse values of contractual freedom, private 
autonomy, and self-regulation, all of which fit within the broad framework of 
laissez-faire capitalism. This language was ostensibly progressive in so far as it 
promised to cut down on unnecessary delays and guarantee litigants access to a 
speedy trial. But it was also wed to an anti-regulatory philosophy that saw legal 
conflict as a dominion that should remain controlled by business, not by external 
governmental authorities.  
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Once we understand the corporate interests, political-economic vision and legal 
justifications that converged in the making of the FAA, the neo-liberal contours of 
the present day arbitration system come into sharper relief. The political of 
arbitration discourse, as I shall show, makes it subject to ideological manipulation 
and distortion. In recent times, conceptions of progress through arbitration have 
been recast in such a way that gives business unprecedented control over the 
institution of “adjudication”. Thus, when the Supreme Court emphasizes the idea 
that arbitration agreements ought to be “rigorously enforced”, they also 
necessarily imply that they ought to be subject to minimal oversight and control 
from government authorities. 
 
The chapter identifies central elements of the laissez-faire paradigm that emerged 
in the 1920s, and how they have been resuscitated by the Supreme Court and the 
corporate arbitration lobby and select arbitration intellectuals to construct a neo-
liberal arbitration policy agenda.  When the U.S Supreme Court defends the 
“freedom of contract” with the aim of keeping arbitration fast, expedient and 
flexible, it is in fact resuscitating a Lochnerian vision of arbitration that seeks to 
bolster business freedom against judicial and state interference. Protecting 
disputes from public scrutiny is important to corporations.  Under this arbitration 
regime business disputants amass a wide range of strategic disputing advantages 
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that they otherwise would not have enjoyed in courts of law, including a form of 
“regulatory immunity” from the courts’ power, the ability to conceal information 
from court records, and the possibility of avoiding punitive damages and treble 
damages in the case of anti-trust.  The courts’ ability to oversee and administer 
corporate conflict is diminished, and their ability to govern corporate behavior is 
effectively circumscribed.  In the name of expediting legal conflict in such a way 
that suits the need of capital, what is being developed is a privately run, privately 
funded system of adjudication that yields to corporate demands for expedient, 
opaque forms of decision-making, that delimits public involvement in business 
activity, dampens the already quite delimited forms of democratic participation in 
the courts. It is very difficult for justice to flourish in such a system because all of 
the procedural safeguards that are necessary to produce it are curtailed. 
 
Present-day corporate lobbying campaigns to shape the arbitration system have an 
important precursor in the early 20th century arbitration reform movement.104 By 
examining the ways in which corporations sought to shape the development of the 																																																								
104 The Federal Arbitration Act sought to reverse longstanding judicial hostility 
to arbitration in the United States. As Wilson notes, “The FAA proved to be a 
turning point for arbitration, as it overcame judicial hostility such that arbitration 
agreements are now routinely enforced.” See Jodi Wilson, Wilson, Jodi. "How 
the Supreme Court Thwarted the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act." Case 
Western Reserve Law Review. 63 (2012): 91. 
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of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, we may better understand what is at stake 
in corporate lobbying efforts to reform arbitration today. Presently, the U.S 
Supreme Court, corporate actors, and arbitration professionals want to isolate 
commercial arbitration from public interference, and are reversing doctrines that 
previously put limitations on arbitration. Contemporary arbitration reform efforts 
mirror the past in at least two ways: They are wedded to a belief in the power of a 
self-adjusting market free from government interference. Proponents of 
arbitration present the beneficiaries of the arbitration system in universal terms, 
conflating the corporate interest with the interests of the general public.  
 
In focusing on these historical parallels, I want to challenge a commonly made 
political association, the tendency to identify arbitration (and the development of 
the FAA in particular) with progressive legal reform. To be sure, both progressive 
and pro-market forces sponsored the FAA. What modern commentators tend to 
overlook, however, are the specific political-economic interests of the business 
forces had in promoting the Act, and their willingness to adopt progressive 
discourse. Corporate lobbying in favor of the FAA not only alerts us to the way 
powerful economic actors sought to reshape adjudication broadly speaking, but to 																																																																																																																																																							
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discursive strategies which powerful economic groups present their own interests 
as legitimate to the wider population. 
 
The first section of this chapter provides an overview of the debate over the FAA 
that has emerged in the wake of the Supreme Court’s recent decisions, 
specifically, AT&T v. Concepcion and American Express Co. v. Italian Colors 
Restaurant. I highlight the way that these decisions have inspired some legal 
historians to return to the origins of the FAA in search of an alternate narrative to 
the Court’s embrace of “contractualism”, the idea that arbitration agreements 
should be enforced according to their terms. While I am sympathetic to efforts to 
identify the political stakes at play in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, I believe 
that efforts to retrieve a progressive jurisprudence from the FAA overlook a 
countervailing set of social forces that also supported arbitration, powerful 
economic interests.  
 
In the second section, illustrate the nature and scope of corporate lobbying in 
favor of the FAA. I show how arbitration responded to structural legal problems 
that affronted corporations, and the way that arbitration figured within a broader 
economic vision of laissez-faire. The third section focuses on two intellectual 
exponents of “corporate” arbitration; Frances Kellor and Owen Young, and the 
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way that they envisioned arbitration as a means of addressing problems of 
corporate governance. The fourth section shows how corporations used arbitration 
as a means of regulatory avoidance, and of contending with the increasing 
regulatory powers of the Federal government. In the conclusion, I reflect the 
tension between public values and privatized dispute resolution, and the political-
economic contests that emerge therewith. 
 
2. The History of the FAA in Question 
 
The Federal Arbitration Act is the cornerstone of arbitration law in America. It 
overturned what had been a longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration by 
making agreements to arbitrate “valid, enforceable and irrevocable”. Prior to its 
passage, arbitration was much more ad hoc and unpredictable. While arbitration 
was certainly used in a wide array of settings, especially in maritime disputes and 
trade associations, judges were prone to overturn arbitration awards if they found 
that the arbitrator had erred in their decision, or had made a ruling that was 
contrary to existing law. The enforcement of an award depended, in the last 
analysis, on judicial discretion. The FAA changed all that by designating the 
proper scope of arbitration agreements, and by outlining criteria by which 
decisions could be challenged.  
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The FAA was passed nearly a century ago. But it has attracted a lot of scholarly 
attention in recent times. This turn to the history of the FAA is not merely a 
response to the increasing interest in arbitration and other forms of ADR. It is also 
takes aim at a series of U.S Supreme Court decisions which have used a particular 
reading of FAA history as justification for its pro-arbitration agenda. 
 
According to the Court, in passing the FAA, Congress not only intended to 
promote the use of arbitration, but to create a “liberal Federal policy” in which 
agreements were “rigorously enforced”. The criteria for challenging arbitration 
agreements, should thus be narrowed, in the name of keeping arbitration cost-
efficient.  
 
What I wish to emphasize is the way this particular reading of FAA history is 
being used to promote a neo-liberal policy agenda. What at first blush seems to be 
the Court’s unobtrusive promotion of arbitration is, upon closer examination, a 
pro-business doctrine that makes it very difficult to challenge arbitral awards, and 
which serves to make arbitration immune to outward challenges from judges, 
lawmakers, watchdog groups and citizens. 
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In what follows, I outline the parameters of the current debate over the FAA. I 
provide an overview of U.S Supreme Court’s current approach to arbitration. I 
then chart critical responses to the Court, and how they have sought to mine the 
history of the Federal Arbitration Act in search of a countervailing, progressive 
jurisprudence. This well-intentioned turn to history, I believe, overstates the 
degree to which the Court has departed from principles expounded by the 
founders of the FAA. As I shall show, another important element of the early 
twentieth century arbitration movement were corporate efforts to shape the 
arbitration system in ways that would shield capitalists from increasingly 
powerful forms of regulatory oversight and public interference.  
 
Recent histories of the FAA take aim at the implications of the U.S Supreme 
Court’s embrace of what it calls, the “emphatic” view of arbitration. According to 
this view, the Federal Arbitration Act was not merely designed to place 
agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as other contracts, but to actively 
promote the use of arbitration on a national scale. In AT&T v. Concepcion  and 
American Express co. v. Italian Colors, Justice Scalia restated the Court’s 
position, first stated in its 1983 Moses Cone decision, in which it decided that the 
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FAA signaled “a liberal policy strongly favoring arbitration”.105 The Moses Cone 
decision set the trend for the next decade. In subsequent rulings, the court ruled 
that the intention of the FAA’s architects was not merely to reverse judicial 
hostility to arbitration by making arbitral awards “valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable” (as is stated in section 2) but also, as it interpreted the Act, to 
actively promote the use of arbitration on a nationwide scale. On its own, this 
statement appears relatively benign. What critics have objected to, however, is the 
way this policy has been used to reverse laws and policies that sough to govern 
arbitration. These include, but are not limited to, judicial review of arbitral 
awards, public policy exception, measures that ensure fairness in arbitration etc.  
 
The Court’s arbitration jurisprudence has generated a considerable amount of 
backlash in the wider arbitration community.106 Critics have read the Supreme 																																																								
105	(“Section 2 is a congressional declaration of a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state or procedural policies to the 
contrary. . . . The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any 
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of 
arbitration . . . .”).		See 460 U.S. at 24–25	
 
106 See for example the New York Times investigation into the use of arbitration 
agreements in fine print contracts in October 2015, and more recently, by Justice 
Jed Rakoff of the Southern District Court of New York.  Jessica, Silver-
Greenberg, and Gebeloff Robert.  “Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of 
Justice.”  The New York Times. October 31, 2015, sec. 
Dealbook. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-
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Court’s decisions in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, and American Express Co. v. 
Italian Colors Restaurant, as marking a turn toward a distinctly pro-business 
vision of arbitration that reneges on its progressive origins, placing consumers and 
workers at a disadvantage against more powerful disputants.107  The betrayal of 
the FAA’s progressive principles takes many forms: It is manifest in the Court’s 
rulings against state law governing arbitration, in the turn against class-action 
arbitration, as well as in its reluctance to subject arbitral awards to review. Critics 
have argued that the Supreme Court has narrowly interpreted the FAA, denying 
citizens their right to trial and other forms of class-wide relief.  They claim that 
the Court’s willingness to enforce mandatory arbitration clauses, class-action 
waivers, and other fine-print arbitration agreements has served to deny consumers 																																																																																																																																																							
everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0.  As Justice Rakoff writes, 
“…companies have widely imposed mandatory arbitration clauses on their 
employees and customers, so as to deny them access to the courts, as well as to 
exclude them from exercising their constitutional right to a jury. In addition, 
since the Concepcion decision, most such clauses also forbid people with 
complaints to bring class action claims, even in arbitration.” Jed. S., Rakoff. Jed. 
S., Rakoff. “Why You Won’t Get Your Day in Court.” The New York Review of 
Books, November 24, 2016. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/11/24/why-
you-wont-get-your-day-in-court/. 
 
107 Aragaki, Hiro N. "The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform." NYUL 
Rev. 89 (2014): 1939.  Wilson, Jodi. "How the Supreme Court Thwarted the 
Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act." Case Western Reserve Law Review. 63 
(2012): 91.  Schwartz, David S. "Claim-Suppressing Arbitration: The New 
Rules." Indiana Law Journal 87 (2012): 239. 
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and employees access to the courts, while at the same time relieving businesses of 
unwanted litigation from weaker parties, evidence a pro-business bias.108  
 
This has set the stage for a return to the history of the FAA. In this context, a 
number of legal scholars have sought to probe the history of U.S arbitration to 
counter what they view as the Court’s one-dimensional (pro-business) 
interpretation of the FAA. Recent contributions to FAA history depart from the 
usual focus on business actors and emphasize the role of legal progressives in 
lobbying for arbitration reform.109 
 
Hiro Aragaki’s commentary on Italian Colors, as well as his exploration of the 
value of “freedom” in arbitration discourse, is the most cogent instance of this 
critical response. Aragaki takes aim at the Court’s narrow reading of the FAA. He 
argues that early 20th century arbitration reformers were not merely interested in 																																																																																																																																																							
 
108 Sternlight, Jean R. "Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?." Stanford 
Law Review (2005): 1631-1675. Schwartz, David S. "Claim-Suppressing 
Arbitration: The New Rules." Indiana Law Journal 87 (2012): 239. 
 
109 Aragaki, Hiro N. "The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural Reform." NYUL 
Rev. 89 (2014): 1939. Imre, Szalai. Outsourcing Justice: The Rise of Modern 
Arbitration Laws in America. Carolina Academic Press, 2013. 
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devising cheaper and faster alternatives to business litigation, but also committed 
to socially progressive change through procedural reform.  
 
As he contends,  
 
On what I shall call the “procedural reform model,” early twentieth-
century businessmen did not lobby for the FAA solely because they 
embraced Adam Smith’s invisible hand or Henry David Thoreau’s 
motto that “government is best which governs least.”  They also did 
so because they—and the judges and lawyers who supported them—
were desperate for qualitatively superior adjudicative alternatives to 
the increasingly unworkable public system of civil justice. 
 
To be sure, Hiro Aragaki does not take issue with Katherine Stone’s prior claims 
that a major force behind the FAA was the association movement, nor with Ian 
MacNeil’s identification of the New York Chamber of Commerce as a central 
force in lobbying for arbitration reform. The role of business in supporting the 
FAA is acknowledged, the shift is on emphasis. Thus, Aragaki acknowledges that 
business support for arbitration reflected a “commitment to freedom of contract” 
and “privatized dispute resolution”, he argues that it would be a mistake to derive 
that arbitration reform simply reflected a pro-business agenda. In Aragaki’s view, 
reformers were also committed to a progressive program of court modernization 
that sought to facilitate access to an alternative forum characterized by simplicity, 
flexibility, and intolerance of technicalities. 																																																																																																																																																							
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I agree with Aragaki’s assessment that the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in 
Italian Colors and Concepcion elevates the “freedom of contract” as the most 
important determinant in the enforcement of arbitral awards. This means that 
checks on arbitral power like state-law pre-emption, manifest disregard (explain), 
and public policy exception are secondary to the need to “enforce arbitration 
agreements according to their terms”. This would indeed seem to suggest that the 
Supreme Court’s approach to arbitration is “libertarian”. 110  Yet Aragaki’s 
response to this, an effort to rescue a progressive interpretation from the history of 
the Federal Arbitration Act, runs into three conceptual difficulties that merit 
closer scrutiny. The first problem is descriptive. In seeking to retrieve a distinctly 
progressive model of reform from the early 20th century arbitration movement, 
Aragaki actually underestimates the nature and scope of business lobbying efforts, 
and their strategic motives for doing so. The lobbying efforts of the New York 
Chamber of Commerce’ Committee on Arbitration and the Arbitration Society of 
America, the organizational harbingers of the arbitration movement, were in fact 																																																								
110 “By freedom of contract, I mean the enforcement of arbitration agreements 
with minimal regulation by the state - what the U.S. Supreme Court has 
described as “rigorously enforcing[ing]’ arbitration agreements according to their 
terms." Aragaki, Hiro N. "Does Rigorously Enforcing Arbitration Agreements 
Promote Autonomy." Indiana Law Journal 91 (2015): 1143. 
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dominated by corporate interests who did espouse the libertarian model of 
arbitration that he wishes to criticize. As I shall show in the next section, 
corporate mobilization in favor of arbitration reform was far greater than even 
mainstream accounts of the FAA acknowledge. Arbitration reform was not 
merely supported by trade associations and merchant’s organizations, but by some 
of the largest corporate firms in America. These firms wanted to diminish judicial 
and government tampering in their affairs.   
 
This descriptive problem, I argue, begs a political-economic question. Who 
benefited from the reforms enacted by FAA? Why was arbitration reform a 
priority for U.S corporations? And, by extension, nearly one hundred years later, 
who are the beneficiaries  of the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration policy? This 
question becomes all the more thorny when we consider the fact that the 
contemporary Supreme Court own rhetoric is progressive in its own right, 
mirroring early twentieth century’s focus on judicial morass, excessive 
technicality, cost, speed, accessibility and freedom. How were dominant corporate 
groups able to cast arbitration reform in such a way that appealed to members of 
the broader public?  Without foreclosing the possibility that can arbitration be 
used to meet genuinely progressive ends, I wish to argue that commitments to 																																																																																																																																																							
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progressive legal reform are much more ambiguous and open to manipulation 
than Aragaki suggests they are.  In fact, “progress through arbitration reform” has 
been the battle-cry of corporate-led arbitration campaign for years now. My point 
is that in the 1920s, just like today, the language of progressive legal reform 
permeates the discourse of those who favor the free-market model of arbitration. 
It thus becomes imperative to distinguish between genuinely progressive desire 
for reform from corporate ideology.  
 
 
3. Corporate Legal Mobilization in Favor of the Federal Arbitration Act 
 
Corporations were a major lobbying force behind the FAA. Their efforts, though 
nominally waged in the name of a progressive vision of legal order, were also 
aimed at promoting their own interests and shielding corporate power from public 
interference. While corporate support for the FAA does not necessarily preclude 
the possibility that its architects harbored progressive principles – it does beg the 
question as to how the needs of the corporate community were balanced with 
those of the more general population, and how these were reconciled into a more 
or less coherent legal ideology. I believe that this balancing act, I suggest, has 
become even more evident (and difficult to maintain) given the marked difference 
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between corporate disputing needs and the legal needs of the general population.  
If imbalances in the arbitration system are to be addressed, policymakers and 
jurists should pay greater attention to segmentations in the market for arbitration 
services, and the regulatory problems that these ineluctably give rise to. 
 
The claim that business supported and lobbied in favor of the Federal Arbitration 
Act, at least in its generality, is on its own, uncontroversial.111   Past histories of 
the FAA have documented the activities of a number of business and trade 
associations that lobbied in favor of the Act through the New York Chamber of 
Commerce, the American Bar Association, and the Arbitration Society of 
America, they have also pointed to the considerable support from merchant 
associations (mainly in New York and Chicago).112 
 																																																								
111 Indeed, the main spokespersons for the Act were representatives of private 
associations, not by elected officials, and the greater share of congressional 
testimony appears to have come from private interests.  As Szalai writes “During 
the 1924 Hearings regarding the proposed legislation, virtually all of the written 
and oral testimony came from witnesses appearing on behalf of or at the request 
of commercial interests.” Szalai, Imre S. "Modern Arbitration Values and the 
First World War." American Journal of Legal History 49, no. 4 (2007): 380. 
 
112  See e.g Ian, Macneil. American Arbitration Law: Reformation - 
Nationalization - Internationalization. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
Stone, Katherine Van Wezel. "Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under 
the Federal Arbitration Act." North Carolina Law Review. 77 (1998): 931. 
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Business support for the FAA is commonly attributed to three main forces.  The 
first is the New York Chamber of Commerce’ Committee on Arbitration, which, 
led by Charles Bernheimer and Julius Cohen, launched a massive lobbying 
campaign seeking to promote the use of arbitration amongst both business and the 
broader public.113  The second is what Katherine Van Wezel Stone identifies as 
the “association movement”, the increasing national prominence of trade 
associations that arose under by Secretary of Commerce, and future president, 
Herbert Hoover - who would later serve on the board of the American Arbitration 
Association. 114  The third is the American Bar Association’s Committee on 
Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, who produced the first draft of the bill.  
 																																																								
113 Part of this campaign involved promotional work. "Arbitration Week" in 
1923, Charles L. Bernheimer "arranged a program in which more than fifty trade 
and commercial organizations participated". Ian, Macneil. American Arbitration 
Law: Reformation - Nationalization - Internationalization. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1992. Jerold S., Auerbach. Justice Without Law? (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 1983), 23. 
 
114  Since many trade associations already had well-developed, privately-
administered systems of arbitration in place to resolve disputes amongst their 
members, they were naturally in favor of efforts to bolster the legitimacy and 
national profile of arbitration. “The growth of commercial arbitration went hand 
in hand with the explosive growth of trade associations in the 1920s.” Stone, 
Katherine Van Wezel. "Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act." North Carolina Law Review. 77 (1998): 978. 
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Katherine Stone’s work presents the most comprehensive attempt to locate 
business influence over the development of the FAA. In her view the FAA was 
corporatist, (by which she means that arbitration reform saw private-led initiatives 
as substitutes to government-led regulation). Increasing reliance on arbitration, in 
her view, can be understood as a by-product of Secretary of Commerce Herbert 
Hoover’s vision of private-public cooperation.115 
   
Part of the problem can be attributed to the very language that is used to describe 
actors in the arbitration system. Most studies mirror the language of early 20th 
century business representatives in speaking of the use of arbitration by 
“merchants” and “traders” as opposed to “capital” or “corporations”. In so doing, 
however, they commit themselves to a certain conceptual short-circuiting that has 
the effect of diminishing the importance a radical transformation in business 
organization that shaped the early 20th century American economic system, the 
rise of the corporation. At a semantic level, it is true that corporations are 
“merchants” and “traders”. But the commerce and trade in which corporations 																																																								
115  France’s Kellor’s largely promotional book, American Arbitration Law 
remains the most extensive source of documentation on the FAA’s corporate 
support base. Kellor, Frances. American Arbitration: Its History, Functions and 
Achievements. Beard Books, 1999. 
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engage is on altogether different scale and scope than which prior configurations 
of business did.  By the 1920s and 1930s, it had become increasingly evident to a 
new generation of American political economists that corporations had grown to 
such size as to make prior conceptions of a competitive market economy - 
characterized by competition amongst many buyers and sellers, out of joint with 
the reality of economic concentration.116 In adopting such descriptive terms, 
scholars have overlooked the way in which support for both Bernheimer’s 
Committee on Arbitration and Moses Grossman’s Arbitration Society of America 
hailed from elements of the ascendant U.S. corporate sector, and the extent and 
scope of their political mobilization in favor of arbitration.  
 
Indeed, the period 1910-1930 (the period of which the arbitration movement grew 
to its height) was also characterized by extraordinary advancements in corporate 																																																								
116 While corporations are in one sense - “merchants” in so far as they engage in 
“commerce”, they are also concentrations of economic power with the wealth, 
managerial powers, and vast networks of planning necessary to conduct 
operations on a national and international scale.  It was precisely these features 
that led a new generation of political economists in the 1920s and 1930s for 
obstructing the principles of liberalism. Berle, Adolf Augustus, and Gardiner 
Gardiner Coit Means. The modern corporation and private property. Transaction 
publishers, 1991. Veblen, Thorstein Bunde. Essays in our changing order. 
Transaction Publishers, 1964. Corey, Lewis. The House of Morgan: A Social 
Biography of the Maters of Money. G. Howard Watt, 1930. 
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organization, and saw the consolidation of business giants including General 
Motors, Ford, General Electric, the Radio Corporation of America, Westinghouse, 
and the Sears Roebuck corporation, many of whom were part of lobbying efforts 
in support of commercial arbitration.117 These firms rapidly rose to a position of 
dominance in the American economy. 
 
To gain a sense of the magnitude and scope of corporate backing for the FAA, it 
is instructive to observe the general membership of the New York Chamber of 
Commerce, acknowledged by virtually all histories as a driving force in the 
arbitration movement.  Between 1910-1930, the period roughly coinciding with 																																																								
117  The Arbitration Society of America (later to become the American 
Arbitration Association in 1926) was founded in 1922 by a number of prominent 
business figures and former justices. Its founders included Jules Bache, owner of 
one of the largest broker firms in New York and majority shareholder in the 
Chrysler Corporation, Julius Rosenwald President of Sears Roebuck corporation, 
Felix S. Warburg, of the European banking dynasty, John D. Rockefeller of 
Standard Oil. 117 When the Association was renamed The American Arbitration 
Association in 1926, Anson Burchard, president of General Electric, would later 
serve as the American Arbitration Association’s President. “Decennial Report of 
the American Arbitration Association 1926-1936.” American Arbitration 
Association , 
1936. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104315850;view=1up;seq
=3. 
 
Chandler Jr, Alfred D. The visible hand. (Harvard University Press, 1993.) Berle, 
Adolf Augustus, and Gardiner Gardiner Coit Means. The modern corporation 
and private property. Transaction publishers, 1991.  
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the height of the arbitration movement, the commodities traders that had 
dominated the Chamber’s membership in the late 1900s were increasingly 
eclipsed by directors of large-scale corporations.  The Chamber’s 1922 annual 
report, for example, lists chief executives from virtually every major sector of 
American industry including banking, insurance, rail, radio and 
telecommunications, oil and gas, retail, automotive, and textiles.118  These include 
the leaders of some of largest industrials in the United States, including Gerard 
Swope, President of General Electric, Owen D. Young of Chairman of the Radio 
Corporation of America, Jules Bache, investment banker and majority shareholder 
of Dome Mines, and Charles M. Schwab, President of U.S. Steel.119   
 
On its own, the incidence of these corporate magnates amongst the Chamber’s 
membership is nothing more than suggestive. It does not provide sufficient 
evidence to suggest that the FAA was necessarily any more “pro-corporate” than 																																																																																																																																																							
 
118  “Sixty Fourth Annual Report of the Corporation of the Chamber of 
Commerce of the State of New York for the Year 1921-1922.” 
https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015067348808;view=1up;seq=5. 
 
119 “Decennial Report of the American Arbitration Association 1926-1936.” 
American Arbitration Association 1936. 
 https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104315850;view=1up;seq=3. 
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favored “small business” or any other classification of merchant.  For example, it 
is possible that elements of the Chamber’s activity took a passive stance on the 
arbitration, and left organizing activities to the Chamber’s Committee on 
Arbitration.  Yet there is evidence that corporate sponsorship of the Act was more 
than just salutary or incidental, but in fact, heavily enmeshed in the planning 
process.  Frances Kellor, who acted as vice-president of the American Arbitration 
Society (which changed name to the American Arbitration Association in 1926), 
wrote a largely promotional, but nevertheless informative history of the 
arbitration movement in 1948 entitled American Arbitration, its History, 
Functions and Achievements. 120   In the section “Builders of American 
Arbitration” she lists some of key business patrons of the Arbitration Society.  
These included Julius Rosenwald, President of Sears Roebuck corporation; Felix 
S. Warburg, of the renowned European banking dynasty; and John D. Rockefeller 
of Standard Oil.  Anson Burchard, vice-president of General Electric, would later 
serve as the first president of the American Arbitration Association, the result of 
the merger between Berheimer’s Arbitration Foundation and Moses Grossman’s 																																																								
120  Frances Kellor. American Arbitration: Its History, Functions and 
Achievements. (New York: Beard Books, 1999)  
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Arbitration Society of America.121 By 1936, six years after the Federal Arbitration 
Act was ratified by President Coolidge, the AAA’s board of directors, led by 
Thomas J. Watson, CEO of IBM, includes an even broader base of corporate 
support.  They include Samuel McRoberts, vice-president of National City Bank 
of New York and president of Metropolitan Trust Company, P.W Litchfield, 
president and chairman of the board of GoodYear Tire and Rubber Company, 
Frederick Ecker, president of Metropolitan Insurance Company, and John 
Otterson of Western Electric.122 
 
What, apart from desire to “have arbitration agreements enforced according to 
their terms” (a phrase so often deployed today) motivated corporations to endorse 
the emergent commercial arbitration system?  Despite evidence that corporations 
sponsored the activities of the arbitration lobby, the documentary record is 
limited, making it difficult to answer this question with certainty.  The memoirs of 
corporate magnate, diplomat and lawyer Owen Young, and the writings of France 																																																								
121 John N. Ingham. Biographical dictionary of American business leaders. Vol. 
1. (New Haven: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1983.) 
 
122 “Decennial Report of the American Arbitration Association 1926-1936.” 
American Arbitration Association , 
1936. https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.35112104315850;view=1up;seq
=3. 
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Kellor, however, give a more in-depth look into the organizational efforts 
undertaken by leaders of the U.S corporate sector amidst the reform movement.  
 
 
4. American Arbitration’s Corporate Visionaries 
 
In this section, I show how two figures in the early twentieth century arbitration 
reform movement articulated a vision of arbitration that would serve the interests 
of the American corporate sector.  
 
Of all the business magnates in the arbitration movement, Owen Young, who 
served as chairman of GE, and later of RCA, left the most extensive commentary 
on arbitration. Both his official statements and memoirs give an even more 
revealing account of some of the regulatory matters that arose from the increasing 
ambit of the arbitration system, offering some clues as to why arbitration would 
have been particularly appealing to businesses at the time, and the ways in which 
it enabled corporations to shield themselves from regulatory scrutiny.  
 
Young had long been supportive of resolving business disputes by means of 
arbitration. As he wrote to his associate,  
		 	
	 151	
 
After active practice of nearly twenty years I am more and more impressed 
with the view that the lawyers must correct not only the form procedure in 
the courts but their own dilatory habits in order to effectively keep the 
judicial machinery in step with the needs of business. […] the delays in 
court today, compared with he speed with which business transactions are 
handled, are greater than they have ever been in the history of the world 
before. This means that the law is lagging further and further behind 
business.123 
 
It is safe to assume that Young’s experience of the dilatory habits of the legal 
profession was not of an abstract nature.  As CEO, he had first-hand experience 
with the litigation caseload faced by the newly formed RCA. In his letters of the 
time, Young speaks of the “legal warfare” RCA had become engaged in with 
AT&T its major competitor in the market for radio appliances.  The issue of 
broadcasting rights was particularly acrimonious, it involved a extraordinarily 
rapid divvying up of the national market amongst the radio giants – a plan 
explicitly endorsed by Hoover. 124  Unlike other countries in which national 																																																								
123  Josephine Case Young, and Everett Case Needham. Owen Young and 
American Enterprise, A Biography. (Boston: David R. Godine, 1982): 156. 
	
124 Young’s business and political career was illustrious. An attorney by training, 
he was appointed as general counsel of GE in 1912, and was later the company’s 
president in 1922.  He served as U.S envoy to the League of Nations and 
participated in the Dawes plan proposals during the Versailles treaty 
negotiations. Young would also serve as the CEO of the Radio Corporation of 
America (RCA) when it was created in 1919.  During his tenure at RCA, he 
forged close ties with two future presidents; Herbert Hoover (then secretary of 
commerce) and Franklin Roosevelt (then secretary of the navy). During his 
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broadcasting had been placed under state control, as secretary of commerce, 
Hoover was determined to place radio broadcasting under corporate control.125 As 
Young’s biographers note, “By 1925 the difficulties with patents and 
manufacturing were almost overpowering. The cutthroat competition which 
developed in the field as soon as it was clear that radio business meant money 
brought widespread pirating of the Radio group’s patents and constant 
litigation.”126  
 
The fact that a firm like RCA was mired in legal conflict helps why Young would 
want to arbitrate, rather than litigate disputes.  Eric Barnouw’s history of 
American broadcasting also points to other motivations for arbitration. Barnouw 
documents the way that arbitration enabled firms like RCA to avoid 
entanglements with the Federal government. In the years leading up to the FAA, 
RCA and AT&T had been engaged in a “bitter behind-the-scenes private war” 																																																																																																																																																							
tenure at RCA, he presided over the formation of a cartel agreement involving 
AT&T, GE, United Fruit, Westinghouse and Marconi electric which divided 
control of American radio broadcasting.  
 
125  Smulyan, Susan. Selling radio: The commercialization of American 
broadcasting, 1920-1934. Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1994. 
 
126  Josephine Young, Case, and Case Everett Needham. Owen Young and 
American Enterprise, A Biography. Boston: David R. Godine, 1982. 156. 
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over broadcasting rights. By 1924 they were involved in a massive Federal Trade 
Commission investigation charging them with “combined and conspired for the 
purpose of, and with the effect of, restraining competition and creating a 
monopoly in the manufacture, purchase and sale in interstate commerce of radio 
devices … and in domestic and transoceanic communication and broadcasting.”127 
In order to avoid the Federal probe, RCA and AT&T sought to revolve their 
broadcast licensing disputes in private, free from public oversight.                   
 
These first major phase of arbitration reform took place during the economic 
boom years of the late 1920s.  By the 1930s, the status of the commercial 
arbitration came under closer scrutiny when it was perceived to an expression of 
the moribund laissez-faire system that was not only antithetical to economic 
growth, but business performance as well. Owen Young’s vision of laissez-faire 
order would be subject to increasing challenge from the proponents of the New 
Deal, who sought to mobilize the state’s powers of economic coordination as a 
means of stabilizing the corporate order. By 1934, Thurman Arnold could write 
that “The arbitration machinery has become a device to maintain the aloof 
position of courts and to isolate them from the technique of investigation and 																																																								
127 Barnouw, E., 1966. A Tower in Babel: A History of Broadcasting in the 
United States to 1933, vol. 1. A Tower in Babel, . 
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conference.” And Heinrich Kronstein, a legal academic who had fled the Nazi 
regime, could write that arbitration was a form of “private government”, 
empowering cartels to collude together to fix prices and avoid anti-trust litigation.  
 
The second of these figures is Frances Kellor, who campaigned in favor of 
arbitration throughout the 1920s. Kellor was prolific. Her writings offer an 
insider’s view of the general significance of the emergent arbitration movement, 
and the important corporate connections involved in its making.  Prior to her work 
in arbitration, Kellor had been active in the Americanization movement, a 
movement that sought to politically assimilate and de-radicalize the growing 
immigrant population of the United States. The ostensible goals of this movement 
were to welcome European immigrants and to integrate them into the nation’s 
economic and political life. Yet such pronouncements served as a thinly veiled 
anti-Bolshevik political campaign designed to de-radicalize the immigrant 
population, whose exposure to then raging class conflict overseas had made them 
an important population to control.  
 
Kellor believed that arbitration had a fundamental role to play in what she called 
“industrial democracy” a cooperative scheme between, government, business and 																																																																																																																																																							
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labor.  As noted, an active anti-Bolshevik and advocate of the neutralization of the 
“immigrant threat”, Kellor believed that Americanism was the solution to 
America’s labor problem. The American social contract would not stem from any 
the common rights of man or abstract utopian declarations, but from government 
cooperation with industry and labor in the name of “industrial democracy”. The 
attenuation of class conflict could be achieved through the correct ordering of 
government and business institutions. Such rhetoric was popular at the time 
amongst business, government and progressive reformers alike.  Through feats of 
institutional engineering, the American system would transcend the class-divided 
politics that were miring Europe.128  
 
In Kellor’s vision business elites would play an important role in fostering this 
model of industrial democracy. As Kessler writes, Arbitration was, in her eyes, a 
means of fortifying American values at home and extending them abroad—and all 
by relying, as she always had, on the help of business elites. Indeed, it is striking 
to note that some of the very same financial magnates who assisted Kellor in her 																																																								
128 According to Kellor, the new industrial society hinged on the development of 
a new approach to governance—one in which “industry, labor, the government 
and the consumer become partners.” Kessler, Amalia D. "Arbitration and 
Americanization: The Paternalism of Progressive Procedural Reform." Yale Law 
Journal (2015). 
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capacity as leader of the Americanization movement went on to play a central role 
in the AAA. During her work in the anti-immigrant Americanization movement, 
Kellor had come into contact with powerful business magnates like Felix 
Warburg. It is noteworthy that despite the close relationships that Kellor forged 
with Rockefeller, Warburg, Astor, and other elements of the American ruling 
class, Kellor did not see the activities of the of the Arbitration Society as 
promoting the particular interests of the American corporate sector. In her view, 
arbitration was an instrument in the service of the “common good”.  
 
5. The Making of American Arbitration 
 
 
This chapter illustrated the way that corporations lobbied in favor of arbitration 
reform, and the laissez-faire ideological framework in which they advanced their 
agenda. It showed the way that arbitration was being used as a form of regulatory 
avoidance by some of the nation’s largest corporations, and the way that 
intellectual exponents of the movement like Charles Bernheimer, Owen Young, 
and Frances Kellor conceptualized the reform agenda. 
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The convergence of corporate giants in the arbitration movement, and the 
subsequent influence they exerted on its central institutions should cast doubt on 
the still widely held view that the arbitration movement was in the first instance, 
inspired by the values of progressivism.  While the movement did enlist the 
contributions of social reformers like Roscoe Pound, and saw business 
representatives speak of the importance of improving judicial machinery for “the 
layman,” such commitments seem to pale in comparison to the business forces 
that mobilized behind the FAA. 129 Instead of juxtaposing two mutually exclusive 
visions of arbitration, one dedicated to laissez-faire, another to progressive 
reform, the more interesting question is how the business has been able to 
successfully frame its campaign of judicial privatization in such a way that has the 
appearance of benefiting the common good. 
 
In chapters four and five, this historical overview of the FAA shall help shed light 
on a contemporary development; corporate efforts to insulate arbitration from 
public oversight, and to separate it from democratic control. When the U.S 																																																								
129 It provides a forum admirably adapted for the settlement of the troubles of the 
small man or the poor man who cannot stand the stress and expense of protracted 
litigation. Bernheimer, Charles L. "The Advantages of Arbitration 
Procedure." The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 124, no. 1 (1926): 99-100. 
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Supreme Court defends the “freedom of contract”, with the aim of keeping 
arbitration cheap, expedient and flexible, it is in the same stroke, dismantling state 
policies that placed arbitration under public supervision, resuscitating a 
Lochnerian vision of arbitration that seeks to bolster business freedom against 
judicial and state interference. By analogy, when arbitration theorists like Jan 
Paullson, Erin O’Hara and Lawrence Ribstein designate arbitration as a zone of 
freedom against the coercive powers of “state” encroachment, they are aligning 
themselves with a Hayekian philosophy of market freedom that has increasingly 
served as template for a pro-business counter-revolution against progressive 
regulation. 
 
Adherence to these principles does not just create a slanted form of jurisprudence, 
it also results in concrete advantages for business disputants.  Under the 
parameters of this particular arbitration regime - corporations amass a wide range 
of strategic disputing advantages that they otherwise would not have been able to 
manipulate in courts of law. The ultimate effect of this is the creation of a form of 
“regulatory immunity” from the courts’ power, both its formal powers to sanction 
commercial disputants, but also, the wide array of informal penalties and costs 
that come along with adjudication in court. Under the current arbitration system, 
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the courts’ ability to oversee and administer corporate conflict is circumscribed. 
Government and citizens’ knowledge of economic activity is diminished. In the 
name of expediting legal conflict in such a way that suits the need of capital, what 
is being developed is a privately run, privately funded system of adjudication that 
yields to corporate demands for expedient, opaque forms of decision-making, that 
delimits public involvement in business activity, dampens the already quite 
delimited forms of democratic participation in the courts, all ultimately bolstering 
corporate power. 
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4. The Political Economy of Arbitration Reform 
 
The process of depoliticization and the creation of state-free spheres is a 
political process.130 – Carl Schmitt 
 
1. Reviving Lochner Politics 
 
The previous chapter identified an ideological and material undercurrent 
informing the development of the Federal Arbitration Act. I argued that early 
twentieth century reformers embraced a vision of arbitration reform that was 
premised on the values of “self-government” and “private ordering”. This 
ideology placed emphasis on reducing the costs and delays of litigation while 
seeking delimit government and judicial interference in commercial disputes as 
much as possible. This framework emphasized the pre-eminence of corporate-led 
initiatives over public planning, and at the same time, warded off more collectivist 
(and militant) approaches to conflict resolution emerging from the labor 
movement. I further showed how the arbitration movement overwhelmingly 
received its financial and political backing from corporate dominated business 																																																								
130 Quoted in Renato Cristi. "Carl Schmitt and Authoritarian Liberalism: Strong 
State, free economy." (Wales, University of Wales Press, 1998). 
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associations. Business giants from virtually every economic sector including the 
banking, telecommunications, shipping, chemicals, the automotive sector, and 
textiles converged in their support as the FAA both directly, as well as through 
business associations like the New York Chamber of Commerce. Arbitration 
reformers adopted the discourse of progressivism to advance their goals, even as 
it was a predominantly elite-led, and corporate financed movement.131  
 
The period between 1870-1940 marked a time of extraordinary business 
restructuring in America that had important implications on patterns of business 
disputing and the structure of the courts more generally.132 As the scale and scope 																																																																																																																																																							
 
131As Jerold Aeurbach writes, “The problem, freshly perceived by New Dealers 
for whom corporate business was the new enemy, was not the legalization of 
arbitration but the immunity it provided business from public regulation. To them 
arbitration symbolized the deficiencies of a laissez-faire economy; law, constantly 
criticized by liberals since the turn of the century for retarding progress, was now 
rediscovered as an instrument of reform that protected public interests against 
private rule making. Auerbach, Jerold S. Justice without law?. Vol. 762. (Oxford 
University Press, USA, 1984.) 112. 
 
132 Alfred Chandler highlights the growth of modern corporation in the late 19th 
and early 20th century. Alfred D. Chandler. "Organizational capabilities and the 
economic history of the industrial enterprise." Journal of economic perspectives 6, 
no. 3 (1992): 79-100. “In the United States, […], the main thrust of the 
centralization of capital became vertical integration.” Giovanni Arrighi. The long 
twentieth century: Money, power, and the origins of our times. (New York, 
Verso, 1994): 295. 
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of conflict increased, as its frequency conflict intensified, corporations sought to 
alter the procedural and substantive rules that governed commercial conflict.133 At 
the height of the laissez-faire era, they designed a system of private law 
enforcement that would avoid cost and delay, as well as public entanglements in 
the resolution of private controversies.134 Since it significantly altered corporate 																																																																																																																																																							
 
133  Edward Purcell’s study of diversity litigation emphasizes the structural 
changes created by the rise of the corporation at the turn of the century. “The 
roughly three-quarters of a century from the 1870s through the 1940s constituted 
a period of rapid and massive industrialization that helped transform social and 
economic relations in the United States. The period also witnessed the emergence 
of large national corporations and their rise to positions of social and economic 
power. That complex historical development, in turn, produced an essentially new 
social type of legal dispute, one between aggrieved individuals and national 
corporations, and it generated literally millions of such disputes”. Edward Purcell 
A. Litigation and inequality: Federal diversity jurisdiction in industrial America, 
1870-1958. (Oxford, Oxford University Press on Demand, 1992.) 17. 
 
134 Gabriel Kolko has conceptualized the use of progressive political themes as a 
means of furthering capitalist objectives as “political capitalism”, as he argues,  
“Progressivism was initially a movement for the political rationalization of 
business and industrial conditions, a movement that operated on the assumption 
that the general welfare of the community could best be served by satisfying the 
concrete needs of business. But the regulation itself was invariably controlled by 
leaders of the regulated industry, and directed toward ends they deemed 
acceptable or desirable. In part this came about because the regulatory movement 
were usually initiated by the dominant businesses to be regulated, but it also 
resulted from the nearly universal belief among political leaders in the basic 
justice of private property relations as they essential existed, a belief that set the 
ultimate limits on the leaders possible actions.” Gabriel Kolko. The Triumph of 
Conservatism. (New York, Simon and Schuster, 2008.): 19.  
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exposure to countervailing forms of power (especially unwanted litigation), 
arbitration reform, I claimed, constituted an important, even if oblique - 
expression of political-economic restructuring. 
 
Statistical data on the extent and scope to which commercial arbitration 
agreements were used by corporations is very limited. While there is no body of 
arbitration cases available to determine the degree to which law-avoidance 
practices were pursued by corporations during the early stages of the arbitration 
reform movement, there are instances to suggest that they were important. 
Already in the 1920s, major radio corporations like the Radio Corporation of 
America (led by arbitration reformers like Owen Young) were using arbitration as 
a mean of curbing their exposure to the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. Already by the 
New Deal, critics of laissez-faire like Heinrich Kronstein and Philip G. Phillips 
were characterizing commercial arbitration as “an instrument of private 
government” and a system of “business anarchy”, suggesting that the commercial 
arbitration system was a site of deregulated lawlessness, the adjudicative 
expression of a pro-business laissez-faire order.135 While the New Deal critiques 																																																								
135 Heinrich Kronstein, who had fled the Nazi regime, was especially concerned 
about the use of arbitration by cartels, who would design self-serving agreements 
argued that business would use “ultilize the arbitration device for their own 
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did not substantively culminate in any fundamental alterations to the Federal 
Arbitration Act, they did set the stage for the public policy exception, and 
delimitations on the scope of arbitration practice in securities arbitration in the 
postwar era.136  
 																																																																																																																																																							
purposes, making use of the three basic functions of tribunals legislative, judicial 
and disciplinary.” Heinrich Kronstein. "Business arbitration instrument of private 
government." The Yale Law Journal 54, no. 1 (1944): 44. 
 
136 In Wilko v. Swan (1953), the Supreme Court held an arbitration clause in an 
agreement between an customer and a securities brokerage firm to be invalid. As 
the court ruled “[i]n unrestricted submissions . . . the interpretations of the law by 
the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal 
courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.” 346 U.S. 427 (1953) 
 
As Stewart Sterk observes “Arbitrators cannot be expected to sacrifice the most 
equitable resolution of the dispute between the parties in favour of the economic 
needs of society as expressed in the antitrust laws. This is not because arbitrators 
are any less capable or unbiased than judges, but because the task of arbitration is 
inconsistent with the purposes and functions of antitrust laws. Arbitrators are 
entrusted with the responsibility of working justice between the parties as it 
appears to them and without explaining their conclusions. Antitrust laws, by 
contrast, have little to do with justice between the parties. Thus, there is a choice 
to be made. Either arbitrators should be permitted to resolve disputes that 
implicate antitrust issues as they do other disputes - unbound by rules of law and 
at the possible sacrifice of antitrust policies - or they must be prohibited entirely 
from arbitrating such disputes. There is no middle ground consistent with the 
arbitration process as it has developed in this country.” Stewart E. Sterk 
"Enforceability of agreements to arbitrate: an examination of the public policy 
defense." Cardozo Law Review. 2 (1980): 481. 
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2. Arbitration Reform from the Lochner era to the Present 
 
This historical freeze frame of the development of arbitration law during the 
Lochner era, and the ensuing debate that it generated is instructive for my present 
purposes. It provides a frame of political-economic frame of reference that I 
believe helps to better understand the legal structure, political agents, business 
interests and ideological themes at play in contemporary arbitration reform.  
 
The U.S Supreme Court and the corporate arbitration lobby are not advancing 
arbitration reform in an ideological vacuum, they are spearheading it in 
accordance with a neo-Lochnerian doctrine that is inspired by the pro-business 
arbitration reforms I described in the previous chapter. This ideology is designed 
as a justification for giving corporations very wide latitude to determine the rules 
by which their disputes will be adjudicated, and to reduce and/or eliminate their 
exposure to countervailing forms of power. One way of putting this is that 
arbitration reform maximizes “individual autonomy” and “efficiency” but another 
is that it insulates corporate activity from unwanted forms of interference like 
regulators, judges, watchdog groups, consumer advocacy groups and citizens. 
This reform process is playing out at multiple sites of contestation. It has found 
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expression in Supreme Court judgments, in the policy proposals and amicus briefs 
of pro-corporate lobby groups, and in professional and scholarly representations 
of the arbitration system. Together it constitutes a relatively unified movement to 
create a privately financed, privately administered system of business disputing 
that is virtually insulated from public participation and discussion.  
 
The revival of arbitration reform modeled on laissez-faire thinking is not merely a 
throwback to early 20th century ideology. It is an intensification of it. 
Contemporary arbitration in fact radicalizes Lochner politics in such a way that 
almost completely insulates business arbitration from any form of governance, 
including state law, statutory law, and from common law principles of contract 
enforcement generally, as well as from being deliberated by regulators, jurists, 
social-scientists, and ordinary citizens. This means that arbitration reform is not 
simply an instance of “old wine in new bottles” as Ian Macneil once suggested. 
The Supreme Court, business associations, arbitration professionals and 
ideologues are seeking to push arbitration in a direction that is even further 
removed from any form of oversight or accountability.  
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The revivification of Lochner style politics finds expression in arbitration reform 
through: 
 
An emphasis on the strictly “private” character of commercial disputes. Just as 
the Lochner era crystallized the 19th century private/public distinction according 
to which contracts (including arbitration agreements) were considered to be 
separate from politics and public policy, so does modern arbitration dogmatically 
insist on the non-public character of private disputes, even in areas where there 
are clear ambiguities (anti-trust, class-actions, environment).  
 
1) A radical shift of scale in the business actors involved.  Just as the 1920s 
witnessed the emergence of the large-scale limited liability corporation to a 
position of economic dominance, altering the structure of litigation, the period 
1970-present has seen the rise of the multinational “mega-corporation” whose 
litigation behaviors differ substantially from those that prevailed during the four 
decades following the postwar period. 
 
2)  An emphasis on privately-led initiatives.  Arbitration reform was packaged in a 
variation of Americanist ideology in which private ordering was a harbinger of 
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the broader regulatory order. 4) Divesting private law enforcement of its public 
content. Corporate elites saw commercial arbitration as embodying a more 
enlightened, and superior order of justice than would have been possible through 
public channels.  As I shall show, these themes have resurfaced, even if in 
inconspicuous or latent form, suggesting that the broad acceptance of commercial 
arbitration in North American legal culture is more problematic than is 
conventionally assumed, and more pertinent to the study of political-economy 
than most commentators have realized.  
 
3) The legal framework of the Federal Arbitration Act remained intact through the 
postwar era, even as the momentum for arbitration reform diminished. The reason 
for this for the relative decrease in importance of commercial arbitration may be 
explained by decreasing rates of corporate litigiousness by corporate reluctance to 
engage in formal litigation tactics throughout the postwar period. Amidst 
conditions of rapid economic-growth, corporations tended to avoid litigation in 
favor of informal, non-binding modes of settlement that sought to avoid 
acrimony.137 The preservation of business relationships took priority over the 																																																								
137 Macaulay, Stewart. "Non-contractual relations in business: A preliminary 
study." In The Law and Society Canon, pp. 155-167. As Joel Rogers and Terence 
Dunworth summarize, “Manufacturers and their dealers, who engaged in 
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aggressive litigation tactics that later became the hallmark of Wall Street law 
firms during the 1980s.138 Even corporate litigation took a backseat to more 
lucrative aspects of lawyering like mergers and acquisitions and deal-making.  
 
Looking back nearly forty years onward, the parallel emergence of the arbitration 
movement, and the politics of neo-liberal economic restructuring are striking. As 
deregulation, denationalization, and increasing hostility toward the achievements 
of the Rights Revolution became palpable as a political force in the national 																																																																																																																																																							
relationships lasting for years, were unwilling to do anything to disturb the 
relationship, particularly something so extreme as threatening or starting 
litigation. Firms in long-term continuing relations, such as those Macaulay 
described, were likely to develop dispute resolution mechanisms that avoided 
lawyers and the courts. Continuing relations between businesses are valuable to 
the extent that the parties value future transactions, the stakes of the transactions 
are high, and there is a high probability of continued relation.” Dunworth, 
Terence, and Joel Rogers. "Corporations in court: Big Business litigation in US 
federal courts, 1971–1991." Law & Social Inquiry 21, no. 3 (1996): 497-592. 
 
138 William Nelson attributes the rise in contract litigation in the 1980s to the 
increasing array of social groups seeking representation through legal means, as 
well to conditions of increased competition amongst business. “To account for the 
long-term, nationwide increase, it is necessary to search for equally long-term 
transformations in the business corporations served by large law firms and in the 
elite legal profession itself. Important structural changes did, in fact, occur both in 
business and in law and the legal profession during the 1960s and 1970s.” “ The 
internationalization of business in the 1970s and 1980s has simply repeated this 
process on a larger scale.” Nelson, William E. "Contract litigation and the elite 
bar in New York City, 1960-1980." Emory Law Journal 39 (1990): 413. 
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politics, a legal movement sought to side-step the courts, was suspicious of 
judicial authority, and to promote privately led approaches to dispute resolution.   
 
Could there be a link between arbitration reform (expressed through hostility to 
adjudication) and neo-liberal restructuring (expressed through a preference for 
privatization over regulatory initiatives)? Modern critics of arbitration have 
focused on the erosion of public values that the increasing reliance on private 
tribunals has brought about.139 Arbitration, it is claimed, forfeits the integrity of 
civil procedure in favor of cheap, expeditious dispute resolution – as long as it 
agreed to by the parties. This chapter argues that the relationship between 
arbitration reform and the politics of neo-liberal privatization is closer than has 
previously been recognized. I claim that a distinctive body of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence, arbitration scholarship, and ideological production converges in a 
neo-liberal arbitration political doctrine that has opened the field for business to 
resolve disputes according to their own terms, while imposing significant 
restrictions on smaller-scale disputants. The ideal typology of this politics is 																																																								
139 Fiss, Owen M. "Against settlement." The Yale Law Journal 93, no. 6 (1984): 
1073-1090. Cohen, Amy J. "Revisiting Against Settlement: Some Reflections on 
Dispute Resolution and Public Values." Fordham Law Review 78 (2009): 1143. 
Resnik, Judith. "For Owen M. Fiss: Some Reflections on the Triumph and the 
Death of Adjudication." University of Miami Law Review 58 (2003): 173. 
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closest to what Timothy Kuhner calls “neo-liberal jurisprudence” – an effort to 
apply neo-classical economic principles to legal reform, while in the same stroke, 
dismantling the state’s regulatory powers and the gains of the 1960 and 1970s 
rights revolution. This is the policy by which jurists and corporations have 
advanced a politics of privatization through “non-political” means.   
 
The implications of my argument are that we rethink the way power operates 
through the arbitration system and private law generally, and how the arbitration 
movement has altered the relationship between corporations, law and the state.  
 
We should not be deceived by the apoliticial conceptions of efficiency and 
freedom at the heart of arbitration discourse. Arbitration reform involves a politics 
of redistribution that seeks to immunize business from unwanted forms of 
litigation. While the judiciary is not considered a regulatory institution, the 20th 
century has witnessed important contests over the court’s ability to govern 
economic policy.  Arbitration reform is a site of political-economic struggle in 
which this contest over the court’s broader “regulatory” role is brought into sharp 
relief. My claim is that, just as the Lochner era involved the judicial invalidation 																																																																																																																																																							
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of state and federal legislative efforts to regulate business, so does the new pro-
business arbitration regime severely delimit the ability of courts, government, and 
the public broadly, to govern arbitration agreements.140 
 
Neo-liberal arbitration reform needs to be distilled from the more universalistic 
discourse of “democracy”, “the common good”, “efficiency”, and “the Rule of 
Law” in which it is embedded. Most proponents claim that arbitration is aligned 																																																								
140 According to the dichotomy set out in Lochner, political power was vested in 
the legislative and executive branches of government. Private law constituted a 
sphere of property rights, individual liberty and private transactions that stood 
separately from politics. Laws and policies that infringed upon the private sphere 
were seen to be an illegitimate use of public power. Arbitration policy was 
perfectly in keeping with these ideological principles. The Lochner era was 
characterized by judicial invalidation of state and federal legislative efforts to 
regulate business. The Supreme Court’s 1905 Lochner decision involved the state 
of New York’s efforts to delimit the number of hours that bakeries could remain 
open. In this case, which subsequently came to emblemize an entire era of laissez-
faire jurisprudence, the Supreme Court invalidated a New York statute that 
limited bakery workers to a sixty-hour workweek as breach of the freedom of 
contract. As the court ruled there was “no reasonable ground for interfering with 
the liberty of the person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of 
labor, in the occupation of a baker. Lochner may have involved a seemingly small 
stakes dispute, but its symbolic effect was very great it impact. It effectively gave 
the nod to federal state and courts to strike down legislation that interfered 
business.140 It was not until the fallout of the stock market crash of 1929, and the 
subsequent economic crisis, that New Deal reformers sought to challenge the free 
market orthodoxy that Lochner locked in. Feinman. Feinman, Jay M. "Un-Making 
Law: The Classical Revival in the Common Law." Seattle University Law 
Review. 28 (2004): 1. 
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with liberal democracy because it defends individual rights and places great 
weight on the enforcing of contracts, themselves seen to be integral to private 
freedom from state encroachment. 141  In reality, such arbitration is radically 
conservative in that it revives dogmatic conception of laissez-faire – that markets, 
not public policy, are the best way of ordering the economy. These ideas 																																																								
141 As Edward Brunet writes, “In a democratic society, party autonomy should be 
the fundamental value that shapes arbitration. The personal autonomy inherent in 
arbitration con- stitutes a dominant policy in all areas of a democracy. The 
freedom to select arbitration procedure is a choice that one anticipates should 
exist in a state that values personal autonomy. Arbitration liberty is achieved by 
making party autonomy the highest priority in the pantheon of arbitration values.” 
Edward Brunet Jr. Richard E. Speidel, Jean R. Sternlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 
"Arbitration Law in America." (2006): 4. 
 
Thomas Carbonneau frequently asserts that arbitration is a pillar of democracy. 
“At a domestic level, arbitration has permitted the United States to maintain and 
reinforce the democratic character of American society by empowering a class of 
Americans, often neglected and ignored by the legal system, to have a right of 
redress of their grievances. Further, it allows merchants and companies to expend 
more resources on their commercial activities by supplying them with a frugal, 
fair, and final form of expert and effective adjudication. The Court's activity on 
arbitration during the last forty years has created a new civil procedure that 
warrants the attention, support, and endorsement of all American citizens. The 
legal experimentation with arbitration needs to continue to shape the character of 
American economic relations, society, and democracy.” Thomas E. Carbonneau 
"Judicial Approbation in Building the Civilization of Arbitration." Penn State 
Law Review. 113 (2008): 1367. 
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obfuscate the degree to which corporations in fact dominate the contemporary 
arbitration market. The end result is a vision of law in which asymmetries of 
wealth and power are naturalized, and in which efforts to correct such 
asymmetries is seen to be a violation of “individual liberty”, “the freedom of 
contract”, to sacrifice the inherent efficiencies of arbitration, and ultimately, 
present an affront to the “idea of arbitration” itself.  
 
The contemporary Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence, coupled with 
corporate America’s broad endorsement of commercial arbitration constitutes a 
political-economic shift of great importance. Not only has this dual shift 
ideologically aligned with Lochnerian principles of market freedom – it has in 
many ways, radicalized the early 20th century laissez-faire dogma by further 
empowering business to design contractual agreements without any government 
or judicial oversight. This creates a three-pronged policy shift that empowers 
corporations. On the one hand, it allows corporations to side-step the law and its 
disciplinary power, on the other, it allows them to design the terms of their 
contracts, creating a “procedural vacuum” that enables the pursuit of disputing 
strategies that courts might not otherwise enforce. Finally it creates conditions of 
near total opacity, blocking arbitration awards from being published discussed, or 
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debated. This amounts to a shift or privatization of political power in favor of 
companies and the commercial arbitrators who serve them. 
 
The embrace of neo-Lochnerianism involves a de-emphasis, and even 
abandonment on the “regulatory” paradigm that emerged in the New Deal, and 
later became a mainstay of arbitration law over the several decades of the post-
war period. It also involves a concomitant push toward privately administered 
binding dispute resolution. The end result is striking. Arbitration law is being 
pushed in a direction that is not merely “free-market” but in fact, corporatized – 
placed under the administrative control of the nation’s largest corporations, 
namely arbitration becomes a free-enterprise self-regulating part of the legal 
order. Even claims that arbitration is compatible with liberal democracy are 
difficult to square with the special deference courts now accord to arbitration 
agreements. Even neo-liberals like Hayek, who was highly suspicious of all 
socially oriented ordering, whether its expression was public policy, 
administrative law, or regulation generally wished for private law relationships to 
be guided by common-law principles. Arbitration reform is heading in such a 
direction that is hostile to both public policy and the common-law, and which 
departs from even conservative understandings of contract law.  
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This political shift is both legitimized and concealed by the resuscitation of a 19th 
century conception of private law, in which commercial contracts are thought to 
stand separately from public law and political power. While proponents of this 
doctrine believe that arbitration stands separately from politics and political-
economic power, I show that this seemingly apolitical doctrine is in fact 
permeated with direct and direct distributional implications. These include a 
narrowing, or effective termination of virtually all the criteria by which arbitration 
awards have traditionally been subject to review, invalidation, or annulment. They 
involve the creation of conditions of near total opacity, preventing accurate 
information about arbitration from being published and debated. Furthermore, the 
new free-market arbitration doctrine marginalizes those critical moments of 
arbitration history that delimited the applicability and scope of arbitration 
agreements.  
 
Judicial privatization, delimitation of state interference, opacity, the 
circumscription of traditional common-law principles, atomistic individualism, 
and depoliticization, I claim – are the central elements of a more or less unified 
neo-liberal doctrine that seeks to legitimize and conceal corporate power. This 
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makes it possible to identify contemporary arbitration ideology as a positive 
political doctrine, both in terms of the legal order it negates, but also in the new, 
deregulated order it seeks to create. Not only does it determinately spell out the 
parameters of a project of judicial privatization, it changes the very structure of 
U.S. arbitration law, a shift which spells important changes for virtually all levels 
of arbitration international, commercial, as well as employment and consumer 
arbitration. This is not merely a commitment to an abstract set of principles – the 
embrace of this governing ideology spells out very real consequences for the way 
that arbitration is organized, practiced, and the way that arbitration agreements are 
ultimately enforced.  What is being forged is a privately funded, privately 
administered, deregulated “legal space” that is tailored to the interests of 
corporate disputants, and that is paradoxically dependent on the sanction of 
government and the courts.  
 
From a policy point of view, what is important to seize from this critique is not 
that arbitration is inherently devoid of merit, or that litigation is necessarily 
superior to the type of justice that arbitration provides for disputants. Too often, 
criticism of arbitration is portrayed in a superficial binary of either/or that leaves 
little room for nuance or content. Either one is supportive of arbitration as a free 
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and efficient process, or one is in support of a rigid model of judicial procedure in 
which virtually all disputes, no matter how routine are litigated. These two poles 
are equally superficial. Even moderate reforms could be implemented to 
circumscribe the power of arbitrators, or to limit the egregious use of arbitration 
agreements, or to curb the use of arbitration in areas of commercial dispute 
resolution that affect public interests, the point is that virtually all of the modes by 
which arbitration was previously governed: through common-law, through state 
law, or through doctrines enabling the review or annulment of arbitration awards 
are being reversed. 
 
Neo-liberal arbitration law is not a neatly ordered doctrine, nor is it necessarily 
internally coherent. It comprises multiple, overlapping elements – some of which 
feature more prominently in some variants than others. Despite the apparently 
uneven and un-systemic character of such thinking, it is possible to positively 
identify five central “unifying” themes, and to locate them in concrete policy 
changes. These include: 
 
1) Privatization - Emphasis on privatization of adjudication coupled with the 
creation of a private, unregulated market for litigation services. This market 
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should subject to conditions of price competition that are absent in the public 
provision of adjudication services. 
 
2) Contractualism – The development of a “contractualist” interpretation of 
contracts that places emphasis on contract enforcement above procedural and 
substantive considerations, public policy, and common-law principles generally. 
This is effectively a Lockean understanding of arbitration in which the state’s role 
is delimited to honoring parties’ private agreements. From this point of view, 
efforts to enforce arbitration agreements according to alternative criteria are 
invalid, and a threat to the integrity of commercial arbitration itself.  
 
3) Atomistic Individualism - The embrace of a political-economic epistemology of 
“atomistic individualism” in which individuals resolve private law disputes as 
“equals”, a view which distorts the considerable asymmetries of power and wealth 
that may exist between disputants, but also, conceals the general control that large 
scale business actors have in the system generally.  
 
There are many purveyors of this doctrine, including jurists, corporate officials, 
business associations and scholars. Moreover, there are many degrees of 
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intellectual sophistication to the expression of neo-liberal doctrine, ranging from 
the promotional, to more sophisticated legal treatises and legal-economic 
analyses. Irrespective of its given form, not a single representative of these views, 
as far as I have been able to determine, self-identifies with conservative political 
ideology, or even embraces “neo-liberalism”, at least not in name. Nevertheless, 
my claim is that the manifest content of this body of thought contains a very 
conservative political-economic system of belief that has proven to be very 
influential as a source of public policy. Such thinking reinforces existing 
economic hierarchies by discouraging any form of public policy that would 
interfere with the “freedom” of “individuals”, even when such individuals are 
companies like Pfizer, Wal-Mart, Apple, Lockheed Martin and Royal Dutch 
Shell. This doctrine fundamentally informs arbitration practice, it has found 
expression in amicus briefs to federal and state courts- and more recently have 
served as the basis for the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence. It involves a 
depoliticized conceptualization of markets, private law, and of commercial 
conflict generally that harkens on 19th century classical legal doctrine. This is part 
and parcel of disavowal of the regulatory effect of private law enforcement, both 
presently and historically. This not only obscures the power implicated in the 
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exercise of the arbitrator’s power, discretely conceived, but in the power of the 
system, conceived in aggregate terms.   
 
In the following five sections, I illustrate the way that neo-liberal arbitration 
ideology advances these central motifs, and sites of arbitration reform in which 
this transformation is at play. 
 
3. Privatization 
3.1 Widening the Dominion of Arbitrability and Corporate Control 
 
Commercial arbitration has traditionally been treated as a species of private, not 
public law. At first blush, there is nothing controversial in this assertion. It simply 
reaffirms the classical private/public divide that crystallized in the late 19th 
century.142 According to this separation, public law concerns acts of regulation 
and politics and the application of coercive force. Private law, on the other hand, 																																																								
142 “Although one can find the origins of the idea of a distinctively private realm 
in the natural-rights liberalism of Locke and his successors, only in the nineteenth 
century was the public/private distinction brought to the center of the stage in 
American legal and political theory. “ Morton J. Horwitz. "The history of the 
public/private distinction." University of Pennsylvania Law Review 130, no. 6 
(1982): 1494. 
 
		 	
	 183	
involves the coming together of equals to resolve matters of property and contract 
law.143  
 
Upon closer examination, however, the act of asserting arbitration’s private 
status, is not just an act of legal classification, but a rhetoric of legitimation that 
neutralizes the relations of power that find expression through arbitration reform. 
It is important not to conflate the fact that commercial arbitration is private with 
the politics of privatization generally. The former involves a traditional legal 
designation, the latter a political-economic process whereby government services 
have effectively delegated the provision of public services to private actors. 
Although there are important points of contact between the two, they are not the 
same thing – and it is easy to confuse them, since the latter often masquerades as 
the former. This section examines the discursive parameters of arbitration reform 
and the way that neo-liberals have made a powerful case for delegating judicial 
powers to private arbitrators. 
 																																																								
143 Amr A. Shalakany. "Arbitration and the Third World: A Plea for Reassessing 
Bias Under the Specter of Neoliberalism." Harvard International Law Journal 41 
(2000): 419. 
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The politics of privatization through arbitration reform, I claim, that has become a 
hallmark of the U.S Supreme Court’s jurisprudence.144 It has been given financial 
backing by the corporate arbitration lobby, and defended by associated scholars 
and intellectuals. Its political significance lies in the fact that virtually all areas of 
commercial litigation can now be arbitrated by privately appointed arbitrators, 
irrespective of the stakes in dispute, and areas of private litigation that were 
traditionally considered to be of public importance can also be arbitrated behind 
closed doors.  Even grounds for the invalidation of arbitration agreements like the 
public policy exception have become increasingly narrow, suggesting that it is not 
uncommon for issues of public relevance to be arbitrated in forums that are totally 
removed from public deliberation.   
 																																																								144	The Supreme Court’ s pro-arbitration jurisprudence from Wilko onwards has 
been the subject of extensive commentary. This section only schematically covers 
this line of decision making, highlighting its dimensions of regulatory importance.   
For detailed overviews of the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, see Hayford, Stephen L. "Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme 
Court 1983-1995: A Sea Change." Wake Forest Law. Rev. 31 (1996): 1. Moses, 
Margaret L. "Arbitration law: Who's in charge." Seton Hall Law Review. 40 
(2010): 147. Stone, Katherine Van Wezel. "Rustic Justice: Community and 
Coercion Under the Federal Arbitration Act." North Carolina Law Review. 77 
(1998): 931. 
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Arbitration reform would be a very controversial affair if it meant that privately 
appointed arbitrators, with no obligations to the broader public, came to take on 
the powers of adjudication and lawmaking that is normally attribute to judges. 
The expression of such power would not only breach of Article III of the U.S 
Constitution145, which outlines the scope of the judicial power, but present an 
affront to the ideas of transparency, rationality, and accountability that are 
attributed to constitutional democracy.146 While nobody denies the fact that 
arbitrators act as surrogates to judges, the main line of defense has been to argue 
that the arbitrator’s power is not in violation of constitutional principles.  
 
The discourse of arbitration reform makes it seem like arbitral power is 
circumscribed by the arbitration agreement, and for this reason, to be politically 
unobtrusive. Since commercial disputes are not seen to involve the application of 
the state’s coercive power, but only the mutual agreement of equals to forego 																																																																																																																																																							
	
	
145 Rutledge, Peter B. "Arbitration and Article III." Vanderbilt Law Review.61 
(2008): 1189. 
 
146 Reuben, Richard C. "Democracy and Dispute Resolution: The Problem of 
Arbitration." Law and contemporary problems 67, no. 1/2 (2004): 279-320. 
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litigation in court, the arbitrator’s power is seen to be circumscribed by the terms 
of the contract, as well by as by federal arbitration law as outlined in the FAA. 
Moreover, the fact that arbitration is legal, and that commercial disputes involve 
matters of contract between parties of roughly equal bargaining power, 
theoretically serves to effectively delimit the arbitrator’s power over others. The 
decisions that commercial arbitrators make are understood to be legitimate so 
long as it involves two commercial parties who have agreed to the terms of the 
contract, and questions of public policy are not at stake. Underscoring this system 
of accountability is the public policy exception, an unwritten, but nevertheless 
acknowledged part of the federal arbitration law that has, in the past, been used to 
invalidate arbitration awards. For most commentators, this system serves to 
delimit the application of arbitral power.147 Like the systems of checks and 
balances that are the hallmark of constitutional democracy, and which contain the 																																																								
147 On the other hand, absolute deference is inappropriate. The Constitution vests 
the judicial power of the United States in the federal courts, not in arbitrators. 
Therefore, federal courts should review the merits when arbitration awards 
impinge on the judicial power. For example, courts have the responsibility to 
represent the general public interest and cannot permit a violation of public 
policy, enforce illegal contracts, or otherwise condone illegal behavior. Therefore, 
arbitration awards violating public policy or the law require federal court review. 
Randall, Bret F. "The History, Application, and Policy of the Judicially Created 
Standards of Review for Arbitration Awards." Brigham Young University Law 
Review. (1992): 759. 
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application of executive, legislative, and judicial power, the general architecture 
of the commercial arbitration system prevents the unfettering of arbitral power, 
and the egregious use of arbitration agreements to promote particular interests.  
 
In reality, the fault lines of the private/public separation, and the delimited zone of 
authority that it designates are not as clear as they are often presented by 
advocates of arbitration reform. Commercial arbitrators now routinely rule over 
questions of public importance – both directly and indirectly. What I mean by this 
is that the “private” activities of commercial arbitrators now involve the 
adjudication of multi-million dollar defense contracts 148 , environmental 
disputes149, anti-trust disputes, as well as class-actions involving thousands of 																																																								
148 The 2014 dispute between Raytheon and the U.K. Home Office, for example, 
not only involved a state security contract involving data collection for all 
travellers entering and leaving the U.K, but damages awarded to Raytheon for 
upward of £49,000,000. That is to say that a defense contract between the U.K. 
government and one of the globe’s largest arms dealers, which concerned matters 
of public security, and the use of public funds was left to the decision of a 
privately appointed LCIA arbitrator. Similarly, U.S. law and EU law now allow 
corporations to arbitrate anti-trust claims.  
 
149 Commercial arbitration has also been used to resolve environmental claims. In 
Anderson et al. v PG&E, the residents of Hinkley California, instituted private 
arbitration proceedings against the Pacific Gas and Electric Company. The 
dispute involved allegations concerning the contamination of water caused by 
chromium, a carcinogen, that had  alleging that the company had been discharging 
toxic water, into the groundwater system for more than forty years. As “Because 
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consumers. At present, such uses of arbitration are no longer “aberrations” from 
the norm, but regular features of modern business disputing. 
 
Such forms of corporate disputing were novel in the 1980s, but they have become 
normal features of the arbitration system. Private service providers like the AAA, 
the ICC and JAMS openly offer such services on the market, and openly advertise 
arbitration for environmental, anti-trust, and class action disputes. The widespread 
availability of such services, however, should not prevent us from seeing what is 
historically novel, and by extension, politically potent about the widening scope 
of the commercial arbitration system, especially as it pertains to disputes 
involving corporations. The increasing degree and scope of corporate disputes 
being decided by commercial arbitrators presents a shift of control that changes 
the legal conditions to which corporations are subject, and in turn, shifts the risks 
and rewards involved in the resolution of business controversies. Disputes not 																																																																																																																																																							
these proceedings took place during private arbitration, it is unknown what kind 
of scientific proof the plaintiffs’ attorneys presented and whether or not PG&E’s 
chromium pollution contributed to the ailments of Hinkley’s residents (and if so, 
to what extent). In fact, even some of the plaintiffs involved in the case did not 
know how it was settled, as they were discouraged from attending these private 
trials, and had to rely on attorneys’ letters to learn the details of the case 
proceedings.” Benoit Le Bars. 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Papers_for_Congress/106-
LE_BARS-International_arbitration_and_the_protection_of_the_environment.pdf 
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only involve substantive issues that pertain to public wellbeing, they also directly 
involve corporations’ ability to protect their public reputation, and by extension, 
their “property”. 
 
Arbitration may be a matter of private law, but the politics of privatization 
through arbitration reform is about subjecting increasing areas of law to private 
control, and concomitantly to delimiting the ability of the public to challenge it. 
The stakes in question are not only the ability to challenge corporations legally, 
but “information” more broadly, which could be used to make informed 
decisions. This broad shift, I argue, should in fact be thought of as a political 
doctrine has become a hallmark of the U.S Supreme Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence, given financial backing by the corporate arbitration lobby, and is at 
this point, defended by a wide range of professional and academic supporters. 
Taken together, the significance of this doctrine lies in the fact that virtually all 
areas of commercial litigation can now be arbitrated by privately appointed 
arbitrators, irrespective of the stakes in dispute or the wider public impact of the 
issues at hand. This is all supplemented by a systemic narrowing of criteria by 
which arbitration awards may be subject to appeal, challenge or review, 																																																																																																																																																							
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underscored by the creation of conditions of near total opacity that prevent 
meaningful discussion and deliberation of the arbitration system generally.150  
 
What is significant to seize from the point of view of political-economy is that 
judicial privatization has made it so that issues of distributional importance, 
including defense contracts, consumers disputes, anti-trust disputes, 
environmental disputes and class-actions can legitimately be arbitrated by 
commercial arbitrators. This involves on, the one hand, a delimitation of the 
state’s sphere of action, and on the other, an expansion of business power to 
determine the rules by which they will resolve questions of “justice” both in 
controversies between themselves, as well as with other individuals and groups. 
Finally, this politics creates conditions of opacity that conceal and make it very 
difficult to have a public debate about the merits of arbitration reform generally. 
This is not merely the result of corporations and lawyers devising strategies of 
law avoidance, but also, of policy-makers actively encouraging the use of 
arbitration, dismantling and diluting standards of review, while at the same time 
widening the scope of arbitrability.  																																																								
150 Hayford, Stephen L. "Law in Disarray: Judicial Standards for Vacatur of 
Commerical Arbitration Awards." Georgia Law Review. 30 (1995): 731. 
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3.2 Divesting Arbitration Reform of Political Content 
 
Despite this distinctive shift, arbitration is presented as though it were devoid of 
political content. Arbitration reform through privatization is portrayed as though 
it were politically innocuous or unobtrusive because it does not present an affront 
to judicial, legislative or executive power. Although it is acknowledged that 
arbitrators make decisions, and that their decisions are effective to the extent that 
parties are inclined to obey them, these decisions are conceived differently than 
the application of state force. 151  Since arbitration does not involve elected 
officials, acts of state, party politics, grassroots movements or any agents we 
normally associate with politics, it is for many professionals, jurists, practitioners 
and theorists, simply not politically relevant. 
 
Crucially, the apolitical representation of arbitration is not merely the result of 
systemic oversight, it is actually rigorously asserted and defended by jurists, legal 																																																								
151 As Jan Paulsson declares. “Acceptance of arbitration is a distinctive feature of 
free societies. It is rejected by totalitarian states. It is viewed with scepticism by 
enthusiasts of central planning.” Paulsson, Jan. The idea of arbitration. (Oxford 
University Press, 2013): 1.  
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professionals, and scholars.152  Its manifest content is a “negative image” of 
private relations that makes it seem like commercial arbitration is “frictionless” 
and devoid of political significance. What is most important to recall here is that 
efforts to depoliticize spheres of commercial activity, irrespective of their 
intention, themselves constitute political acts. Carl Schmitt captured this 
“declarative” politics when he saw the depoliticization of economic spheres as 
necessary for the purposes of creating an economic zone characterized by 
conditions of opacity and expediency.  The manifest expression of commercial 
arbitration may appear separate from those processes and activities that we 
associate with politics and public life, but that does not mean that they do not 
have any effect or bearing on the distribution of wealth and political power 
broadly.  
 																																																								
152 As Thomas Schultz suggests, “arbitration dependents” are “…people whose 
income, social status, intellectual recognition, or professional power, depends to a 
large extent on arbitration, on the continued existence of arbitration as we have 
known it for last few decades. For such people, arbitration must not change. They 
would fight tooth and nail to keep the arbitration system as it is, or similar to it, to 
protect it from possibly destabilizing interferences." Schultz, 
Thomas. Transnational legality: stateless law and international arbitration. 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013.): 3.  
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3.3 The Neo-Liberal Political Imaginary of Arbitration Reformers 
 
Even those who have associated arbitration law with politics, like Erin O’Hara 
and Lawrence Ribstein do in their book, The Law Market, mean so in the 
delimited sense that the market for arbitration services creates competition 
between lawmakers and private service providers. This, they argue presents a 
challenge to the traditional model of politics whereby “voters” elect new leaders 
when they desire change. In their words, the law market turns people into 
“consumers” or “buyers” of laws rather than simply voters.” If citizens are 
dissatisfied with laws, they may seek out private service providers who will meet 
their legal needs at a lower cost than a public provider might have been able to 
meet.153 For O’Hara and Ribstein, the political content of arbitration reform is that 
lawmakers must compete with private service providers over the administration of 
disputes. They see this dynamic of competition as a promising site of reform 
because, as they “a law market also might serve the interests of smaller groups 
that the political process otherwise might ignore.”154 
 																																																								
153 Ribstein, Larry E., and Erin A. O'Hara. The law market. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2009): 14.  
 
154 Ribstein and O'Hara. The law market, 14. 
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Similarly, Gillian Hadfield captures the logic of privatization when she 
characterizes the state’s power over binding dispute resolution as a “monopoly”, 
and arbitration reform as a means of breaking it. Since this would only involve a 
widening of choice, and not a full-scale affront on the court’s powers of 
adjudication – the privatization of commercial dispute resolution is not seen to 
present a direct challenge to the state’s authority, nor to its democratic legitimacy. 
As Hadfield writes,  
The state’s monopoly over legitimate coercive power is not, in itself, 
problematic; this monopoly is definitional of the state. The problem lies in 
the state’s monopoly over the rules and procedures governing the 
application of coercion. Not only does the state enforce a contract, it 
designs and administers contract law and procedure. And it does so with 
all the drawbacks of an insulated service provider: unresponsive to costs, 
reluctant to innovate, bureaucratic in its methods of collecting and 
processing information, shut off from entrepreneurial creativity and 
effort.155 
This statement demarcates the state’s legitimate authority in its monopolization of 
force, which is conceived as discretely separate from its creation and application 
of rules of civil procedure. Through this conceptual separation, Hadfield argues 
that the state’s control over rules of procedure could be delegated to private 
service providers without any compromise of its democratic integrity. The state 																																																																																																																																																							
 
155 Hadfield, Gillian K. "Privatizing commercial law." Regulation 24 (2001): 40. 
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can forfeit its control over the creation of these rules without losing its legitimacy 
as the ultimate enforcer of contracts. This is followed by an attribution of 
bureaucratic complacency to judicial control over rule-formulation. In a system 
characterized by a single, not multiple, rules of procedure, adjudication 
“services”, are bound to become insulated from the inherent dynamism of market 
competition, thereby contributing to what Hadfield calls, “the high cost of law”.156 
 
As Hadfield writes, the privatization of adjudication for contracts between 
corporations can successfully achieved without any forfeiture of the state’s 
“democratic legitimacy”.157 How is this so, are not the “rules of procedure” what 
we otherwise know as procedural law, and do these rules of procedure (evidence, 
discovery, appeals) not have an important bearing on substantive law? Is it not the 
case that placing the creation of procedural rules in the hands of private parties, 
particularly businesses opens the door for “private lawmaking”?  
 																																																								
156 Hadfield, Privatizing Commercial Law, Regulation, 41. 
 
157 Democratic legitimacy does impose limits on the extent to which we can use 
private legal regimes to direct the state’s coercive powers. But the state can 
legitimately delegate significant areas of the law to private entities, especially the 
areas governing relationships between corporate entities. Hadfield, Privatizing 
Commercial Law, Regulation, 41. 
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For Hadfield, corporations can, and should be able to determine the rules that 
govern the adjudication of private controversies. Because they, better than any 
other body of authority, are experts in their particular area of business, they are 
best poised to determine by what means their conflicts are adjudicated. This 
special knowledge is not only better acquainted with the problems immediately 
faced by business, it would be able to resolve it faster, and at less cost than the 
courts would. In fact, Hadfield suggests that even lawyers may be removed from 
the equation. Lawyers unnecessarily contribute “procedural morass”, to borrow a 
term from the late justice Scalia.158 This discourse has been adopted by a number 
of arbitration service providers, in which the option of selecting an arbitrator or 
counsel who is not a legal expert, but a business expert, is seen to be desirable in 
itself. 
 
The privatization of adjudication through commercial arbitration does not create 
new or parallel relations of power, it “suspends” them. As Edward Brunet writes,  
Arbitration represents a volitional opt out of the conventional court system 																																																																																																																																																							
 
158  “The switch from bilateral to class arbitration sacrifices arbitration's 
informality and makes the process slower, more costly, and more likely to 
generate procedural morass than final judgment. And class arbitration greatly 
increases risks to defendants.” 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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into a realm of private dispute resolution. When parties select arbitration, they 
privatize their dispute and take a form of market ownership of their disputing 
procedure. Rather than litigate in the conventional public court system, the 
parties to an arbitration agreement opt for adjudication in a private forum. In 
this context, an arbitration clause operates as a sort of forum selection clause 
and can be conceived as a rejection of the public courts.159 
It is clear that Brunet does not think of this “volitional opt out” as itself a political 
act, but more like a lateral shift, or “choice” initiated by the parties from one 
forum (the courts) to another (private tribunal). The parties “own” the controversy 
in question. So long as this relationship only involves the two parties immediately 
involved in the dispute, and these parties meet on relatively equal bargaining 
terms, neither the interests of third parties, nor the interests of “society” generally 
seem to be compromised or place in jeopardy.  
This suspended space is theorized by neo-liberals a zone of individual freedom, a 
space in which parties willingly forfeit the rigors of judicial procedure in favor of 
cheap, expeditious dispute resolution.160 It follows from this set of precepts that 
the law governing corporate relationships can be privatized without presenting 																																																								
159 Brunet, Edward, Richard E. Speidel, Jean R. Sternlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 
"Arbitration Law in America." (2006): 151. 
 
160 In Concepcion v. AT&T Antonin Scalia approvingly cited Preston v. Ferrer in 
which it was stated that “A prime objective of an agreement to arbitrate is to 
achieve ‘streamlined proceedings and expeditious results” 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). 
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any affront to “democracy”. Commercial arbitration constitutes a dominion of 
“efficiency” that can be conceived as analytically separate from the democratic 
functions of the state. 
In its democratic function law protects rights, structures the institutions of 
democratic governance, redistributes wealth, promotes social objectives 
such as equality or clean air, and resolves disputes among citizens. In its 
market function, law provides the structure of markets determining 
property rights, providing a means of commitment through contract to 
support cooperative activity-and regulation to correct for market failures 
in the achievement of efficiency. The democratic function of law is one 
that must be accomplished through public institutions, accountable to the 
polity in order to preserve democratic legitimacy. The market function of 
law, however, is not so clearly a function that cannot be privatized.161 
 
What Ribstein and O’Hara, Gillian Hadfield, Brunet as well as other proponents 
of the privatization of adjudication overlook, however, is that private law 
enforcement is itself an important feature of constitutional democracy, and 
historically, has played a very important role in governing corporate behavior.162 																																																								
161 Hadfield, Gillian K. "Privatizing Commercial Law: Lessons from 
ICANN." Journal of Small & Emerging Business Law. 6 (2002): 263.	
	
162 “Although it has roots in earlier times, this tradition of reliance on private 
regulation of business dates in America from the era of industrialization in the 
19th century. An important 19th century example is the federal antitrust law 
providing for treble damages.” Carrington, Paul D. "The American tradition of 
private law enforcement." German Law Journal 5 (2004): 1413. 
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Paul Carrington for example, illustrates the wide range of private litigation that 
has historically been used as a deterrent for errant business behavior.  
The system seeks to attract plaintiffs to courthouses not merely to seek 
compensation for an injury or disappointment they may have experienced, 
but to deter antisocial conduct by those who might escape accountability if 
we relied upon our clumsy governments to provide the deterrence and 
punishment needed to constrain corporate greed, a state of mind perhaps 
especially rampant in the United States.163 
 
But how much can we dissociate democracy from rules of procedure? The 
conceptual separation presented by Hadfield suggests that procedure is something 
extraneous, or which can forfeited without diluting the integrity of the democracy 
generally. Procedure is “technical”, whereas the democratic legitimacy of the state 
lies in its monopolization of “force”. This presents a version democracy and the 
historical development of private law in the United States. Aspects of judicial 
procedure like discovery, evidence, jury trials, and appeals all constitute modes of 
reasoning and public deliberation that are designed to ascertain a higher degree of 																																																								
163 “…private law enforcement is the primary method of enforcing the securities 
laws, the consumer protection laws, the civil rights laws, antitrust laws, and 
environmental laws.” Carrington, Paul D. "The American tradition of private law 
enforcement." German Law Journal 5 (2004): 1413. 
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truth than if disputants were left to their own devices. They are markers of public 
participation, accountability, transparency, and rationality.164  
 
More importantly, and more to the point of governing corporate behavior, the 
procedural rules to which individuals and business are subject, are, and 
historically have been, very important in regulating business. Anti-trust law, 
environmental law, class-actions and even free speech law have been used to 
regulate errant corporate behavior. Efforts to relegate the state’s democratic 
legitimacy to the “enforcement” function take on a distinctively neo-liberal 
quality because they divest the public values that have traditionally been 
embodied in law and legislation.  
 
The innocuous political transformation involved in the privatization of 
adjudication is at this point, firmly entrenched in a series of Supreme Court 
opinions that assert the primacy of arbitration law in America. The seminal case, 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Plymouth Inc. illustrates the innocuous politics 
of judicial privatization involved in the Supreme Court’s embrace of its “pro-
arbitration” doctrine. 																																																								
164 563 U.S. 333 131 S. Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed. 2d 742 
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At first glance, Mitsubishi may have appearance of being a dispute over the 
relative merits of domestic and international arbitration law, and the order of 
priority of domestic U.S law vis-à-vis the Federal Arbitration Act and the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
Upon closer examination, however, Mitsubishi’s significance lies in spelling out a 
doctrine according to which the range of business disputes (domestic and 
international) that could be arbitrated was radically widened, even where such 
claims stood in conflict with domestic law and/or public policy. In so doing, the 
Court expanded the general ambit of the commercial arbitration system, set the 
stage for the development of a doctrine in which the enforcement of arbitral 
awards was seen to pre-empt the public policy exception. It foreshadowed a 
distinctive line of neo-liberal jurisprudence, in which areas of litigation 
traditionally associated with public policy and the regulatory state not only came 
under private control, but was “immunized” from outward legal challenge.  
 
In Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court sought to decide on the question as to "whether 
an American court should enforce an agreement to resolve antitrust claims by 																																																																																																																																																							
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arbitration when that agreement arises from an international transaction."5 The 
dispute involved an attempt to resist arbitration on the grounds that Mitsubishi 
had violated the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. The Japanese manufacturer, Mitsubishi, 
sought an order from an American court compelling arbitration in Japan. The 
Puerto Rican Soler corporation, however, defended on the grounds that the 
arbitration agreement was A) not designed to include antitrust claims, and B) that 
antitrust claims were not capable of being arbitrated.  
 
By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the 
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their 
resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the 
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, 
informality, and expedition of arbitration. We must assume that, if 
Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute to 
include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that 
intention will be deducible from text or legislative history.165 
 
In determining that the violation of statutory claims was not a special subset of 
law pertaining to the violation of arbitration agreements, the Court indicated it’s 
strong proclivity to enforcing commercial arbitration agreements, and paved the 
way for radically expanding the dominion of arbitrability to areas that were 																																																								
165 (Mitsubishi Motors Corporation v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 US 614 
(1985), at 628). 
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previously seen to involve questions of public policy. Anti-trust is an obvious 
instance of commercial litigation that has a broader public-policy function, but 
environmental litigation, securities litigation, and class-actions are others that 
have traditionally fulfilled a policy effect. But even areas of commercial litigation 
that are not associated with public policy may nevertheless have important 
“governance effects” on corporate behaviour. For example, the negative publicity 
that firm may incur amidst high stakes lawsuits may weaken investor confidence 
in their stock, thereby negative affecting their ability to turn a profit in the future. 
Such “effects” of commercial litigation are not just about the successful resolution 
of individual claims, but about deterring socially unacceptable  behaviour. As it 
currently stands, corporations find themselves in a legal climate in which they 
have the assurance that their awards will not be subject to review or appeal.  
 
The law avoidance strategies that corporations may pursue by resorting to 
arbitration means that the procedural rules that they are encounter may be less 
stringent, and present a dilution of the state’s power to administer commercial 
conflict. They take for granted the fact that lawmakers should be responsive to 
market demand for adjudication services, but in so doing, lose sight of the 
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important regulatory functions performed by the private law enforcement, and the 
forfeiture of adjudication’s policy relevance in the meantime.  
 
4. Contractualism 
4.1 The Doctrine of Contractualism 
 
Arbitration liberty is achieved by making party autonomy the highest 
priority in the pantheon of arbitration values.166 – Edward Brunet Jr. 
Commercial arbitration has its basis in contract - an arbitration agreement, which 
sets out the rules of procedure, the selection of arbitrators, and the scope of 
disputes that can be arbitrated. Under the Federal Arbitration Act, agreements to 
arbitrate are valid, enforceable and irrevocable, unless procured by force, fraud, or 
exhibit manifest disregard of the law. Crucially, the Federal Arbitration Act 
reversed judicial antipathy to enforcing arbitral awards by placing agreements to 
arbitrate on the same footing as other contracts. 
 																																																								
166 Brunet, Edward, Richard E. Speidel, Jean R. Sternlight, and Stephen J. Ware. 
"Arbitration Law in America." (2006): 151. 
 
		 	
	 205	
Arbitration’s basis in contract law is uncontroversial. What is politically potent, I 
claim, is the emergence of the doctrine of contractualism which asserts the 
primacy of contract enforcement over and above alternative approaches of 
governing arbitration agreements, including state law and public policy. What 
contractualist doctrine does is effectively make the arbitration agreement a form 
of robust “super contract” that is very unlikely to be overturned or appealed. 
Business can use these contracts to exercise a form of decision-making control 
over the conduct and nature of the arbitration, with the near total assurance that 
the outcome will not be subject to appeal, review, or public scrutiny. Thus, even 
though contractualists claim that arbitration will be in keeping with the Rule of 
Law, they advocate the dismantling of virtually all mechanisms that in fact are 
able to determine whether arbitral decisions are in fact in keeping with common-
law principles and public policy. 
 
This approach to arbitration law has found intellectual exposition by arbitration 
scholars, and has steadily been advanced by the Supreme Court, most notably in 
recent cases AT&T v. Concepcion and Italian Colors v. American Express Co. 
Even though its ostensible presentation and defense is apolitical, contractualist 
doctrine, I argue, is being used to broaden the scope of arbitrability, and in the 
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same stroke, delimit the ability of judges and lawmakers to regulate, oversee, and 
govern the arbitration process. This gives business a form of de facto lawmaking 
power that immunizes them from legal procedure, an immunity that they may 
deploy at will to engage in strategic forms of disputing. More generally, it makes 
the arbitration system virtually totally insulated from public participation – even 
from oblique forms of participation like research and reflection. 
 
At face value, the norms and policy choices that contractualists advocate are 
intuitively desirable. Proponents of contractualism like Stephen Ware, Edward 
Brunet and Christopher Drahozal claim that rigorously enforcing arbitration 
agreements “according to their terms” promotes efficiency and personal 
autonomy.167 When disputants have the assurance that their arbitration agreement 
will be enforced, and the terms of the contract are the rules that will govern the 
arbitration award, they are spared the time-consuming processes of discovery, 
jury trials, and appellate review that are associated with public courts. 
Furthermore, allowing disputants to design the terms of their contracts, on their 
own terms, with minimal interference from the judiciary and legislature preserves 																																																								
167 “Acceptance of arbitration is a distinctive feature of free societies. It is rejected 
by totalitarian states. It is viewed with scepticism by enthusiasts of central 
planning.” Paulsson, Jan. The idea of arbitration. Oxford University Press, 2013.  
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the main benefits of informal dispute resolution; control, expediency, opacity, and 
cost-effectiveness. And like the agents of judicial privatization I covered in the 
last section, contractualists argue that the greater availability of arbitration 
services lends itself to a more efficient use judicial resources, and encourages 
price competition on the law market, thereby reducing the cost of legal services. 
 
The language of contractualism, I claim, is deceptive in its generality and claims 
to universality. Its emphasis on “rigorous enforcement” in the name of efficiency 
and autonomy, conceals a neo-Lochnerian political-economic transformation – a 
transfer of lawmaking power to private actors that insulates them from legislative 
and judicial “interference” (read, public authority). The paradox of this insulation 
is that its very condition is one that involves aggressive judicial intervention in 
arbitration policy, in which the courts become the arbitration system’s 
“underwriter of last resort”. In other words, without active judicial intervention, 
the validity and effectiveness of contractualist doctrine, itself designed to delimit 
judicial authority, would topple on top of itself.    
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This transfer of power is more impactful than merely delegating judicial power to 
private arbitrators, something that at this point, is accepted by all legal 
commentators, even those critical of arbitration. Its real potency lies in the fact 
that it makes such decisions virtually immune to outward challenge. In the words 
of Elena Kagan, it as though the courts are saying to those who object to 
arbitration, “too darn bad”. 168  In the name of efficiency and freedom – 
contractualists effectively endorse a form of authoritarian arbitral rule, a form of 
business decisionism, if you will. Such decisionism has little to do with the 
personal integrity of the arbitrator, the ethics of the arbitration profession, or the 
fact that the parties may have consented to the arbitrator’s final decision – it 
simply derives from the fact there are fewer modes of challenging the arbitrator’s 
decision, and that parties have very wide latitude to design the terms of their 
contract, with the assurance that it will in all likelihood be enforced by the courts.  
 
By prioritizing enforcement in the name of promoting autonomy and the 
“freedom of contract”, the doctrine of contractualism effectively gives private 																																																								168 Weiss, Debra Cassens. "'Too Darn Bad'? SCOTUS Enforces Contracts barring 
Class Arbitration, despite High Litigation Cost." ABA Journal. June 20, 2013. 
Accessed October 12, 2017. 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/too_darn_bad_scotus_enforces_contracts
_barring_class_arbitration_despite_hi/. 
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disputants a form of “lawmaking” power that is unchecked by any countervailing 
power. The point is not necessarily the case that the emphasis on enforcement 
means that commercial arbitrators will rule arbitrarily, but that private disputants 
gain a whole series of protections that they otherwise would not have had in 
courts of law. This power has been strategically deployed to limit the ability of 
others to meaningfully participate in, and even monitor arbitration. It also allows 
business disputants to design virtually every part of the commercial contract with 
the assurance that it will be enforced. This state affairs, I claim, stands in 
problematic relation to principles of constitutional democracy and its attendant 
values, rationality, accountability and transparency, all of which are giving 
concrete meaning in the separation of powers. It creates an unchecked form of 
arbitral power that can be manipulated by wealthy disputants, a power which is 
paradoxically dependent on the American state as “guarantor” and “underwriter” 
of the contemporary arbitration regime. 
 
In theory, contractualist doctrine is universal in application. An arbitration 
agreement between a landlord and tenant might be said to be just as enforceable 
as a one between two pharmaceutical corporations, for instance. 																																																																																																																																																							
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The abstract nature of contractualist discourse, however obscures the way that 
corporate disputants are better poised to reap the benefits of the courts’ tendency 
to enforce arbitration agreements “according to their terms”. Repeat litigants like 
corporations whose disputes involve complex, high-stakes claims, and whose 
exposure to unwanted lawsuits can have deleterious effects on their public image 
and their ability to generate profit in the future can repeatedly “divert” sensitive 
disputes to arbitration tribunals, closed from public scrutiny. This has already 
happened in the domain of anti-trust litigation,169 environmental litigation, and in 
defense-related contracts, and if recent Supreme Court decisions are any 
indication of things to come, new areas of traditionally “public” litigation will 
likely be open to private arbitral rule in the future.  
 
4.2 The Elements of Contractualist Doctrine 
 																																																								
169  As Vera Korzun writes “Now, the national courts of most developed 
economies accept (and even mandate) adjudication of antitrust claims by private 
international arbitral tribunals. This transformation may be predictive of future 
acceptance of international arbitral tribunals as trustworthy forums for dispute 
resolution of other “public” subject matters.” Korzun, Vera. "Arbitrating Antitrust 
Claims: From Suspicion to Trust." New York University Journal of International 
Law & Policy. 48 (2015): 867. 
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The historical development of contractualist thought is difficult to pin down 
exactly, since its propositional content is, at least at face value, very general. 
Elements of contractualist thinking, as I illustrated in the previous chapter, can be 
traced back to the 1920s. The freedom of contract, desire for cheap and 
expeditious dispute resolution, and the idea that judges and legislators meddle too 
much in private affairs has a long lineage in American history. Despite important 
lines of precedent, it is only in the last forty years that contractualism has become 
more pronounced and given rigorous intellectual exposition and developed into a 
positively identifiable body of legal thought that is being advanced by judicial, 
business, and legal actors.   
 
Those who defend the contractualist position like Stephen Ware, Edward Brunet 
and Christopher Drahozal claim that rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements 
“according to their terms” promotes individual autonomy and efficiency.170 In 
their view, the expeditiousness and cost-effectiveness of arbitration is preserved 
by promoting the principle of party-autonomy, the idea that arbitrations should be 																																																																																																																																																							
 
170  Ware, Stephen J. "Paying the Price of Process: Judicial Regulation of 
Consumer Arbitration Agreements." Journal of Dispute Resolution (2001): 89. 
Ware, Stephen J. "Default rules from mandatory rules: Privatizing law through 
arbitration." Minnesota Law Review. 83 (1998): 703. 
		 	
	 212	
as free as possible from legislative and judicial interference as possible. 
Legislative and judicial efforts to “interfere” in the arbitration process should be 
kept to a minimum, and when they do, should honor the terms set out by the 
parties in the contract.  
 
The ostensible purpose of contractualist doctrine is to assert the autonomy and 
independence of the parties, and to give them as much control as possible over the 
design of their dispute.171 These principles of dispute resolution, often presented 
within the more general framework of Dispute Resolution Design, are defended as 
an extension of liberal democracy.  
As Edward Brunet writes in Arbitration Law in America,  
Arbitration liberty is achieved by making party autonomy the highest 
priority in the pantheon of arbitration values. Viewed in this light, the 
important value of party autonomy is directly related to the freedom 
essential in a democratic state. A strong version of arbitration party 
autonomy exemplifies the significance of freedom of contract. In a state 
such as ours characterized by the respect for individual liberty, courts 
should enforce customized agreements to arbitrate and the legislature 
should regulate minimally. In a society governed by rules of the free 
market, contract norms that guide exchanges are necessarily based on 																																																																																																																																																							
 
171 Brunet, Edward, Edward J. Brunet, Richard E. Speidel, Jean E. Sternlight, and 
Stephen H. Ware. Arbitration law in America: a critical assessment. Cambridge 
University Press, 2006. 
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autonomous action of individual economic actors.172 
 
As Brunet explains, echoing the language of early 20th century reformers, the 
promotion of such autonomy promotes self-governance. The enforcement of 
arbitration agreements enables disputants to create their own “private culture”.  
The delegation to a private arbitrator of hand-forged procedures to resolve 
a dispute creates a form of self-governance that operates outside more 
direct government regulation. When courts enforce party crafted 
procedures, they create an incentive for parties to draft their own rules of 
dispute resolution rather than leave the problem of future disputes to 
government. In this way, law is internalized by the disputants who form 
their own private culture.173 
 
Taken on their own, these statements seem like intuitively sound principles, and 
in keeping with values of liberal democracy. Nobody wants “government 
controlled” arbitration, nor do they want arbitration law cast such a long shadow 
over arbitration procedure that parties lose all of the advantages attributed to 
alternative dispute resolution. The idea that government would in every instance, 
monitor and dictate the terms by which business and individuals resolve conflict 
seems overbearing and “authoritarian”. It for this reason, for example, that Jan 																																																								
172 Brunet, Arbitration Law in America, 5.		
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Paulson, associates arbitration with “free societies”, and similarly, Jurgen 
Basedow makes the case that arbitration is an expression of Karl Popper’s “Open 
Society”. Conversely, states that do not recognize the validity of arbitration 
awards are seen to be tyrannical or overbearing on disputants. 
Contractual “freedom”, of course, is not just about the ability to design a contract 
as such, but to make a contract that is enforceable in accordance with accepted 
principles of law and justice. The paradox of contractualist doctrine is that for all 
of its emphasis on the integrity of contracts, and their centrality to a functioning 
liberal democracy – they are surprisingly willing to forfeit the rigors of 
proceduralism that arguably, make contracts meaningful.  
In application, contractualism’s strong emphasis on the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements “according to their own terms”, has been used to dismantle laws that 
ensured that arbitration awards were fair and did not violate law or public policy. 
Under the discourse of “rigorously enforcing arbitration agreements” what the 
U.S. Supreme Court is doing is making corporate designed contracts increasingly 
difficult to challenge. Moreover, the priorities of enforcement are clearly 
unevenly applied. While the Court considers “bilateral agreements” (disputes 																																																																																																																																																							173 	Brunet Jr. Brunet, Edward J. Arbitration law in America: a critical 
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between two “individuals”) to be unproblematic, it has been far more restrictive in 
enforcing class-action arbitration, which it claims violates the simplicity, 
informality and cost-effectiveness of arbitration involving two parties.   
4.3 The Supreme Court’s Embrace of Contractualism  
 
Contractualism is not just an abstract position advanced by scholars. In a series of 
recent decisions, it has become the centerpiece of the Supreme Court’s arbitration 
jurisprudence. The first wave of the Court’s embrace of contractualism can be 
traced back to seminal arbitration cases in the early 1980s when, as part of a 
general effort to support arbitration, the Court began to assert its emphatic 
approach to the Federal Arbitration Act as a “liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration. 174  In a string of landmark decisions including Moses H. Cone 
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation175, Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth176 and Southland Corp. v. Keating177, the Court 																																																																																																																																																							
assessment. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006): 5. 	
174 Hayford, Stephen L. "Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-
1995: A Sea Change." Wake Forest Law Review. 31 (1996): 1. 
 
17560 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) 
17673 U.S. 614 (1985) 
 
177 465 U.S. 1 (1984) 
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began to spell out policy favoring arbitration that placed emphasis on enforcing 
arbitration “according to their terms”, and in the same stroke, sought to assert the 
autonomy of the arbitration agreement from state law and public policy.178  
As I illustrated in section 2, in Mitsubishi, the Court affirmed that that disputes 
involving statutory claims could be arbitrated, even when they involved issues of 
public policy. Citing the “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements” 
established in Moses Cone, the Court affirmed that the Federal Arbitration Act is 
“at bottom a policy guaranteeing the enforcement of private contractual 
arrangements: the Act simply “creates a body of federal substantive law 
establishing and regulating the duty to honor an agreement to arbitrate”. 
Similarly, in Southland Corp. v. Keating, the Court asserted that “"the purpose of 
the [FAA] was to assure those who desired arbitration [that] their expectations 
would not be undermined by federal judges, or . . . by state courts or legislatures.” 
These decisions definitively set up an anti-legislative, anti-judicial interpretation 																																																								
178 As Hiro Aragaki writes “The Rehnquist and Roberts Courts have further 
extended FAA preemption to a point where, with limited exceptions, private 
arbitration agreements now enjoy the status of federal legislation, which 
effectively gives them the power of supremacy over all contrary state law and 
public policy.” Aragaki, Hiro N. "The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural 
Reform." New York University Law Review. 89 (2014): 1939.  
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of arbitration in which the Federal Arbitration Act emphasis is not just on placing 
arbitration clauses on the same footing as other contracts, but in fact favouring the 
use of arbitration. Moreover, placing emphasis on enforcement, the Court 
overrides alternative criteria of governing arbitration awards.  
 
The second wave of contractualist policy has asserted the autonomy of the 
arbitration agreements even more, and takes arbitration in an even more anti-
legislative, and anti-judicial direction. In AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and 
Italian Colors v. American Express Co. Antonin Scalia restated the Federal 
Arbitration Act’s commitment to cheap and expeditious dispute resolution, and 
underlined the need to enforce arbitration agreements “according to their terms” 
to guarantee speed and cost-effectiveness. These policies, I claim, have 
emboldened corporations like American Express, Mastercard, AT&T, and others 
to introduce strategic mandatory disputing agreements into their contracts with 
consumers, workers, and employees, and to dilute the potency of class action 
lawsuits. Perhaps even more importantly, by attacking the class action as a 
betrayal of “bilateral” arbitration principles, the corporate arbitration lobby has 
succeeded in further insulating commercial arbitration agreements from 
governmental control.  
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In Concepcion v. AT&T Mobility, the Concepcion family claimed that AT&T 
fraudulently marketed its phones as “free”, but ultimately charged them sales tax 
on the full value of the phones. The Concepcions, who were charged $30.22 for 
the “free” phone, sought class-action relief under California’s Discover Bank 
Rule, which classified that most class-action waivers were unconscionable, and 
were eventually granted it by a California Court. According to the Court, AT&T’s 
insertion of a class-action waiver in its consumer contracts violated state-law 
doctrine of unconscionability. They granted the Concepcions a motion to compel 
class-action arbitration with AT&T.  
 
AT&T appealed the California Court’s motion to compel class-action arbitration, 
claiming that California’s Discovery Bank Rule ran contrary to the strong federal 
policy favoring arbitration indicated by the FAA (or more accurately, the pro-
arbitration interpretation of the FAA established by the 1980s rulings). AT&T’s 
petition not only declared that class-action arbitration was contrary to the spirit of 
the FAA, but that California’s application of the Discover Bank Rule would spell 
the “death knell” for all arbitration, since it created specialized legislation that 
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they claimed unfairly targeted arbitration agreements.179 This point of view was 
echoed by a series of corporate lobby groups in the amici. For example, the U.S 
Chamber of Commerce, in its petition in favour of AT&T, argued that “Decisions 
like the [the 9th circuit’s], which invalidated a class-arbitration waiver, frustrate 
the parties’ intent, undermine their existing agreements, and erode the benefits 
offered by arbitration as an alternative to litigation.”180 (emphasis mine). Here, 
what the Chamber of Commerce interprets as the “parties’ intent” radically gives 
the benefit of the doubt to stronger disputants who in fact design the arbitration 
agreements and insert them into small-print consumer and employment contracts. 
“Rigorous enforcement” does not mean rigorously enforcing arbitration 
agreements in accordance with principles of common-law or public policy – but 																																																								
179 As Andrew Pincus stated in his petition in support of AT&T’s : “For if an 
arbitration agreement that contains “perhaps the most fair and consumer-friendly 
provisions” that one judge has ever seen is unenforceable under California law, 
then no agreement providing for bilateral arbitration will be enforceable under 
California law.” Andrew Pincus, Brief for Petitioner AT&T. 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_previ
ew_briefs_pdfs_09_10_09_893_Petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf (Accessed 
September 1st, 2018): 1.  
 
 180	Andrew Pincus, Brief for Petitioner AT&T. 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_previ
ew_briefs_pdfs_09_10_09_893_Petitioner.authcheckdam.pdf (Accessed 
September 1st, 2018): 2.  
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something else altogether, it means elevating the principle of enforcement as 
such, even when the underlying contract is unconscionable or in conflict with 
state-law. 
 
The U.S Chamber of Commerce even warned that upholding the Discover Bank 
rule would propel businesses to boycott arbitration altogether. “We should expect 
the same flight from arbitration in the many other industries that rely on bilateral 
arbitration to minimize their dispute resolution costs, including credit, brokerage, 
insurance, financial services, legal, accounting, health care services, and still 
others.” 
 
Ultimately, the Court followed the logic presented by AT&T, and the petitioners. 
It then effectively quarantined class-action action arbitration from the broader 
pro-arbitration language of the FAA. In other words, while the Court recognized 
that the routinized enforcement of arbitration clauses was necessary in bilateral 
contracts (contracts between two individual parties), this reasoning did not extend 
to class-action arbitration, which was too complex, and included questions that 
arbitrators were not experienced in.  
Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and 
different procedures and higher stakes. Confidentiality becomes more 
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difficult. And while it is theoretically possible to select an arbitrator with 
some expertise relevant to the class-action certification question, 
arbitrators are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant 
procedural aspects of certification, such as the protection of absent parties. 
The conclusion follows that class arbitration, to the extent that it is 
manufactured by Discover Bank rather than consensual, is inconsistent 
with the FAA.181 
 
Similarly, in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, the Supreme 
Court denied Italian Colors’ restaurant’s motion for anti-trust litigation against 
American Express. The plaintiff, Italian Colors Restaurant, a small family-owned 
restaurant franchise in California brought an anti-trust suit against American 
Express that had been charging higher fees than its competitors for use of its 
credit cards. Italian Colors filed for class-action certification against American 
Express, even though their contractual agreement with American Express 
contained a class-action waiver. Italian Colors claimed that the arbitration waiver 
forced them into bilateral arbitration that would make it all but impossible to 
recover its costs.  
 
The Second Circuit initially sided with Italian Colors, and refused to enforce the 
class-action waiver. American Express appealed the decision, which was 
subsequently reversed by the Supreme Court. It ruled that the vindication doctrine 																																																								
181 563 U.S. 333 131 S. Ct. 1740, 179 L.Ed. 2d 742 
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invoked by the second circuit applied only to cases where a party can demonstrate 
that a particular arbitration procedure operates as a prospective waiver of its 
“right to pursue” federal statutory remedies. Thus, even though the costs of 
pursuing statutory arbitration against American Express made the case a surefire 
loss for Italian Colors, there was no nominal forfeiture of its federal rights to it.  
As the Court proclaimed, the effective-vindication doctrine, which remained 
established that arbitration was legitimate so long as it did not prevent parties 
from exercising their Federal statutory rights, did not guarantee disputants the 
assurance that they could arbitrate low-value claims. The Supreme Court’s 
judgment thus struck a blow not only to class-action arbitration, but any disputant 
seeking to use arbitration to recover low value claims. In the meantime, it further 
consolidated its permissive approach to the enforcement of bilateral claims.  
 
Curiously, in no other area other than class-wide arbitration has the court or the 
arbitration lobby suggested that any dispute is too complex for arbitration. Even 
the most notoriously complex areas of commercial litigation, including anti-trust 
suits, intellectual property suits, and environmental suits are seen to be arbitrable 
because they are “bilateral”. However, class-arbitration, the only form of 
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arbitration which allows smaller-scale disputants to challenge large businesses, is 
“too complex”, and thus, unfit for arbitration.  
 
4.4. Contractualism as Business Decisionism 
 
Contractualism masquerades as an ordinary defense of contract law when it is in 
fact something else altogether. Contractualist doctrine is about creating special 
conditions for arbitration agreements that would not otherwise hold for other 
contracts.  It involves the creation of “super-contracts”, which MUST be 
enforced, no matter what is in them. 
 
The doctrine of contractualism is not just about recognizing the enforceability of 
arbitration awards, but about prioritizing and emphasizing their enforcement, 
even when there is evidence to suggest that there were problems with the award, 
or that the award is in conflict with law or public policy. What the doctrine of 
contractualism is really about is making “enforcement” the cardinal value of 
arbitration, and in the same stroke, narrowing virtually all of the other criteria by 
which arbitration awards have traditionally been governed. The ultimate effect of 
this doctrine is that judicial activity is delimited to a Lockean “minimalist” form 
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of state intervention in which the superimposition of any extraneous form of rules 
of procedure, interpretation, or governing philosophy other than what is laid out 
in the contract is seen to be illegitimate, a violation of the idea of arbitration itself. 
 
Contractualism creates a furtive transfer of power to corporations which makes 
them far less likely to incur challenges to the agreements they design. What 
contractualism is really about is delegating greater legal authority to commercial 
arbitrators by making the standards for review and annulment of arbitration 
agreements more narrow, and in some instances, eliminating them altogether. As 
a result, business not only gain a form of “lawmaking” power, they get everything 
but a full assurance from the courts that their disputes will not be subject to 
outward challenge. This doctrine, theoretically, applies to everyone. But it is 
especially significant to large-scale corporations who constitute the most litigious 
entities in the United States and who, by virtue of the size and scope of their 
business operations, have different stakes at play in legal conflict generally. When 
corporations gain the assurance that the arbitrations in which they are involved 
will not be subject to challenge, they gain greater latitude to act without 
encountering interference – in other words, more power. Upon closer inspection, 
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contractualism has very little to do with contract law, and more with creating 
conditions of deference to business and arbitrators.  
 
The contractualist interpretation of commercial arbitration conceals a shift of 
power to business. By expulsing questions of procedure and substantive law, and 
delimiting the legitimacy of award enforcement to the narrow grounds of whether 
or not the parties agreed to arbitration in a contract, courts are effectively vesting 
private parties the ability to design their own rules of procedure, turning a blind 
eye to the question as to whether or not they deviate from rules of civil procedure, 
as well as to other grounds for annulling or vacating arbitration awards. 
 
5. Depoliticizing Commercial Arbitration 
 
Proponents of market-led arbitration like to point out that the use of arbitration in 
America can be traced back centuries. They do this as proof that deregulated 
“law-markets”, can work, and have worked, without state interference. (Benson, 
Posner, Hadfield). But there is a persistent anti-sociological streak in these 
analogies. 17th century arbitration involves relatively small-scale disputes between 
“merchants”. But we are no longer dealing with a “Jeffersonian” nation of small 
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property holders, nor with merchants and traders that informed 19th century 
laissez-faire thought. Arbitration involves giant multinational capitalists whose 
primary mode of conducting business is concentrated in the institutional 
framework of the modern business corporation. 182  These involve household 
names Chevron, ConocoPhillips, Mastercard, Pfizer, Kraft Foods, and others. 
While 19th century arbitration involved merchants involved in maritime disputes 
and product exchanges - contemporary arbitration amongst corporations often 
involves complex, multi-party issues with elevated stakes. These include “bet-the-
company” scenarios, situations in which a lawsuit jeopardizes a company’s future. 
Such disputes can have financially ruinous results for companies, placing their 
very existence in jeopardy. Moreover, modern corporate litigation is systemic. A 
single corporation like Wal-Mart may at any point in time be involved in 
hundreds of ongoing suits in multiple jurisdictions across the globe. In this 
organizational context, arbitration is not about an informal meeting of individuals 																																																								
182 Heinrich Kronstein, already in 1944, perceived this anti-sociological quality. 
“The danger that arbitrative procedure might be used to overthrow this naturally 
achieved balance and establish control by monopolies and cartels was not 
generally foreseen, particularly since arbitration seemed to operate primarily in 
connection with the product exchanges, a traditional fortress of free enterprise.” 
Kronstein, Heinrich. "Business arbitration. instrument of private 
government." The Yale Law Journal 54, no. 1 (1944): 36-69. 
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to resolve grievances, but a managerial strategy aimed at managing corporate 
caseloads.   
 
Modern arbitration discourse renders the organizational properties, and 
distributional stakes involved in corporate conflict invisible. Even though it is 
well known that commercial arbitration frequently involve corporate entities - the 
parties to arbitration are conceived abstractly as “individuals”, “parties”, or 
“interests” with little attention to the underlying scale and structure of their actual 
organization.183 The discourse of individual freedom masks the issues involved in 
contemporary economic conflict. Arbitration discourse makes no differentiation 
between the individual and  the corporate personality and presents their freedom 																																																								
183 Amy Cohen illustrates the radically different social problems when we cross 
the spectrum of scale in arbitration discourse. “The dangers I am envisioning arise 
simply when we forget that the idea of equivalence across scale is fictitious. 
Dispute systems designers may reasonably find this fiction convenient, even 
necessary: configuring the organization, the city, the NGO, and the business as 
each like an individual greatly facilitates our ability to design horizontal dispute 
processing systems that can encompass a multitude of public and private entities 
in a parsimonious, representative, and coherent fashion. But it is a fiction 
nonetheless, and one that can cause human suffering when it masks the “complex 
realities behind [it].” Cohen, Amy J. "Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, 
and the Problem of Scale." Harvard Negotiation Law Review. 14 (2009): 51. 
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as though it were coeval.184 Despite the increasing importance of large-scale, 
multinational corporate actors in the international economic system, as well as a 
structural change in the scale and scope of commercial conflict, arbitration 
discourse is in fact reverting closer to the laissez-faire model that crystallized in 
the late 19th and early 20th century. This discourse emphasizes individual 
autonomy from state encroachment, and the idea that private parties ought to have 
as much latitude as possible to draft the terms of their contracts.  
 
The corporate embrace of arbitration appears to be a privately led initiative in 
which self-interested individual agents have opted, out of their own volition, for 
the most economically efficient means of resolving disputes. It appears to provide 
relatively clear cut example of what Lawrence Ribstein and Erin O’Hara call the 
“law market” – an ideal typology of forum shopping in which people and firms 
“choose” amongst different available legal regimes.185  																																																								
184 Classical political economy in the United States was dedicated to the principle 
that the state could best encourage economic development by leaving 
entrepreneurs alone, free of regulation and subsidy. Hovenkampf, Herbert. "The 
classical corporation in American legal thought." Georgia Law Journal 76 (1987): 
1594. 
 
185 “Once a state or nation produces a law, people and firms connected with the 
polity must obey the law or suffer consequences. But people and firms 
increasingly have another choice, that is, to move beyond laws’ reach. These 
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Yet, this shift would not be nearly pronounced were it not for the dosage of 
steroids that arbitration has received from the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration 
jurisprudence, which is characterized by two parallel shifts: 1) Its interpretation of 
the Federal Arbitration Act as a “liberal Federal policy favoring arbitration”186 
that it has used to strike down state laws governing arbitration 2) its reversal of 																																																																																																																																																							
moves are becoming easier with faster communication and transportation and 
freer trade. Parties, in effect, can shop for law, just as they do for other goods. 
Nations and states must take this “law market” into account when they create new 
laws.” Ribstein, Larry E., and Erin A. O'Hara. The law market. (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2009.) 3.  
 
186 This opinion was first advanced in the Court’s 1983 Moses Cone Memorial 
Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corporation decision, in which the court ruled 
that section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act “was a congressional declaration of a 
liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state 
substantive or procedural policies to the contrary. The effect of the section is to 
create a body of federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any 
arbitration agreement within the coverage of the Act.” This opinion has since 
been reaffirmed but has since been restated arbitration related cases including 
AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion and Italian Colors v. American Express Co. 
Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital. v. Mercury Construction Corp, 460 U.S. 1, 24 
(1983).  As Margaret Moses points out “The so-called policy favoring arbitration 
appears to be one created by the judiciary out of whole cloth.” Margaret Moses . 
Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration 
Law Never Enacted by Congress." Florida State University Law Review. 34 
(2006): 123.   
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laws and policies that had previously placed restrictions on the types of conflict 
that could legitimately be submitted to the rule of arbitrators.187  
 
The distributional changes implied by arbitration reform are both direct and 
indirect. 
 
Direct examples include curtailing the potency of class-actions and anti-trust 
litigation – both of which provide rather obvious cases of using private law to 
achieve public policy end.188  
 
Indirect examples corporate empowerment through arbitration reform provide less 
intuitive, but nevertheless significant forms of redistributive policy. They include 
the ability to curb the “spotlight” effect created by litigation – allowing firms to 
avoid the significant negative publicity and loss of reputational standing that firms 																																																								
187 Stephen L. Hayford "Commercial Arbitration in the Supreme Court 1983-
1995: A Sea Change." Wake Forest L. Rev. 31 (1996): 1. 
 
188 Deepak Gupta, and Lina Khan. "Arbitration as Wealth Transfer." Yale Law & 
Policy Review. 35 (2016): 499. 
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may incur as a result of lawsuits from competitors, consumers, or workers.189 This 
not only allows firms to curb potential losses in the event of litigation that hurts 
their public image, it also deprives other actors of information that would allow 
them to make fully informed economic decisions. Thus, the asymmetries of 
information created by the opacity of the contemporary arbitration regime must 
also be considered forms of economic power.  
 
There is evidence that American corporations are experimenting with new ways 
of pushing arbitration agreements in ways that shield them from unwanted 
litigation. In 2012, the private equity firm, the Carlyle Group, upon making its 
initial public offering, announced that shareholders would be bound by arbitration 
agreements, thereby forfeiting their right to trial.190 Under Carlyle’s securities 																																																								
189 The Merck Vioxx case involved a massive effort to contain the financial 
damage and loss of reputational standing from the medical complications 
associated with the arthritis drug. McClellan, Frank M. "The Vioxx Litigation: A 
Critical Look at Trial Tactics, the Tort System, and the Role of Lawyers in Mass 
Tort Litigation." DePaul Law. Review. 57 (2007): 509. The Valdez Spill offers 
another example. Bardwick, Deborah S. "The American Tort System's Response 
to Environmental Disaster: The Exxon Valdez Oil Spill as a Case 
Study." Stanford. Environmental Law Journal 19 (2000): 259. 
 
190Kevin Rose. “Carlyle Drops Arbitration Clause from IPO Plans.” Dealbook  
February 3, 2012. Accessed February 12, 2012. 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/carlyle-drops-arbitration-clause-from-i-
p-o-plans/ 
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governance structure, securities claims would be arbitrated in a private tribunal in 
Delaware. Carlyle’s efforts to effectively ban securities litigation, and in the same 
stroke, terminate the possibility of class-actions, was ultimately stopped by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission. However the case illustrates the efforts 
business are making to push the scope and power of arbitration agreements.191 
 
Most commentators, even critical commentators, have tended to overlook the 
latter set of distributional problems because they do not appear as nakedly they do 
in cases where both parties are of radically uneven bargaining power. When two 
corporations arbitrate, rather than litigate, no party to the dispute seems to be 
placed at a significant disadvantage. Yet there is a more generalized political shift 
at play. When large-volumes of disputes involving corporations are arbitrated, 
rather than litigated, is it not only the case that the formal rules of procedure 
change (e.g discovery, evidence, and appeals) – but the general architecture of 																																																																																																																																																							
 
191 As Steven Davidoff Wrote in the wake of the Carlyle proposal. “It is quite 
possible that the Carlyle Group, the private equity firm that is preparing to go 
public, is proposing the most shareholder-unfriendly corporate governance 
structure in modern history.” Steven Davidoff. Carlyle Readies an Unfriendly IPO 
for Shareholders. Dealbook January 18, 2012. Accessed January 24, 2012. 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/01/18/carlyle-readies-an-unfriendly-i-p-o-for-
shareholders/ 
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public oversight, public authority, and public deliberation is radically altered 
along with it. This political shift is scarcely perceptible at the level of individual 
lawsuits, but taken in the aggregate, it marks a radical overhaul of modern 
commercial litigation, and thus, of the public policy relevance of private law 
enforcement.  
 
6. Reviving Lochner Through Arbitration Reform 
 
Modern arbitration law has distinctive Lochnerian themes, it is based on a 
philosophy of “negative liberty” that places emphasis on individual freedom from 
state encroachment.192 Still, it would be a mistake to see a mere repetition of 
Lochernian principles in present reform efforts. Modern arbitration law is based 
on creating a zone of private activity that is virtually insulated from government 
regulatory power, but this comes with a twist. While Lochner era arbitration law 
sought to legitimize arbitration by placing arbitration agreements on the same 																																																																																																																																																							
 
192  As Hiro Aragaki writes “In recent decades, contract—together with its 
associated values of autonomy, consent, and self-determination—has become the 
principal lens through which arbitration law and policy are debated and 
analyzed.” Aragaki, Hiro N. "The Federal Arbitration Act as Procedural 
Reform." New York University Law Review. 89 (2014): 1939. 
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footing as other contracts, contemporary free-market proponents of commercial 
arbitration have gone a step further. The Supreme Court, the corporate arbitration 
lobby, as well as arbitration ideologues have sought to consign the state’s role to 
merely enforcing agreements, leaving questions of substantive law and procedure 
to the parties involved. This agenda is pursued in the name of abstract principles 
of cost-savings, expediency and individual freedom, however, it involves a 
transfer of “political” power to corporations, who as a result gain far greater 
discretion over the design of contracts that than they otherwise would have if they 
were adjudicating their claims in courts of law. According to Brunet, “Arbitration 
liberty is achieved by making party autonomy the highest priority in the pantheon 
of arbitration values.”193 Party autonomy, he claims, is a central feature of a 
democratic society. 
In a democratic society, party autonomy should be the fundamental value 
that shapes arbitration. The personal autonomy inherent in arbitration 
constitutes a dominant policy in all areas of a democracy. The freedom to 
select arbitration procedure is a choice that one anticipates should exist in 
a state. Viewed in this light, the important value of party autonomy is 
directly related to the freedom essential in a democratic state. A strong 
version of arbitration party autonomy exemplifies the significance of 
freedom of contract. In a state such as ours characterized by the respect for 
individual liberty, courts should enforce customized agreements to 																																																								
193 Brunet Jr. Brunet, Edward J. Arbitration law in America: a critical assessment. 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
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arbitrate and the legislature should regulate minimally. In a society 
governed by rules of the free market, contract norms that guide exchanges 
are necessarily based on autonomous action of individual economic 
actors.194 
This statement sets out a vision of democracy in which economic policy is 
governed by free-market principles and in which the state role in governing 
contracts seems to be delimited to “enforcement”. Alternative models of 
democracy and economic policy notwithstanding, this pledge begs an important 
question. What is it about contracts themselves that might have invited non-
enforcement from the judiciary, or then again, greater regulation from 
government? Why is it necessary to dismantle these efforts in order for arbitration 
guarantee autonomy?  
The FAA should not stand as a barrier to what seems to be a judicial green 
light toward the contract model. The thrust of the FAA is that of party 
autonomy. The drafters appear to have recognized the use of arbitration as 
a means to achieve merchant self-governance among business 
constituents. The theme of upholding the intent of the parties resounds 
throughout the legislative history of the FAA. 
 
The Supreme Court’s arbitration policy not only seeks to delimit state 
involvement in the governance of arbitration, but to guarantee and bolster the 																																																								
194 Brunet Jr. Brunet, Edward J. Arbitration law in America: a critical assessment. 
Cambridge University Press, 2006. 
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autonomy of “individuals”. These individuals, of course, include multinational 
firms with billions in market capitalization, hundreds of millions in annual 
revenue, thousands of employees, and operations across the globe. In so doing, 
however, it has equipped corporations with the possibility of pursuing strategic 
disputing behaviors and law avoidance strategies. Then again, arbitration may 
involve actual individuals like Vincent and Liza Concepcion, whose motion for 
class-action relief against AT&T was denied by the U.S Supreme Court. 
 
Irrespective of the ideal subject it is addressed to, the doctrine of freedom has 
important consequences. In practice, it effectively routinizes the enforcement of 
arbitration awards. This furtively vests corporations with powers of law-making 
and what for lack of better term we may call “legal strategizing”. The neo-
Lochnerian flavor of modern arbitration reform is not just about “enforcing 
contracts”, as is claimed by some of its exponents. Arbitration agreements are 
being accorded a special status that makes them immune to challenge, review, and 
oversight. This is especially significant for corporate disputants, because they 
have everything short of a guarantee that their arbitration agreements will be 
enforced, irrespective of their irregularities.  Although the Federal Arbitration Act 
states that awards may be overturned for fraud, corruption, or “manifest disregard 
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of the law” – in reality, the scope that would even allow for such challenges to 
arise is narrowing.  
 
This is a matter of political-economic importance because it alters the legal and 
regulatory conditions to which corporations are subject, particularly to forms of 
private litigation that they view as an anathema to their interests. The Supreme 
Court does not say as much, but by deferring to commercial arbitrators (and the 
disputants who hire them) it is effectively unfettering commercial litigation from 
any system of checks and balances, including government regulation, judicial 
scrutiny, public deliberation, and even written record.195  
 
This doctrine grants corporations a form of legal immunity, virtually guaranteeing 
that arbitration awards will not be subject to scrutiny or annulment. Part and 
parcel of this policy shift is a delimitation of the criteria that can be used to revoke 																																																								
195  As Robert Lee Hale wrote against proponent of marginalist economics, 
Thomas Nixon Carver. “What is the government doing when it " protects a 
property right"? Passively, it is abstaining from interference with the owner when 
he deals with the thing owned; actively, it is forcing the non-owner to desist from 
handling it, unless the owner consents.” Hale’s emphasis on both active and 
passive elements of government “activity”, and its resultant distributive 
consequences can easily be applied to arbitration law. Hale, Robert L. "Coercion 
and distribution in a supposedly non-coercive state." Political Science 
Quarterly 38, no. 3 (1923): 470-494. 
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arbitration awards. It gives business a great degree of latitude to custom-design 
the contracts they create with others, and to include tailor-made arbitration clauses 
that are strategically placed to ward off unwanted litigation, including class-action 
litigation. Conceived in aggregate terms, the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration 
jurisprudence effectively creates a privately funded, privately administered 
parallel legal system that is virtually insulated from outward interference – 
including interference from judges, regulatory probes, press coverage, and 
generally speaking, citizen participation.  
 
This transformation is often described and theorized as though it merely entailed a 
shift from public to private forums governed by pragmatic concerns. However, it 
involves changes to the architecture of the regulatory state, and along with it, a 
transfiguration of the values of justice that have traditionally been attributed to it. 
Arbitration reform, I claim, is a means by which corporations have sought to 
implement political change by non-political means. 
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5. The Corporatization of ADR 
 
 
The (Supreme) Court’s “national policy favoring 
arbitration” has no basis in any legislative enactment or 
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indeed any expression by any political body, state or federal, 
that is accountable to the people.”196 - Paul Carrington 
 
 
1. The Beginnings of the Corporate Arbitration Movement 
 
In 1984, Eric D. Green, a prominent figure in the American arbitration profession, 
co-founder of JAMS International, Resolutions LLC, the Center for Public 
Resources and professor of law at Harvard University described the emergent 
corporate embrace of alternative dispute resolution as a “consumer movement.”197 
This observation was in many ways prescient.198 The “corporate” segment of the 																																																								
196 Carrington, Paul D. "Self-Deregulation, the National Policy of the Supreme 
Court." Nevada Law Journal 3 (2002): 259. 
 
197  “To a large extent, corporate interest in ADR constitutes a consumer 
movement at the upper end of the legal market.” Green, Eric D. "Corporate 
Alternative Dispute Resolution." Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution. 1 
(1985): 203. As Green himself noted, corporate interest in ADR did not appear to 
be motivated by the same concerns as those progressives using it for community 
building purposes or delivering access to justice – it was more likely a response 
to hyperlexis - the idea that America was becoming a more litigious society, and 
that the costs associated with it were overburdening corporate America. 
198  I follow Bryant Garth’s 2003 article,  “Tilting the Justice System” in 
identifying a pyramidal structure of the arbitration system. As Garth writes 
“There is a very special elite group of judges, retired judges, commercial courts, 
mediators, and arbitrators who provide tailor-made justice geared specifically to 
large business disputes-a category that includes the new wave of large class 
actions. This elite has its own sets of lawyers as well, and this relatively small 
group dominates the agenda for federal court reform as well as the elite ADR 
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arbitration sector has since grown to a billion dollar industry with hundreds of 
specialized law firms, arbitration tribunals, arbitrators, and consultants who derive 
their income from the provision of ADR services.199  
 
But the corporate embrace of ADR has not merely been a matter of consumption, 
it has also been politically driven. By expanding the corporate arbitration system, 
corporations have been able to pursue strategic disputing behaviors that have little 
to do with what is written in arbitration textbooks, or contained in formal 
arbitration doctrine.  
 
This chapter argues that corporate lobbying in favor of arbitration reform 
constitutes an elite legal mobilization that has sought to delimit public 																																																																																																																																																							
market. Garth, Bryant G. "Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic 
Movement to a Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution." Georgia State 
University Law Review. 18 (2001): 927.930. 
 
199 There is very little statistical data on the size of the arbitration service sector. 
According to the Global Arbitration Review annual awards, the combined 
portfolio value of the Global Arbitration Review’s Global top 30 law firms is in 
excess of 1 trillion U.S dollars. (This only denotes the value of the disputes in 
question, not income derived from the delivery of arbitration services 
themselves). One private study estimates that the value of the Toronto arbitration 
market at around $273 million annully.  
https://www.crai.com/sites/default/files/publications/An-Economic-Study-of-the-
Size-of-the-Arbitration-Sector-in-Toronto.pdf 
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interference corporate activity, a shift that I theorize as political, because it entails 
a reorganization of state power in favor of capital, and has been directed against 
the historical legacy of the regulatory state. In addition to developing dispute 
resolution programs and services of their own, corporations have pledged 
financial, political, and intellectual resources to fostering a neo-liberal system of 
dispute resolution that is severed from public control (and even knowledge), is 
thus, “safe for business”. The historical emergence of this corporate legal 
mobilization200, its governing ideology, and its relationship to democracy - are the 
subject of this chapter.  
 
Corporate sponsorship of arbitration reform has been political in four major ways. 
1) It is an elite driven movement, comprised of corporate litigators, active and 																																																								
200 For an account of elite political mobilization, and its ties to corporate capital, 
see Stephen Gill. Stephen Gill. American hegemony and the Trilateral 
Commission. Vol. 5. CUP Archive, 1991.For a different account of elite politics, 
see Steven M. Teles, The rise of the conservative legal movement: The battle for 
control of the law. Princeton University Press, 2012. See also Sarah Staszak’s 
more recent work traces conservative attacks on Rights era litigation through 
ADR. Staszak, Sarah. No Day in Court: Access to Justice and the Politics of 
Judicial Retrenchment. Oxford University Press, 2014. Both Teles’ and Staszak’s 
works differ from traditional accounts of lobbying campaigns in so far as they 
focus on informal networks, intellectual leadership, and attempts to influence 
“culture”, rather than the legislative process or the structure of the economy.  
Both Teles and Staszak appear to associate business interests with the political 
right.  
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retired jurists, former government officials and intellectuals 2) it has been 
advanced through non-democratic channels including business associations, 
think-tanks, and through elite networks 3) the ideology the lobby has given 
expression to is ultimately conservative, favoring existing powers interests 
against redistribution 4) it has enabled new strategic disputing behaviors that 
benefit wealthy disputants. This form of “law-making by private groups” has 
given business a way of opposing judicial and regulatory reforms that they 
resented for having expanded the regulatory state throughout the 1960s and 
1970s.  
 
To be sure, I am not arguing that there is anything inherently manipulative or 
biased about arbitration as such, nor am I denying that there have been genuine 
parallel efforts to use ADR for progressive purposes. What I am drawing attention 
to are efforts by corporate lobbyists to “capture” arbitration law and to advance 
reforms that are modeled on neo-liberal conceptions of state and market.  
 
There is reason to be suspicious of the movement’s claims to defend the interests 
of consumers, workers and ordinary Americans, or to embody a universal system 																																																																																																																																																							
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of justice that advances the common good. In reality, corporate arbitration reform 
dedicated to a conservative view of free market politics that serves to protect the 
interest of capital. Put differently, the corporate ADR movement is best 
understood as a form of elite politics that has sought to radically altered the rules 
and norms to which corporate disputants are subject, a shift which spells 
important changes for both the distribution of power and authority in the capitalist 
state, not to mention, for the “value” of justice itself.201  
 
At the forefront of the corporate arbitration movement is a coalition of business 
officials, jurists, former government officials and professional ideologues who 
have waged a decades-long lobbying campaign aimed at combatting the “high 																																																								
201 Jay Feinman has written about such an elite coalition in the tort-reform 
movement. “Politicians, academics, and ideologues have joined the cause to 
advance their own interests and to promote a conservative agenda. A network of 
trade groups, think tanks, right-wing foundations, membership organizations, 
lobbyists, and litigation centers link the elements of the cam- paign in a 
coordinated effort of funding, lobbying, networking, and advocacy to advance 
the new approach to law.” Feinman, Jay M. Un-Making Law: The Conservative 
Campaign to Roll Back the Common Law. Beacon Press, 2004. 
 
For a discussion of conservative philosophy as the protection of privilege. Robin, 
Corey. The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah 
Palin. Oxford University Press, 2011. While I focus specifically on arbitration 
reform, judicial privatization through arbitration reform should be read as part of 
a greater deregulatory vision of the past forty years.  
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costs of litigation”. They have converged in think tanks and business associations 
like the International Center for Conflict Prevention (CPR), the Business 
Roundtable of the U.S Chamber of Commerce (BRT), and the dispute resolution 
section of the American Bar Association. The lobby says that it wants to make 
litigation faster and cheaper, and to promote the “freedom of contract” - 
commitments that have been echoed in a series of U.S Supreme Court decisions, 
most notably, in the decisions of the late Justice Scalia.202 
 
The lobby’s commitment to cheap and expedient system of arbitration comes 
along with, and in fact necessitates, the forfeiture of many of the mechanisms that 
ensure that judicial decisions are lawful. At this point, these features of arbitration 
are well known, and are routinely cited in the scholarly and professional literature. 
Arbitrators are not bound by rules of common law precedent, their decisions are 
final and not normally subject to review or appeal. Press coverage is next to non-																																																								
202 For an ideological contextualization of the  Supreme Court’s emphasis on 
cost, speed, and the freedom of contract. See. George, Eric. "A Historical 
Reflection on Arbitration and the Corporation as an Object of Economic 
Governance." Western New England Law Review 39, no. 4 (2017): 557. For the 
Court’s embrace of neo-liberal principles. Aragaki, Hiro N. "Does Rigorously 
Enforcing Arbitration Agreements Promote Autonomy." Indiana Law Journal 91 
(2015): 1143. Aragaki, Hiro N. "Constructions of Arbitration's Informalism: 
Autonomy, Efficiency, and Justice." Journal on Dispute Resolution. (2016): 141. 
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existent in arbitration, awards are published in highly redacted form. In other 
words, arbitration happens in conditions of complete opacity. Clearly, the 
integrity of what we call justice would suffer if the entire court system were to be 
reformed according to these principles. However, arbitration law does not 
superimpose these conditions upon anyone who does not want them. It effectively 
enables the voluntary forfeiture of one’s right to a trial in exchange for swift and 
cheap dispute resolution.  
 
But there is a broader regulatory problem at stake that has received little attention 
in the arbitration literature. Adjudicating commercial conflict (and civil litigation 
generally) is not just about resolving disputes in a way that is satisfactory to the 
two parties203 but as Owen Fiss once put it  “an institutional arrangement for using 
state power to bring a recalcitrant reality closer to our chosen ideals.”204The rise 
anti-trust litigation in the late 19th century, and the growth of administrative law in 
the 20th century saw the use of civil litigation as a means of governing corporate 																																																								
203 Contrast this with Gillian Hadfield’s statement that “The rules we want in 
these interactions are the rules that promote and facilitate efficient market 
relationships between corporations. In this setting, we are not interested in what 
is fair or just between two corporations; we are interested in what makes their 
economic relationship as productive and valuable as possible.” 
 
204 Fiss, Owen M. "Against settlement." Yale Law Journal 93 (1983): 1073. 
		 	
	 247	
conduct.205 Historically part of that use of state power has been to deter and 
govern corporate behavior however, the fact that commercial arbitration dilutes 
and/or eliminates these features of the courts is very important because it radically 
alters the corporation as an object of economic governance. 
 
The privatization of adjudication 206 , engendered through arbitration reform, 
enables corporations to pursue strategic disputing behaviors that would not have 
been possible in courts of law. In the same stroke, arbitration negates the 
“spotlight effect” created by litigation. It delimits the public’s access to 
information that would have enabled them to make informed (consumer, voting 
and planning) decisions about the kind of society they would like to live in. 
 																																																																																																																																																							
 
205 Carrington, Paul D. "Self-Deregulation, the National Policy of the Supreme 
Court." Nevada Law Journal 3 (2002): 259. 
 
206 As Brunet writes. “The desire for secrecy, the attraction of moving to a 
custom of using industry experts as arbitrators, and the selection of trade norms 
as the rules of decision each play an important part in the privatization story. I 
support the positioning of privatization as one of the few most important values 
of arbitration.” Brunet, E.J., 2006. Arbitration law in America: a critical 
assessment. Cambridge University Press. 
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While privacy and confidentiality may be desirable for even small-scale 
disputants who wish to protect sensitive information, opacity takes on special 
significance when it applies to multinational business giants whose disputes oven 
exceed sums of hundreds of millions of dollars and often involve public policy 
issues like environmental damages and anti-trust claims. Even disputes that seem 
to be of relatively low social consequence, like patent litigation, can have great 
impact if their details are made public. Such disputes may be formally treated as 
“private” and thus, of significance to only the two parties involved in the dispute, 
but they are in effect, matters that are of broader concern to “third parties” 
including shareholders, workers, consumers, communities and citizens.  
 
Proponents of commercial arbitration see themselves to be doing the public a 
service by diverting their disputes to private forums. (It is telling that the main 
corporate arbitration think tank was initially called “The Center for Public 
Resources”). The greater availability of dispute resolution mechanism (arbitration, 
mediation, and preventative tactics like early neutral evaluation) are seen to 
present a net benefit to society. The building of the “multi-door courthouse”, as it 
was famously conceived by Frank Sander, a pioneer of ADR, was meant to 
multiply the tools available to judges and disputants by affording them with a 
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greater range of choice. Since there is no “one size fits all” model of justice, ADR 
was seen to widen the spectrum of available dispute resolution options. Within 
this broader schema, commercial disputes were often seen to be the least suspect, 
and moreover, the least subject to potential abuse, because the parties were 
assumed to be on roughly equal bargaining terms.  
 
Thus, the diversion of corporate litigation to arbitration tribunals was - and 
continues to be seen as a mere “lateral movement” of litigation from one (public) 
forum to another (privately administered) tribunal. The problem with this line of 
reasoning is not necessarily that it is false but that it moves too quickly. To be 
sure, nobody denies that litigation is public and arbitration private. But the 
promotion of ADR cannot be dissociated from the privatization of adjudication 
generally – which is to say that a transformation of the value of dispute resolution 
and its place in the broader democratic order, is in play. The forfeiture of the 
procedural formality and relative transparency of trial litigation is seen to be a 
small price to pay for faster, cheaper and more responsive decisions, especially if 
both disputants are of roughly equal bargaining power and they agree to 
arbitration in advance 
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While privatization has received extensive treatment in the critical literature207, 
what has been less discussed is the way that corporations have been able to make 
strategic gains from the privatization, especially in commercial dispute resolution, 
seen by many to be least vulnerable to manipulation. My argument is that in its 
current manifestation, the proliferation of ADR mechanisms implies a dilution of 
public power over the enforcement of private conflict, a transformation which 
spells out important changes for the nature of the courts and regulatory agencies – 
as well as for the architecture of the modern capitalist state more generally. This 
radically changes the corporation as an object of governance, and in the same 
stroke, diminishes citizens’ ability to make informed decisions about the kind of 
society they want to live in.  
 
2. The Corporatization of Alternative Dispute Resolution 1977-Present 
 																																																								
207 Hensler, Deborah R. "Our courts, ourselves: How the alternative dispute 
resolution movement is re-shaping our legal system." Penn St. L. Rev. 108 
(2003): 165. Fiss, Owen M. "Against settlement." Yale Law Journal 93 (1983): 
1073. 
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American corporations are no longer tolerating the high costs of litigation.208 
James F. Henry – President and Founder of the Center for Public Resources  1985 
 
A new corporate arbitration lobby is afoot today, and it has remobilized and in 
many ways intensified, the political-economic themes that I identified in the early 
20th century corporate arbitration lobby. The lobby includes corporate think-tanks 
and associations like the International Center for Confliction Prevention (CPR), 
the American Bar Association and the Business Roundtable (BRT) of the U.S. 
Chamber of Commerce. These organizations are joined by elite jurists, former 
state officials and intellectuals who have lent their intellectual patronage to a 
corporatized vision of arbitration (and alternative dispute resolution more 
broadly). 
 
3. Elements of the Corporate Arbitration Lobby 
 
This section describes the re-making of the corporate arbitration lobby from 1977-
to present. The corporate arbitration lobby, I argue, is constituted by an informal 																																																								
208 Henry, James F. "Alternative Dispute Resolution: Meeting the Legal Needs of 
the 1980s." Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution. 1 (1985): 113. 
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set of business associations, think tanks and intellectual representatives. It is 
characterized by a form of elite politics that transcend partisan lines – and in some 
ways defies conventional categorization of “conservative” and “liberal”, since it 
draws support from both former Democrats and Republicans, as well as jurists 
appointed by both Republic and Democratic presidents. What this politics shares 
in common is an acute sensitivity to corporate frustrations with the legal system, a 
set of attitudes that is perhaps best encapsulated in the term “compliance fatigue” 
the idea that the combination too many regulations have sapped the competitive 
dynamism of business.209 In the name of reducing costs and delays, and of 
promoting the “freedom of contract” corporations have used ADR as a means of 
transforming the American judicial system, and of limiting their exposure to 
unwanted forms of public interference – from government, watchdog groups, the 
press, workers, consumers and citizens. 
 
Corporate arbitration reform is often portrayed as though it arose from objective 
conditions. On their own, costs, delays, and “technicalities” of civil procedure do 																																																																																																																																																							
 
209 Binham, Caroline. "Multinational Companies Suffer ‘compliance 
Fatigue’." Financial Times, June 10, 2014. Accessed June 10, 2014. 
https://www.ft.com/content/b9072126-ef14-11e3-acad-00144feabdc0. 
 
		 	
	 253	
not strike one as political. Certainly nobody defends the integrity of the justice 
system on the grounds that it is expensive, time-consuming and has a labyrinth of 
rules to navigate. Complaining about “delays”, “costs”, and “excessive 
technicality” of the courts does not raise political suspicion because it is directed 
against problems that nobody actually defends. Upon closer examination, 
however, these complaints are often waged against attributes of the regulatory 
state, and against specific types of litigation that were perceived to be responsible 
for precipitating the litigation crisis. As Bayless Manning put the matter in 1977 
in a piece entitle “hyperlexis”, 
A significant contributor to the flood of litigation, regulations and 
legislation is a rising feeling among many members of the public 
that the society as a whole should in some way compensate the 
individual for almost any loss he sustains. That is a political 
proposition, not an attribute of the legal system itself.210 
 
In other words, Manning perceives at least one source of increasing litigation to 
be part of the tide of regulatory measures and rights litigation that gained 
increasing traction in the 1960s and 1970s.211  																																																																																																																																																							
 
210 Manning, Bayless. "Hyperlexis: Our national disease." Northwestern 
University Law Review. 71 (1976): 767. 
	
211 The 1971 Powell memorandum, written by Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. 
Powell Jr. called upon business to organize against what he called the “broad-
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Indeed, by the 1980s statements were routinely expressed by corporate officials 
and elite jurists decrying the increasing tide of rights litigation – and the 
accompanying belief that litigation could redress all of society’s ills.212  Chief 
Justice Warren Burger, for example, warned of the problems of delay, high cost, 
and unnecessary technicality in the American court system. As he wrote in 1984,  
One reason our courts have become overburdened is that Americans are 
increasingly turning to the courts for relief from a range of personal 
distresses and anxieties. Remedies for personal wrongs that once were 
considered the responsibility of institutions other than the courts are now 
boldly asserted as legal "entitlements." The courts have been expected to fill 
the void created by the decline of church, family, and neighborhood unity.213 																																																																																																																																																							
based and consistently pursued” assault on the American free enterprise system 
that was “gaining momentum and converts.” As Galanter writes, this document 
foreshadows the pronounced increase in business spending on politics, as well as 
the arrival of right-wing think tanks, institutes and foundations and the 
establishment of conservative public-interest law firms. Powell advises the 
Chamber of Commerce to mount an aggressive campaign to cultivate and 
support scholars, “who do believe in the system”, to critique textbooks, to 
promote a “steady flow” of scholarly and popular articles, and to intervene in the 
courts.  
 
212  As Steven Teles writes “Although conventional wisdom holds that the 
Republican coalition was held together by anticommunism and opposition to 
taxes, just as important were the specter of “activist judges” and the liberal 
organizational network that supported them. Businesses hated the courts for 
legitimizing and accelerating the expansion of the federal regulatory state.” 
 
213 Burger, Warren E. "Isn't there a better way." ABA Journal 68 (1982): 274. 
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To be sure, there is evidence that a “litigation crisis” being experienced by 
business was in fact happening. Rates of contract litigation in Federal district 
courts grew substantially in the 1980s, as did the size of the legal profession. In 
retrospect, the politics of the litigation crisis was the apportionment of blame. 
Many business elites and elite jurists blamed the encroaching regulatory state.214 
Like the development of the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925, the corporate 
arbitration lobby has acted outside of traditional political channels, and in near 
total isolation from democratic participation. It is an initiative comprising CEOs 
from Fortune 500 corporations, general and outside counsel from corporate law 
firms, retired judges, former government officials, and intellectuals. While these 
actors do not necessarily see themselves as politically motivated, the structural 
effect of their activity is, the corporatization of ADR has effectuated a major 
transformation of state power that has served corporate interests. Together, these 
actors form a “corporate legal mobilization” that has sought to transform the 																																																								
214 By the mid 1960s, courts, legislatures, and lawyers had transformed the legal 
landscape. Civil rights, enlarged tort-liablity, the emergence of poverty law, 
consumerism, and environmentalism all reflected higher expectations of 
institutional performance by manufacturers, doctors, and government. 
Government responded by to and promoted rising public expectations by 
launching a “War on Poverty” as well as by enacting a wave of civil rights, 
consumer, and environmental legislation. 
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judiciary, government agencies, the internal governance structure of the 
corporation, as well as the values and ethics traditional associated with the legal 
profession.215  
 
At the center of the lobby’s activity is an effort to replace conventional 
approaches to commercial adjudication with a “corporate” concept of ADR. 
Corporate ADR has little to do with the progressive ADR techniques that leftists 
envisioned in the 1970s, and in many ways, go well beyond the FAA, which 
placed agreements to arbitrate on the same footing as other contracts. The idea 
behind “corporate ADR” is that private arbitrators and mediators are often better 
equipped to manage corporate conflict than judges, and that a private market for 
“decisions” would better allocate society’s legal resources than the judiciary’s 
monopoly over dispute resolution.  
 
4. The Center for Public Resources 
 																																																								
215 Garth, Bryant. "From Civil Litigation to Private Justice: Legal Practice at War 
with the Profession and Its Value." Brooklyn Law Review. 59 (1993): 931. 
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One of the most important agents in the arbitration lobby has been the Center for 
Public Resources (now the International Center for Conflict Resolution). Since 
1979, the CPR has been a fixture of the corporate arbitration movement, playing a 
leading role in promoting interest in ADR for virtually every aspect of corporate 
conflict including asbestos litigation, class-actions, anti-trust suits, and 
environmental litigation.  
 
The CPR was founded as a non-profit by James F. Henry in New York in 1977, 
one year after Harvard Law Professor Frank Sander had made his now famous 
address to the American Bar Association, “The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction 
with the Administration of Justice,”216 a speech many view as having spearheaded 
the ADR movement in the 1970s217.  At the time, the support base for ADR was 
diverse – it included many left wing and progressive elements who wanted to use 																																																								
216 This phrase was stylized version of Roscoe Pound’s 1906 address.  
 
217 The organization’s title is somewhat counter-intuitive, since arbitration is a 
private good, not a public resource. Alternative dispute resolution is not strictly 
speaking, a public resource, it is a private service that can be bought and sold 
much like any other commodity. Any pretension to being a public resources has 
to do with its desired effects. It is notable that the CPR has changed names twice 
since 1979. The center was renamed the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution in 
1994, and later, marking its establishment in the field of international arbitration 
- the International Center for Conflict Prevention and Resolution in 2004.  
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alternative dispute resolution as a means of promoting “access to justice” to 
marginalized groups. But alternatives also drew considerable attention from 
business, who by the 1970s had begun to complain about an increasing tide of 
regulatory and consumer litigation that they perceived to be sapping their ability 
to compete in international market.  
 
The CPR took on a multi-pronged approach to promotion of ADR principle, 
targeting jurists, corporate officials and educators. First, it assembled general 
counsel from firms including General Electric, Royal Dutch Shell, 
ConocoPhillips, and Monsanto to devise cost-saving dispute resolution strategies 
to the litigation crisis. By 1986, the CPR had attracted a coalition of over 140 
major corporations and law firms to adopt its corporate pledge, a voluntary 
agreement indicating their commitment to using ADR over litigation whenever it 
was deemed appropriate.218  
 																																																								
218 "Our company pledges to commit its resources to manage and resolve 
disputes through negotiation, mediation and other ADR processes when 
appropriate, with a view to establishing and practicing global, sustainable dispute 
management and resolution processes." Signatories of the CPR pledge include 
major American corporations including Conoco Phillips, IBM, Pfizer, Microsoft, 
Mastercard, Raytheon, Royal Dutch Shell, and Xerox. 
https://www.cpradr.org/resource-center/adr-pledges/21st-century-pledge 
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The CPR’s early activities involved the creation of programs targeting specific 
areas of problem litigation. For example, in 1984, the center was approached by 
major asbestos producers (including Union Carbide and Chevron) to develop a 
program to manage over 38.2 billion dollars in claims over the subsequent three 
decades.219 Another CPR initiative was the development of “mini-trial” services, 
abbreviated trials with limited power of discovery in which disputants would 
present their “best case” before one of the CPR neutrals. These trials could be 
administered by retired justices, arbitrators, or corporate managers with no formal 
judicial training, but whose expertise in specific areas of business qualified them 
to serve as a neutral. By the mid 1980s, CPR mini-trials had been used to settle a 
number high-stakes commercial disputes, including multi-million dollar disputes 
involving firms like Amoco, Gillette Oil, Union Carbide.  
 
While corporations had the option to arbitrate commercial disputes prior to the 
1980s, the caseload of major arbitration tribunals had remained relatively small.  
U.S companies were still averse to entrusting high-stakes disputes to commercial 																																																																																																																																																							
 
219 Green, Eric D. "Corporate Alternative Dispute Resolution." Ohio State Journal 
on Dispute Resolution 1 (1985): 203. 
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arbitrators. To overturn corporate antipathy to using ADR for high stakes 
disputes, the CPR sought to bolster its perceived legitimacy through the 
recruitment of high-profile government officials, federal and state justices who 
formed its national “Judicial Panel”. Not only did this provide an important 
symbol of legitimacy, it allowed judges to cash-in on their experience as neutral 
decision-makers. The CPR recruited Irving Younger, Harold Tyler and Simon 
Rifkin of the prestigious District Court for the Southern District of New York. It 
also was able to bring in former government officials from the Carter 
administration including former White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler, Attorney 
General Griffin Bell, and secretary of education Shirley Hufstedler. Such 
additions helped CPR led efforts to establish the Federal Office of Dispute 
Resolution, as well as the Federal Interagency ADR Working Group under the 
Clinton Administration.  
 
The CPR also targeted top U.S law schools by establishing connections with law 
schools Harvard’s Program on Negotiation, which had famously delivered the 
Pound lecture as well as Harry Wellington, Dean of Yale Law School. Other key 
contributors have been Mark Fisher and William Ury of Harvard’s Program on 
Negotiation as well as representatives of the Law and Economics variety like 
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Gillian Hadfield, and Robert Mnookin. These intellectuals have generally taken a 
favorable view of the further privatization of commercial law.220 By securing 
intellectual representation amongst the nation’s top law schools, the corporate 
lobby succeeded in both popularizing ADR as a legitimate mode of dispute 
resolution for commercial conflict.  
 
In addition to honoring CEOs, lawyers and arbitrators who have made 
contributions to the development of corporate ADR, the CPR regularly invites 
elite politicians. Contributors to its annual conference have included former 
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien, Chairman of the Democratic National 
Commitee Howard Dean, Senator George Mitchell, and Harriet Miers, White 
House Counsel to George W. Bush. 
 
It would be some misnomer to speak of the CPR as a lobby group, at least in the 
more familiar sense of the term, because most of its activities are not directed at 
legislative change properly speaking.  
 																																																								
220 Hadfield, G.K., 2001. Privatizing commercial law. Regulation, 24, p.40. 
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5. The Delaware Arbitration Experiment 
 
The corporate arbitration lobby also draft amicus briefs in cases where it 
perceives corporate interests to be at stake. Although these activities do not 
constitute “lobbying” in the formal sense of the term, they are a way that the 
business associations and think tanks can directly communicate to their views to 
judges. What can be seen in recent cases is the convergence of business groups 
and jurists behind a “pro-arbitration” doctrine that emphasizes the importance of 
cost cutting, expediency and “the freedom of contract”.221  
 
The issues that arose in Strine v. Delaware Coalition for Open Government, Inc. 
are illustrative of the corporate arbitration lobby’s commitment to maintaining the 
arbitration system’s opacity. In 2011, the public watchdog group, the Delaware 
Coalition for Open Government (henceforth DelCOG) filed a lawsuit against 
Delaware’s Chancery Court, challenging the constitutionality of its recently 
implemented Uniform Arbitration Act.  The case drew attention from the legal 																																																								
221 The Delaware Coalition for Open Government is a coalition of journalists, 
lawyers, elected officials, news organizations, business owners, government 
employees, civic associations and private citizens dedicated to promoting and 
defending the people’s right to transparency and accountability in government. 
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commentators not just because of the nature of the claims, but because of the 
stature of the chancery court. The state of Delaware is a very important 
jurisdiction in the broader U.S corporate system. Its sophisticated system of 
incorporation, its lower tax rates, and its historic role in building the legal 
architecture of the U.S. corporate system make it an attractive jurisdiction for 
corporate-led legal experimentation. 222   Roughly six in ten Fortune 500 
corporations are registered in Delaware, and its chancery court system is reputed 
for its expertise in corporate law matters, as well as for making expeditious 
judgments.   
 
The Uniform Arbitration Act was implemented in in 2009 at the recommendation 
of Delaware’s Corporate Council. This legislation permitted Delaware chancery 
court judges could arbitrate private disputes during “off hours”. The arbitrations 
conducted under the program were for all intents and purposes, exactly like civil 
trials, with the exception that the proceedings were confidential, and the 
judgments final and binding. The act applied to business disputes valued at 
upward of $1 million dollars. The only restriction was that the disputes not 																																																								
222 Horwitz, Morton J. "Santa Clara revisited: The development of corporate 
theory." West Virginia Law Review. 88 (1985): 173. 
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involve consumers. By 2012, the court had arbitrated six such cases, including a 
$262.5 million deal involving an attempt by Skyworks Solutions to escape its 
agreement to buy Advanced Analogic Technologies.223 The fee for an arbitration 
was $15,000, with an additional cost of $6000 per day. Judges oversaw the 
proceedings, effectively “bracketing” their public function – and temporarily 
assuming the role and function as commercial arbitrators.  
 
DelCOG objected to the Uniform Arbitration Act on the grounds that it 
effectively enabled “secret judicial proceedings” that violated the First 
Amendment’s requirement that the public and the press have access to civil and 
criminal trials. Since the arbitration proceedings were carried out by public 
justices on public premises, Delcog argued that the proceedings should have been 
subject to a public right of access.  In their view, public access to civil trials was a 
fundamental right in democratic society.  
 																																																								
223 Steven Davidoff, Solomon. “A Troubled Deal and the Law of Unintended 
Consequences.” Dealbook, November 7, 2014. Accessed October 17, 
2017. https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/11/07/a-troubled-deal-runs-into-the-
law-of-unintended-consequences/. 
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DelCOGs’ objection to the Delaware program, and the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s subsequent decision to terminate it, elicited a series of condemnations 
from the arbitration program’s business supporters. In an amicus brief, the 
Business Roundtable of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce224, condemned the 
Delaware Supreme Court’s decision to annul the arbitration program, arguing that 
the judgment squandered the potential for Delaware to compete with international 
arbitration tribunals.  Similarly, TechNet,225 a lobby group representing “more 																																																								
224 As the U.S Chamber of Commerce stated in its petition. “The Chamber of 
Commerce of the United States of America (Chamber) is the world’s largest 
business federation. It represents 300,000 direct members and indirectly 
represents the interests of more than three million companies and professional 
organizations of every size, in every industry sector, from every region of the 
country. An important function of the Chamber is to represent the interests of its 
members in matters before Congress, the Executive Branch, and the courts. To 
that end, the Chamber regularly files amicus curiae briefs in cases that raise 
issues of significant concern to the nation’s business community.” Brief of the 
Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners. Del. Coal. v. Strine, 2012 U.S. Dist. 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/Strine-Chamber-
BRT-amicus-2014.pdf  
 
225 Technet’s amicus brief describes the organization as “an association of chief 
executive officers and senior executives of the Nation’s leading technology 
companies, including in the fields of information technology, biotechnology, 
clean technology, venture capital, e-commerce, and finance. Together, they 
represent more than two million employees and $800 billion in revenues. By 
uniting technology industries’ strongest voices with federal and state leaders, 
TechNet helps to shape public policy that promotes the growth of technology-led 
innovation. TechNet therefore has a substantial interest in this case, because the 
statute at issue is part of an ongoing effort by the State of Delaware to provide 
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than two million employees and $800 billion in revenues”, petitioned the court’s 
decision, citing the importance of the arbitration program in innovating faster, 
cheaper modes of resolving tech disputes. 
  
But perhaps most telling is the general hostility expressed by counsel to the idea 
of public participation.   
Beyond that, what the panel majority cited as beneficial here - educating 
the public, promoting public confidence, deterring corruption and 
misrepresentation - could be invoked to justify access to virtually any 
governmental activity, be it a hearing about driver’s licences or the 
herding of horses.226 
 
Similarly, TechNet failed to see any real purpose, beyond “theoretical” to 
Delcog’s objection. 
 																																																																																																																																																							
businesses—including technology innovators—with an efficient and effective 
forum for resolving their disputes.” Motion for Leave to File Brief as Amici 
Curiae and Brief for Technet in Support of Petitioners. Del. Coal. v. Strine, 2012 
U.S. Dist. http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/TechNet-
Amicus-Brief.pdf 
 
 
 
226  Brief for Technet in Support of Petitioners. 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/TechNet-Amicus-
Brief.pdf 
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The response the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision provoked by Technet and 
BRT gives us a glimpse into the current state of business arbitration in the U.S. 
First, the Delaware case illustrates the way that private arbitration places a direct 
limit on the values of judicial oversight and transparency. Second, it involves a 
revolving-door effect of public justices, whether active or retired, acting as 
patrons to the private sector. This means that businesses are consulting judges to 
see what a court “might rule” if they were in fact were to go to trial, and are 
making legal decisions based on this information. The view that arbitration would 
lead to “a better outcome” is indicative of a pragmatic approach to justice that 
pervades the arbitration literature: these practices are not seen as belonging to a 
specific political philosophy or involving a normative vision of what a justice 
system should do. 227  Perhaps most strikingly is Steven Davidoff’s offhand 
comment that the Delaware experiment led to a situation in which “corporate law 
is made but nobody would know about it”. 
 
6. The Elite Politics of the Contemporary Arbitration Movement 
 																																																								
 
		 	
	 268	
Like its early 20th century precursor, the lobby is almost completely removed 
from popular representation, its main agents and spokespersons act in private 
capacity, they are not democratically elected or formally accountable to public 
body. Just as the early 20th century lobby saw arbitration as an expression of “self-
governance,” the modern corporate lobby speaks of the arbitration system as a 
bastion of individual freedom. Moreover, the lobby is committed to widening the 
scope of arbitrability, thereby expanding the dominion of the arbitration system, 
most strikingly, to government-business disputes, as well as regulatory issues. 
Finally, it has recruited “organic” intellectuals who have expounded a general 
theory of arbitration that seek to give the movement its “universal character”.  
 
Does this mean we are merely witnessing a repetition of early 20th century themes 
that I identified in the last chapter? While the analogy is tempting, there are key 
differences between the early twentieth century arbitration movement and today’s. 
For one, the methods and scope of the corporate arbitration movement’s agenda 
are much more intensive than the reforms envisioned than its predecessor. The 
lobby has sought to make arbitration a legitimate mode of dispute resolution for 
virtually every aspect of modern litigation, including anti-trust disputes, 
environmental disputes, weapons and aerospace contract disputes, and 
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shareholder derivative suits. Although initially focused on arbitration between 
commercial parties, the movement has channeled its energies to applying private 
dispute resolution techniques into government-business disputes, as well as 
regulatory matters.228  
 
Like their early 20th century forebears, the contemporary corporate arbitration 
movement’s ostensible commitments have little or nothing to do with politics, 
regulation, distribution or even the governance of corporate behavior properly 
speaking.229 Arbitration is seemingly pragmatic and technical, it does not stem 
from first principles like socialism or conservatism. The lobby’s language, oft-
repeated over in public relations communiqués suggests that they are occupied 																																																								
228 As the CPR’s founder, James F Henry writes, “government agencies have 
crafted procedures to serve the full range of corporate and government conflict, 
including complex, multiparty conflicts, and even mega-disputes, such as mass 
torts or the Sept. 11 claims.”228 Steven Davidoff and David Zaring speak of the 
replacement of government-led regulatory functions with privately administered 
negotiations as “regulation by deal”. Davidoff, Steven M., and David Zaring. 
"Regulation by deal: the government's response to the financial 
crisis." Administrative Law Review. 61 (2009): 463 
 
229	The contemporary arbitration movement’s language is scarcely different from 
that of its predecessors. Charles Bernheimer’s 1922 statement that “To litigate, 
the most wasteful procedure to which a business man can resort, means strife, 
expense, annoyance and the rupture of business friendship, sapping the very 
lifeblood of commerce" is not substantively different from the oft repeated 
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with the intricacies of highly specialized areas of commercial litigation - not with 
a broader normative framework, let alone with the general architecture of the 
capitalist state  
 
Thus, one will search in vain for an explicitly political treatise spelling out this 
neo-liberal vision, as well as any suggestion that arbitration law is being 
developed to advance this or that particular interest. Even though associations 
like the CPR and the SVAMC are overwhelmingly occupied with corporate 
clients – they do not see their promotion of ADR as benefitting any specific class 
of disputants. They make no differentiation, for example, between the progressive 
aims of the early ADR movement, and their own distinctly “corporate” brand of 
ADR.” Like the promoters of arbitration in the 1920s, the benefits of arbitration 
are thought to be a distributed to an assortment of actors including workers, small 
business, and families, amongst others.  
 
My claim is that this neo-liberal political-economic ideology is concealed, but it is 
nevertheless discernable in a body of professional and judicial opinion that 
informs the Supreme Court’s current interpretation of the FAA. The ideology is 																																																																																																																																																							
statements of arbitration PR campaigns. Galanter, Marc. "A world without 
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best illustrated in those cases where these central principles have been subject to 
challenge – and where corporate lobby groups have deemed it necessary to defeat 
measures that they see as antithetical to vitality and success of the ADR 
movement. From an intellectual vantage point, the closest expression of this 
worldview can be found in the writings of Gillian Hadfield, Erin O’Hara, and the 
late Lawrence Ribstein. In jurisprudence, it is best illustrated in the string of 
decisions delivered by Justice Scalia and the “contractualist” school of arbitration 
law defended by Edward Brunet Jr. and Stephen J. Ware. When arbitration law is 
governed according to these principles, corporations gain a series of strategic 
advantages. They are able to divert sensitive cases to private tribunals that delimit 
negative exposure to the public. They are able to hand-pick arbitrators who are 
more likely to give them a favorable ruling. Moreover, they are able to diminish 
their exposure to unwanted forms of conflict.  
 
The corporatization of arbitration involves the efforts of lobby groups, jurists, and 
intellectuals seeking to make litigation as conducive as possible to business 
interests. Coporatization involves more than the fact that corporations are in fact 
routine users of arbitration – it involves the superimposition of managerial 																																																																																																																																																							
trials." Journal on Dispute Resolution. (2006): 7	
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strategies and de-regulatory politics upon the institution of adjudication. It 
involves a transformation of litigation, the delimitation of common-law practices, 
and the subsumption of commercial conflict to logics of commodification, profit, 
and corporate control, and concomitantly, to the exclusion of public control and 
democratic oversight.  
 
 
 
 
 Conclusion 
 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, the use of arbitration proliferated so rapidly that 
its proponents resorted to accolades to describe it. Thomas Carbonneau, one of the 
most prolific arbitration commentators, described the rise of arbitration as a 
“civilization”.230 He characterized arbitration as “force for good in American 
Society”, and the U.S Supreme Court’s role of promoting arbitration as 
“instrumental to American democracy. 231  While there were problems with 																																																								
230  Carbonneau, Thomas E. "Building the Civilization of Arbitration-
Introduction." Penn State Law Review 113 (2009): 983. 
 
231 “If arbitration, in any of its applications, withers, it will besmirch the process 
and negatively effect American democracy and citizens. The duplicity of the 
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arbitration, namely, the use of “forced” arbitration clauses in consumer and 
employment contracts, he downplayed such issues, declaring that arbitration “was 
ultimately in the best interest of American citizens.”232 Others appealed to social 
theory to bolster arbitration’s profile. For Jurgen Basedow, arbitration best 
reflected the law of Karl Popper’s Open Society, and its attendant values of 
rationality, the Rule of Law, open dialogue and tolerance.233 With the exception 
of Owen Fiss, who warned about the dilution of justice in the informalism 
movement, there were few outspoken critics. Litigation was acrimonious, 
outmoded, and provincial, arbitration was lean, efficient, and presented a 
seemingly simple solution to the popular notion that America was a litigious 
society, flooded with needless lawsuits.  
 																																																																																																																																																							
leftwing critique of arbitration should not be allowed to prevail. The interests of 
American citizens should be given expression through the triumph of arbitration 
and the workable form of adjudication it embodies.” Carbonneau, Thomas E. 
"Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration." Cardozo Journal of Conflict 
Resolution. 10 (2008): 396. 
 232	Carbonneau, "Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration."  396.	
	
233 Basedow, Jürgen. The Law of Open Societies: Private Ordering and Public 
Regulation of International Relations: General Course on Private International 
Law. Place of pub? Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2013. 
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An entire host of functions were attributed to the arbitration revolution. 
Arbitration had a key role to play in the transcending the limitations of national 
courts, and of upholding principles of justice in a globalized economic system. It 
was credited with surmounting outmoded judicial formalism, and of providing 
new avenues for people to get justice. Arbitration values and practices were 
sufficiently flexible to be integrated in all kinds of conflict. One of the best 
testaments to the success of ADR values is the popularity of Robert Fisher and 
William Ury’s bestselling Getting to Yes, which promoted ADR and the principles 
of “interest-based dispute resolution”. Rather than resorting to adversarial 
procedure, disputants could tailor their own forms of dispute resolution with the 
aid of a mutually appointed party. The scope of Fisher and Ury’s project was 
ambitious. As they saw it, ADR principles were just as applicable to family 
disputes as they were to the Arab-Israeli conflict. They advocated the techniques 
in their book not only to lawmakers and managers, but also to families, couples 
and entrepreneurs.  
 
The optimism that surrounded arbitration extended to both the domestic and 
international settings. Arbitration was not just a promulgator of speed and 
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efficiency, but of democratic values. As Carbonneau wrote in a response to 
critics,  
Arbitration does not contribute to, or act as a vehicle for, injustice; rather, 
it fills wide gaps and makes adjudication accessible to individuals by 
promoting economy and effectiveness through the provision of expertise, 
basic fairness, and binding determinations. Statutory rights and the 
freedom from discrimination are more certain of application in an 
adjudicatory process that can actually function.234 
 
For some time, the critics of arbitration seem not only outnumbered, but to be 
hopelessly out of fashion. Criticism of arbitration was equated with a defense of 
litigation in court, something that was neither particularly well viewed, nor seen 
as desirable. Worse still, at the end of the Cold War, precisely at the historical 
moment when the Soviet behemoth of state-planning was crumbling, proponents 
of adjudication sounded statist. Why would anyone deny willing disputants the 
opportunity to resolve their disputes amongst one another if it did not come at 
anyone else’s expense? There in fact was very little opposition to arbitration, and 
its popularity was evidenced by its broad-backed basis of support both business, 
access to justice circles and community groups. 
 																																																								234	Carbonneau, "Arguments in Favor of the Triumph of Arbitration."  396.	
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The seemingly untrammeled ascent of arbitration, both international and 
domestic, however, has recently been met with a backlash that members of the 
profession do not appear to have seen coming – and the attack is coming from 
multiple fronts. 
 
At the domestic level, the use of mandatory arbitration agreements has drawn 
criticism from progressive jurists for not only violating the consensual nature of 
arbitration, but of superimposing unfair rules that place consumers workers in an 
unfair position against business. While no immediate linkage is normally made 
between domestic and international arbitration. There are commonalities in the 
focus on secrecy, opacity, and lack of oversight. In 2016 criticism of investment 
arbitration – hitherto confined to academic circles – drew tens of thousands of 
Europeans to march against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) and the Transpacific Partnership (TPP), both of which were to include 
privately administered arbitration tribunals for the resolution of international trade 
conflict. In Berlin, some 250,000 gathered in opposition to CETA and the TTIP. 
Though these protests focused on the way multinationals would use the Canada 
Europe Trade Agreement, and the TTIP to avoid environmental, consumer 
protection and labor laws – it was the structure of the arbitration tribunals that 
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drew some of the most heated criticism from onlookers. The TTIP, TPP, and 
CETA (all of which have been indefinitely scrapped by the Trump 
Administration) would have integrated arbitration tribunals that were not only 
isolated from public oversight, but had no mechanisms available for challenge or 
review. The secretiveness of the selection of investment arbitrators, and the small 
pool from which they are drawn, made the operation of these tribunals seem 
completely removed from public engagement and democratic processes.   
 
These types of objections to arbitration have not been delimited to and 
demonstrations, they have found expression in mainstream electoral politics. U.S. 
Senator Elizabeth Warren, for example, claimed that ISDS was used by 
corporations to challenge environmental, health, and safety regulations, including 
decisions on plain packaging rules for cigarettes , natural resource policies, health 
and safety measures, and denials of permits for toxic waste dumps. Perhaps most 
interestingly, criticisms of international arbitration not been confined to the 
political left. The neo-corporatist Trump campaign (dismissed by many until its 
eventual victory in November of 2016) took many political commentators by 
surprise when Trump announced that the U.S would back out of further TTIP and 
TTP negotiations – 
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Agreement – whose own arbitration tribunal has been subject of repeated political 
contestation for decades. Unlike the left, the nationalist flank of the conservative 
movement attacks multilateral arbitration agreements, not because they promote 
business interests at the expense of the general public, but because they erode 
national sovereignty, and surrender U.S power to the forces of liberal 
internationalism and “globalization”.  
 
There has also been greater attention to the manipulative use of arbitration in the 
domestic setting. In the 2016, Jessica Silver Greenberg and Robert Gebeloff, 
writing for the New York Times, reported on widespread use of mandatory 
arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts, and the way that 
business were using them to avoid unwanted litigation.235  These arbitration 
agreements are not only conducted in private, but administered by business-
friendly arbitrators. Greenberg and Gebeloff documented the widespread use 																																																								235	Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking the Deck of Justice, New York Times Dealbook (Oct. 31, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-
stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/4ZHD-LWTW].   
 
Jed. S., Rakoff, Why You Won’t Get Your Day in Court, New York Review of 
Books, (Nov. 24, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/11/24/why-you-
wont-get-your-day-in-court/ [https://perma.cc/7KRG-KXQD]. 
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these agreements by American retailers including Sears, Macy’s and Wal-Mart, as 
well as by credit card companies like Visa, Mastercard and American Express. 
Such criticisms have been echoed by U.S. jurists. Jed Rakoff of New York’s 
Southern District Court has repeatedly criticized the way that business use of 
mandatory arbitration clauses in consumer and employment contracts to deny 
weaker parties their day in court. More recently, these criticims have been 
articulated by Supreme Court justice Elena Kagan, who already since her 2010 
appointment by Barack Obama, has issued a number of dissenting opinions 
against the Roberts Court’s pro-arbitration stance.  
 
What these critiques unwittingly share in common is a focus on inequality 
between disputants. If arbitration was unjust, this clearly had to do with the 
asymmetries of power between disputants, not with the broader architecture of the 
arbitration system as such. But what about disputes involving parties of relatively 
equal bargaining power. The critics’ well-meaning focus on inequality, however, 
was ultimately informed by time-honored liberal principles. Contracts are 
legitimate so long as they are entered into willingly. Things went wrong when one 
party was able to use its superior wealth, connections, influence over another to 
gain a favorable outcome. What this well-meaning suspicion of arbitration left 
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out, however, was an extraordinarily large segment of the arbitration system; the 
segment administering disputes between large-scale corporations. It was merely 
assumed that any problem with such disputes would be offset by these disputants 
wealth. I also suspect that such disputes were not ultimately seen to involve 
substantive issues of justice. Corporate litigation has an air of technicality and 
routine to it that does not strike observers as being as worthy a cause of justice as 
criminal trials, discrimination suits, and civil rights issues. In fact, this is precisely 
Gillian Hadfield’s argument. The segment of the arbitration system administering 
disputes between corporations could be effectively quarantined from the rest of 
the legal system, thereby allowing judges to rule on more pressing issues.  
 
The general assumption that arbitration between corporate disputants can safely 
be left to business to administer is an empirical oversight caused by a set of 
ideological parameters. It is a longstanding conceit of liberal political theory that 
a harmonious society can be achieved through a balancing of interest group power 
through the state. But what of those social frictions that are not only left 
unresolved, but unaddressed altogether? In the 19th century, that major 
contradiction, at least according to the followers of Marx and Engels, was class 
warfare. Today, it may well be ecological survival. The arbitration system has a 
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brilliant and elegant conceptual architecture to hide its true impact – but that does 
not mean that this system is adequate as a historical and sociological explanation 
of arbitration’s function. The arbitration system’s claims to legitimacy, I claimed, 
concealed direct and indirect forms of distributive conflict. To challenge this 
view, I sought to go to the root of arbitration ideology and its basis in private law 
theory. I then moved to the institutional actors who insist of defending this set of 
parameters. 
 
This dissertation has sought to identify the constellation of practices and values 
associated with arbitration as a politics. This politics may be oblique, and it 
certainly does not have the same candor or rhetoric as the politics that dominate 
national headlines, but it can nevertheless be positively identified.  
 
To shed light on this arbitral politics, I did three things.  
 
First, I traced the development of the Federal Arbitration Act historically. Most 
histories focus on the testimony of the official spokespersons of the arbitration 
movement; Charles Bernheimer and Julius Cohen. But in the background was a 
vast business lobby that financed, organized, and supported the movement. 
		 	
	 282	
Drawing on the New York Chamber of Commerce’s Annual reports, as well as on 
documents detailing the members of the Arbitration Society of America, I showed 
how corporate capital figured prominently in the arbitration movement. Owen 
Young, one of the key figures of the arbitration movement, was himself CEO of 
the RCA Corporation, and directly involved in anti-trust arbitration while the 
FAA was being developed. 1920s arbitration thought, I argued, was rooted in a 
laissez-faire paradigm that sought to give as much latitude to business to order 
their affairs as they pleased. It is precisely for this reason that contemporary 
libertarians return to the FAA to draw inspiration. What they do mention is that 
the 1920s paradigm was severely challenged throughout the New Deal, and then 
again in the postwar period by a new generation of jurists who saw the Lochner 
doctrine as a thinly veiled defense of big business.  
 
Second, I went to the very core of arbitration ideology, the private law relation 
that is established as a matter of contract, and ultimately governed by national 
arbitration law. This seemingly elegant and simple doctrine, I showed, is more 
puzzling than first meets the eye. Contractual relations normally have meaning 
because they are enforced in accordance with common-law principles. In 
arbitration however, it is coming to be the case that contracts are enforced 
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because it is considered expedient to do so. This is true of individual arbitration 
agreements, but also, for the vitality of the arbitration system as a whole. But 
what kind of justice does that lead to? Surely enforcement in the name of speed 
and efficiency is not itself a theory of justice. It turns out however, that it is 
concurrently the basis of the Supreme Court’s argument in favor of arbitration.  
 
This focus on speed and efficiency as animating principles begs the question as to 
what the substance of arbitral justice actually is. It turns out that we do not know 
much about this – and we cannot know, because the data that would be required to 
make such an assessment either are not available or simply do not exist. We are 
not, however, completely in the dark. Challenges to arbitral awards, the exposure 
of cases that were thought to be confidential via leaks, and points of friction 
between competing policy proposal and judicial rulings tell us a lot about the 
stakes in question. The forces that have to combat the Such anecdotal or 
incomplete information can take us so far, but if people wanted to know the full 
extent and scope of the power of contemporary arbitral justice, it would require a 
full public investigation that, for the time being (and given the current political 
climate) seem very far removed from the realm of possibility.  
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The prevailing theory of contractualism, I claimed, obscures the impact, scale and 
dimensions of the segment of the arbitration system that is serving corporations. 
Arbitration is supposed to involve two parties and two parties only – but it clearly 
is being used in areas where third parties are affected. The private law theory 
upon which arbitration law is based is for lack of a better term, a necessary 
illusion that sustains contemporary arbitration practices, and the income of the 
arbitrators and lawyers who draw their income from it.  
 
Third, I focused on the corporate actors who themselves have sought to alter the 
course of arbitration law. Drawing on policy memos of the organizations like the 
Center for Public Resources and the Business Roundtable of the U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce, I showed how a new corporate lobby is trying to push arbitration law 
in a pro-business direction. These actors actively lobby the Supreme Court 
through amicus briefs and conduct public relations campaigns to promote 
arbitration. The Supreme Court plays a very important role in shaping arbitration 
law. The late Justice Scalia played a major role in directing this politics in a pro-
business direction. Given the conservative consolidation of the Court in the recent 
confirmations of Neil Gorsuch and Brett Kavanaugh, it would appear as though 
the Court is prepared to continue in the spirit of contractualist doctrine, while 
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ignoring or downplaying the objections the more liberal justices, particularly 
those of Elena Kagan, who has been the most vocal on the arbitration front.  
 
While there are reasons to believe things will get worse, or will not change, I will 
remark the following.  Even over the course of writing this dissertation, 
perceptions about international and domestic arbitration were clearly in motion. 
Critiques that were at one time relegated to the margins of academia began seeing 
greater discussion. The Corporate Europe Observatory’s Profiting from Injustice, 
for example, drew a great deal of academic attention. Gus Van Harten’s work on 
the inequalities of international investment arbitration became the focal point of 
discussion in the events leading to the TPP and TTIP negotiations. Perhaps most 
importantly, an entire generation of young legal academics went through a crash 
course in arbitration as the proponents of the TTIP and TPP crash and burned in 
the wake of the U.S’s exist from further talks. The new generation is increasingly 
attuned to issues of transparency, environmental justice, and human rights. There 
is undoubtedly a general malaise with arbitration, and this malaise has arisen in 
academic, policy-making, and commentary. Some of it seem to have made the 
arbitration movement increasing self-conscious.  Increasingly, the titles of 
arbitration conferences speak of a crisis of legitimacy, the need for awareness of 
		 	
	 286	
human rights issues, and transparency deficit. Still, merely talking about these 
issues does not necessarily mean that anything will be done about them. None of 
criticisms of arbitration have yet to be translated into any comprehensive political 
vision that would issue a challenge, let alone “replace” the existing arbitration 
regime.  
 
Some Remarks Concerning Potential Avenues for Future Research 
 
One of the things that struck me most over the course of this project is how little 
is actually known about corporate litigation at all. Economists have general 
models and data to study virtually every aspect of modern trade and investment. 
This is distinctly not true of the legal scholars who study contemporary dispute 
resolution. Not only is there very little data – that which does exist is not as 
reliable as commonly used economic indicators. To aggravate matters, there is a 
paucity of corporate litigation theory. There is no general theory of corporate 
litigation – why it arose, how it has changed, or what drives it today. The main 
brunt of the material consists of individual cases – not patterns of disputing 
behavior. Case analysis, for all its intrigue, gives one very little sense of the size, 
scope, frequency and impact of litigation generally. Clearly, however, corporate 
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litigation is important, and not just because it involves vast sums of money. 
Corporate conflict is important because it tells us a lot about the social frictions 
what our most important business actors face, and how they are resolved, if at all.  
 
At present, there is very little reliable data, and that which does exist in 
painstaking to collate in any meaningful sense. In the literature review, I relied 
greatly on the work of the Wisconsin Business Disputing Group led by Marc 
Galanter, Thomas Palay, Terence Dunworth and Joel Rogers. This group is one of 
the few to systematically inquire into the patterns of litigation of the Fortune 
1000. Apart from this, very little has been written about the political-economy of 
the corporate litigation system, let alone the segment of the arbitration system 
serving corporations. Much more could be written about corporate litigation, and 
even more could be written about corporate arbitration. This dissertation merely 
scratched the surface of the multi-billion dollar industry for business disputes. 
Given the increasing importance of such conflict – especially in high-impact areas 
like natural resources, defense, and intellectual property, future research could 
seek to shed light on the profitability of private dispute resolution markets.  
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There is clearly an aura intrigue surrounding commercial arbitrators themselves. 
For the most part, they come across as extraordinarily articulate and learned legal 
practitioners whose judgment is well worth the money that they charge their 
clients. Intrigue and “virtue” is one thing, but what do arbitrators get paid, how 
much money do the arbitration services offered by private service providers and 
the major law firms generate, and what are the determinants of competition and 
change in the sector? Other areas of the professions, like medicine, are intensively 
studied. But we still lack any meaningful body of knowledge, especially 
quantitative knowledge, of the arbitration profession. Future research could zone-
in on these aspects of commercial arbitration. 
 
Apart from these very significant empirical deficits, there is also a lack of 
meaningful arbitration theory. Most of what passes for arbitration theory is in fact 
appraisal of arbitration and ADR values. A lot of arbitration scholarship is in fact 
written by arbitration practitioners whom, it would appear, have a strong interest 
in promoting it. This dissertation sought to take arbitration theory seriously, and 
by way of immanent critique, to shed light on its limits. The language of 
contractualism that is at the heart of arbitration law needs to be subject to greater 
scrutiny. What good are contracts without a governing body of law to enforce 
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them, and then again, without a system of oversight to ensure that they are 
enforced in accordance with meaningful principles. These statements cannot be 
taken for granted or at face value. It cannot merely be assumed that arbitration is 
in fact an expression of liberal principles of contract. More work needs to be done 
on the substantive content of arbitral justice, and to analyze that content in 
relation to traditional conceptions of justice.  
 
Finally, this dissertation showed how development in U.S arbitration law cannot 
be disassociated from the international arbitration system. Too many studies treat 
these systems as discretely separate spheres than have no bearing on one another. 
In reality, the boundaries of these respective systems are far more porous and 
fluid that one might expect, especially given the routine way in which they are 
usually separated.  
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